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Abstract
Trade can be an important driver of economic development, and Aid for Trade – an 
initiative launched by the WTO in 2005 – aims to assist developing countries to ben-
efit from the opportunities arising from trade liberalisation. This desk study answers 
several evaluative questions related to the policy reorientation undertaken by the 
German Federal Ministry for Cooperation and Development (BMZ). The empirical 
analysis is based on policy papers, project documents and data retrieved from the 
OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System as well as discussions with representatives 
from BMZ and the implementing agencies of German development cooperation.
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1.
Background, objectives, and methodology
The Aid for Trade (AfT) initiative, launched at the Sixth 
World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in 
Hong Kong in 2005, aims to support developing countries 
in realising potential welfare gains from trade liberalisation 
and to compensate them for disadvantages arising from the 
implementation of trade agreements. The precise definition, 
nature and value added of AfT have been fiercely discussed: 
AfT is neither a new global development fund nor a new aid 
category. Instead, it is broad in scope and forms an integral 
part of a wide variety of regular Official Development Assis-
tance (ODA) programmes.
Based on its AfT concept, which was published in 2011, 
Germany has put considerable effort into implementing the 
AfT initiative within its development cooperation structures. 
Germany is one of the three leading donor countries in terms 
of total AfT disbursements; the other two are Japan and the 
USA. Because of the volume of German AfT and the continuing 
debate on AfT’s effectiveness, it seems appropriate to review 
the implementation of the AfT approach now that almost a 
decade has passed since the launch of the initiative. 
There has not been an in-depth reassessment of German AfT 
since a study carried out by Petra Voionmaa and Michael Brün-
trup in 2009 and the publication of the Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) AfT concept 
in 2011. This desk study aims to fill this gap by reviewing and 
assessing almost ten years of German AfT support. There is 
an overarching interest in learning about the current state 
of German AfT implemented by Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, Kreditanstalt 
für Wiederaufbau (KfW), National Metrology Institute (PTB), 
Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft (DEG) 
mbH, and the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural 
Resources (BGR). In addition, this study will examine the role 
of the BMZ AfT concept in steering these activities. 
The German Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval) 
conducted this study from October 2013 to August 2014. By 
documenting the German approach and portfolio over the 
whole array of aid categories, German development cooper-
ation may use the findings of this study to further refine its 
approach to AfT. 
The specific objectives of the study were
 • to assess whether the current German approach to AfT 
is adequate in terms of its targets and its conceptual and 
organisational setup, and
 • to provide an overview of the portfolio of trade-related 
projects in order to assess whether AfT has been adequate-
ly mainstreamed as stipulated in the BMZ AfT concept. 
From these objectives, the following set of research questions 
was derived:
Research question 1. In comparison with other donors’ AfT 
strategies, does the BMZ concept paper appropriately reflect 
the state of the art of international AfT discussions?
Research question 2. Has AfT been successfully mainstreamed 
in BMZ priority area, sector and country concept papers? 
Research question 3. Does the German AfT portfolio reflect 
the strategic priorities defined in the BMZ AfT concept?
To methodologically reduce the complexity inherent in the 
broad definition of AfT across several sectors and aid modal-
ities, this study particularly addresses AfT after 2008, when 
it began to be divided into narrow and broad AfT. Narrow AfT 
(Trade Related Assistance – TRA) comprises aid categories 
with specific trade relevance, while broad AfT focuses on 
creating the enabling conditions for countries to engage in 
trade (in particular productive capacities and trade-related 
infrastructure). 
The following methods were applied: 
 • document analysis, 
 • comprehensive literature review, 
 • statistical analysis of OECD Creditor Reporting System data 
and data lists provided by German executing agencies.
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2.
Conclusions and recommendations
For those who expect a fully-fledged assessment of the current 
state of German AfT, a word of caution is in order: A desk 
study can only offer limited insights into issues as complex and 
broad as AfT. The quality of the data analysed suffers from a 
number of limitations caused by the broad scope of the topic 
and more specific challenges related to monitoring AfT and 
especially TRA. That being said, the following conclusions and 
recommendations can be drawn in relation to the study’s three 
research questions. 
Research question 1: In comparison with other donors’ AfT 
strategies, does the BMZ concept paper appropriately reflect 
the state of the art of international discussions about AfT?
Conclusion: Overall, the BMZ AfT concept clearly reflects the 
main focus of the discussions during the AfT initiative’s early 
years. In line with international practice, AfT was incorporated 
into German development cooperation through the “soft” 
means of mainstreaming, i.e. through awareness raising and 
persuasion rather than by creating a separate priority area 
devoted to trade. When it was written, therefore, the BMZ 
AfT concept was an appropriate tool. However, compared to 
other donors’ current AfT strategies, it appears very consen-
sus-based and, to some extent, lacking in focus, firm objectives 
and indicators. It would therefore benefit from a revision, 
which would also offer the opportunity to reflect on the 
inclusion of current topics such as green and inclusive growth, 
social standards, investment and coherence between trade 
and development policies. 
Recommendation 1: Consulting recent AfT strategies of donor 
countries such as Finland could help to identify a suitable 
approach for specifying goals and outcomes of German AfT in 
greater detail. 
Recommendation 2: BMZ should place stronger emphasis 
on the integration of green and inclusive growth issues into 
its AfT concept, as this is a highly relevant topic in German 
development cooperation.
Recommendation 3: Germany should follow the example of 
other European donors and explore and take advantage of the 
potential synergies between domestic trade and trade-related 
development. Furthermore, highlighting the importance of 
trade promotion for German companies and for the develop-
ment of partner countries would help raise awareness of the 
AfT initiative. Existing trade policy instruments such as the 
Import Promotion Desk should be integrated into the German 
AfT approach.
Recommendation 4: At present, the BMZ AfT concept gives 
little consideration to the general (regulatory) frameworks for 
increasing foreign direct investment (e.g. intellectual property 
rights, contract enforcement, red tape), mentioning foreign 
direct investment only in relation to local enterprises’ com-
petitiveness. Despite or due to the sensitivity of large-scale 
foreign investment in terms of land grabbing and environmen-
tal impacts, for example, the issue deserves more attention 
and could potentially multiply the impact of aid interventions.
Research question 2: Has AfT been successfully mainstreamed 
into BMZ’s priority area, sector and country concept papers? 
Conclusion: More recent BMZ country strategies incorporate 
the trade dimension in an appropriate manner, even though 
they rarely use the term AfT. Likewise, trade issues have 
successfully been mainstreamed into thematic and priority 
area BMZ papers covering private sector-related issues. By 
contrast, recent BMZ strategy papers on agriculture tend to 
disregard trade issues, even though the documents analysed 
were published quite recently.
Recommendation 5: BMZ should start an internal discussion on 
the potential contributions of regional and international trade 
to agricultural development, including food security. 
Research question 3: Does the German AfT portfolio reflect the 
strategic priorities defined in the BMZ AfT concept?
Conclusion: OECD Creditor Reporting System data confirms 
that Germany is one of the most important bilateral AfT 
donors. However, no clear trend in AfT or TRA numbers could 
be identified since funding sharply fluctuated over the period 
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under investigation. For example, AfT disbursements rose 
substantially between 2008 and 2010, followed by a sharp 
decrease since 2010 due to fluctuations in loans for trade-re-
lated infrastructure. Similarly, TRA first rose to its highest 
value (USD 835 million) in 2009 before falling to as low as USD 
587 million in 2012. These fluctuations hint at a low degree 
of steerability of German AfT and especially TRA. They both 
tend to “happen” instead of being deliberately deployed. Some 
related challenges are outside of BMZ’s control: International 
rules for monitoring TRA were defined only after the birth 
of AfT and, hence, have evolved over time. Moreover, they 
remain ambiguous. Steering AfT in the wide sense is even 
more challenging: It covers a wide range of activities – from 
economic policies to infrastructure and productive capacities 
– that make up almost one fifth of German ODA. The AfT 
initiative is only one of many determinants impacting the scale 
of these activities.
However, other factors are within the scope of BMZ’s influ-
ence: For example, German executing agencies apply the trade 
development marker incoherently, which leads to an unstable 
financial volume of Trade Related Assistance. Since German 
executing agencies cannot rely on precise internationally or 
nationally agreed rules for interpreting the trade development 
marker, each executing agency seems to have developed its 
own specific approach, with negative repercussions for the 
comparability and predictability of Trade Related Assistance 
numbers. 
Recommendation 6: BMZ should improve its guidance and su-
pervision of executing agencies with regard to the application 
of the trade development marker. The thematic team “Trade 
and Sustainability” should be revitalised for this purpose. 
Conclusion: For the four AfT priority areas stipulated in BMZ’s 
AfT concept, only partial conclusions can be drawn without 
further field based studies. While trade facilitation does not 
seem – at least statistically –to have received the attention it 
deserves, the picture certainly looks more positive in the case 
of regional integration. As the National Metrology Institute 
(PTB) has succeeded in scaling up its portfolio since the launch 
of AfT in 2005, the third priority area – quality infrastructure 
– also appears to have been strengthened. Due to its scale, it 
is proving difficult to make a similar observation for the fourth 
area, which comprises regional and global value chains and 
other ways of incorporating the potential of export markets 
into measures to develop productive capacities. However, the 
examination of GIZ and KfW project documentation could 
not confirm a trend towards increased emphasis on trading 
opportunities in projects which support agricultural or sustain-
able economic development. While domestic value chains are 
often part of project implementation, the same cannot be said 
of regional and global value chains. This finding suggests that 
the purpose of this (more ambitious) fourth priority area has 
not been achieved.
Recommendation 7: BMZ should realign or adjust its priority 
areas in German AfT. 
Conclusion: The TRA pledge of EUR 220 million per year 
starting in 2010, which was stipulated in the AfT concept , 
was easily met with an average of EUR 515 million per year 
between 2008 and 2012. Interestingly, this pledge would have 
almost been reached with GIZ contributions alone. This raises 
the question whether the German TRA pledge was ambitious 
enough. Of course, the German pledge was derived from a 
European Union commitment which was made without proper 
knowledge of past Trade Related Assistance levels. This led 
to surprisingly high TRA levels in subsequent monitoring 
exercises, with no need for additional funding in order to fulfil 
the pledge. TRA numbers were also boosted by internationally 
agreed monitoring rules, especially with the decision to assign 
100 percent of TD-1 (trade development marker = 1) project val-
ues to TRA. As a result, all the often large-scale and therefore 
expensive TD-1 projects are counted as TRA, even though only 
a small proportion of them is linked to trade. 
Recommendation 8: These monitoring practices underline the 
need not to confine any AfT analysis to aid statistics alone 
but instead, to look more closely at project design in order 
to identify the AfT initiative’s real value added. That can only 
be created if trade is continuously taken into account in all 
relevant projects – either as project indicators or at least as an 
element of project design.
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1  GIZ manages the Monterrey Fund on behalf of BMZ (http://www.giz.de/fachexpertise/html/5696.html, last accessed 25 September 2014). 
Conclusion: An analysis of a sample of GIZ and KfW project 
documentation revealed that taking trade into account in all 
relevant projects seems to be a challenge for both executing 
agencies, with the exception of some recent GIZ projects, 
which are more specifically devoted to trade. In particular, 
agricultural projects offer obvious entry points which were 
rarely exploited. 
Recommendation 9: BMZ should ensure that the executing 
agencies make use of these entry points in the future. This 
is even more necessary considering the extensive practice 
of attributing TD-1 and the effects this has on German Trade 
Related Assistance statistics, given that 100 percent of any 
TD-1 project are counted as Trade Related Assistance.
Conclusion: Knowledge and awareness of AfT and, more gen-
erally, of trade are limited. A considerable number of staff posi-
tions in GIZ’s Competence Centre Economic Policy and Private 
Sector Development are devoted to trade. While synergies 
between the different sections of this Competence Centre are 
being exploited on a daily basis, the sector programme, where 
the staff with more specific trade expertise can be found, is 
not directly involved in the design or implementation of most 
GIZ projects. The same is true of BMZ’s Trade-related Devel-
opment Cooperation division (411), which is only occasionally 
concerned with AfT projects since trade is only one of the 
many topics within its sphere of responsibility. 
Recommendation 10: If trade issues should receive more 
attention within German development cooperation, BMZ’s 
and the executing agencies’ trade-related capacities would 
have to increase. Although BMZ cannot directly interfere with 
the executing agencies’ staffing decisions, it should encourage 
them to build up expertise on trade issues by commissioning 
more projects with a focus on trade aspects. At the same time, 
the Ministry should emphasise that AfT is not a short-term 
trend but a strategic component of German development 
policy. 
Conclusion: With regard to knowledge management, it became 
apparent during the collection of data for this review that little 
information is available on the overall German AfT portfolio 
and on specific projects, and that the information that is 
available is not collected centrally or widely known. 
Recommendation 11: To provide up-to-date data on German 
AfT, the Trade Related Assistance portfolio and more qual-
itative information on trade-related projects, German AfT 
reviews – in two-year-cycles – could prove effective. Ideally, 
they would be linked to international AfT events such as the 
AfT Global Review. This type of review would contribute to 
raising awareness, both within and outside BMZ. To facilitate 
the writing of the reviews, portfolio figures should be drawn 
from BMZ’s internal DASY database, facilitating direct 
comparison between the portfolios of technical and financial 
cooperation. 
Conclusion: So far, AfT has been incorporated into German 
development cooperation through “soft” mainstreaming, 
including awareness raising and persuasion. However, this 
approach has only been partially successful. Alternative 
strategies would entail the launching of trade as a priority area 
of its own, or as a special initiative or fund. In fact, a special 
fund for trade – the Monterrey Fund 1 – already exists within 
BMZ. After some years with only limited funding, BMZ decided 
to increase its budget for 2015. 
Recommendation 12: The expansion of the Monterrey Fund in 
2015 will highlight AfT by initiating and testing new activities 
that specifically focus on trade. After initial funding through 
the Monterrey Fund, these activities should ideally be rolled 
out as integral parts of German development programmes in 
a second step, thus avoiding the creation of isolated solutions 
which are only weakly coordinated with other German 
activities. This approach will, instead, support and reinforce 
the general mainstreaming of German AfT.
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1.
Hintergrund, Ziele und methodisches Vorgehen
Die Aid for Trade (AfT) Initiative wurde 2005 bei der sechsten 
Ministerkonferenz der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) in 
Hong Kong ins Leben gerufen. Sie soll Entwicklungsländer 
dabei unterstützen, potenzielle Wohlfahrtsgewinne aus 
der Handelsliberalisierung zu erzielen, und sie für Verluste 
kompensieren, die sie durch die Umsetzung von Handelsab-
kommen erleiden. Die genaue Definition, die Eigenschaften 
und der Mehrwert von AfT – also von handelsbezogener 
Entwicklungspolitik – werden seit Beginn der Initiative heftig 
diskutiert: Fest steht, dass AfT weder einen neuen globalen 
Entwicklungsfonds noch eine neue Art der Entwicklungs-
zusammenarbeit (EZ) darstellt. Vielmehr ist AfT ein sehr 
breit angelegtes Instrument und ein fester Bestandteil vieler 
Programme der öffentlichen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit 
(ODA). 
Deutschland hat erhebliche Anstrengungen unternommen, 
die AfT Initiative in seine EZ zu integrieren. Als Grundlage 
hierfür diente das 2011 veröffentlichte übersektorale Konzept 
„Aid for Trade (AfT) – Handelsbezogene Entwicklungspolitik“ 
des Bundesministeriums für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit 
und Entwicklung (BMZ). Neben Japan und den USA gehört 
Deutschland zu den drei größten AfT-Geberländern. Wegen 
des hohen Finanzvolumens der deutschen AfT und der 
anhaltenden Debatten über die Effektivität von AfT scheint 
es nun – fast ein Jahrzehnt nach dem Start der Initiative – an 
der Zeit, die bisherige Umsetzung von AfT in der deutschen 
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zu untersuchen. 
Bislang widmeten sich tiefergreifend nur das AfT-Konzept 
des BMZ und eine Studie von Petra Voionmaa und Michael 
Brüntrup aus dem Jahr 2009 dem deutschen AfT Ansatz. Die 
vorliegende Studie soll diese Lücke schließen, indem sie fast 
zehn Jahre deutsche AfT analysiert und bewertet. Es besteht 
ein übergreifendes Interesse daran, mehr über die deutsche 
AfT-Unterstützung zu erfahren, die von der Deutschen 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), der 
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), der Physikalisch-
Technischen Bundesanstalt (PTB), der Deutschen Investitions- 
und Entwicklungsgesellschaft (DEG) und der Bundesanstalt 
für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (BGR) umgesetzt wird. 
Zudem untersucht diese Studie, wie das AfT-Konzept des BMZ 
die Ausrichtung der deutschen handelsbezogenen Entwick-
lungspolitik vorgibt.
Das Deutsche Evaluierungsinstitut der Entwicklungszusam-
menarbeit (DEval) erstellte diese Studie von Oktober 2013 
bis August 2014. Die deutsche EZ kann die Ergebnisse dieser 
Studie inklusive der Darstellung des deutschen Ansatzes und 
der Informationen zum Portfolio der einzelnen AfT-Kategorien 
nutzen, um den deutschen AfT-Ansatz weiterzuentwickeln und 
zu spezifizieren. 
Das Ziel der Studie war es,
 • zu bewerten, ob der gegenwärtige deutsche AfT-Ansatz in 
Bezug auf seine Ziele, seine konzeptionelle Basis und seine 
Umsetzungsstrukturen in sich schlüssig ist, und
 • einen Überblick über das AfT-Portfolio zu geben, um zu 
bewerten, ob AfT – wie im AfT Konzept des BMZ vorgese-
hen – durch Mainstreaming erfolgreich in der deutschen EZ 
verankert wurde. 
Aus diesen Zielen ergeben sich die folgenden 
Forschungsfragen:
Forschungsfrage 1. Spiegelt das AfT-Konzept des BMZ im 
Vergleich zu den Strategien anderer Geber die internationalen 
Diskussionen zu AfT in geeigneter Weise wider?
Forschungsfrage 2. War das Mainstreaming von AfT in BMZ-
Schwerpunktstrategien und Sektor- und Länderkonzepte 
erfolgreich?
Forschungsfrage 3. Spiegelt das deutsche AfT-Portfolio die 
strategischen Schwerpunkte des AfT-Konzepts wider?
Um für diese Untersuchung die Komplexität zu reduzieren, 
die mit der breiten Definition des Themas AfT und dessen 
Reichweite über mehrere Sektoren und EZ-Modalitäten 
einhergeht, konzentriert sich die Studie zeitlich auf die Jahre 
nach 2008. Seitdem wird zwischen enger und weiter AfT unter-
schieden. AfT im engeren Sinne (Trade Related Assistance 
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– TRA) umfasst EZ-Kategorien mit konkreter Handelsrelevanz, 
während AfT im weiteren Sinne darauf abzielt, günstige 
Rahmenbedingungen für internationalen Handel zu schaffen 
(vor allem hinsichtlich produktiver Kapazitäten und handelsre-
levanter Infrastruktur). 
Die folgenden Methoden wurden in der Studie angewandt: 
 • Dokumentenanalyse, 
 • umfassende Literaturübersicht,
 • statistische Analyse von Daten des OECD Creditor Report-
ing Systems und der von den Durchführungsorganisationen 
der deutschen EZ bereitgestellten Projektlisten. 
2.
Schlussfolgerungen und Empfehlungen
All jene, die hier eine umfassende Untersuchung der aktuellen 
deutschen AfT erwarten, seien vorgewarnt: Eine Schreibtisch-
studie kann nur begrenzt Einblicke in ein so komplexes Thema 
wie AfT liefern. Die Qualität der analysierten Daten weist eine 
Reihe von Einschränkungen auf, die aus dem breiten Ansatz 
des Themas und aus den besonderen Herausforderungen beim 
Monitoring von AfT und insbesondere von TRA resultieren. 
Dennoch können folgende Schlussfolgerungen und Empfeh-
lungen hinsichtlich der drei Forschungsfragen festgehalten 
werden:
Forschungsfrage 1. Spiegelt das AfT-Konzept des BMZ im 
Vergleich zu den Strategien anderer Geber die internationalen 
Diskussionen zu AfT in geeigneter Weise wider?
Schlussfolgerung: Insgesamt spiegelt das BMZ AfT Konzept die 
Diskussionen der Anfangsjahre der AfT Initiative gut wider. 
Nach internationalem Vorbild verankerte das BMZ AfT durch 
„weiches“ Mainstreaming in der deutschen EZ, also durch 
Bewusstseinsbildung und Überzeugungsarbeit, anstatt einen 
eigenständigen Handelsschwerpunkts zu schaffen. Damit war 
das AfT-Konzept des BMZ zum Zeitpunkt seiner Entstehung 
ein geeignetes Instrument. Heute erscheint es allerdings im 
Vergleich zu den aktuellen Strategien anderer Geber äußerst 
konsensorientiert und lässt zu einem gewissen Grad eine 
klare Fokussierung sowie eindeutige Ziele und Indikatoren 
vermissen. Eine Überarbeitung wäre daher wünschenswert. Sie 
würde auch die Gelegenheit bieten, die Aufnahme aktueller 
Themen wie nachhaltiges und integratives Wachstum, soziale 
Standards, Investitionen und die Kohärenz von Handels- und 
Entwicklungspolitik in das Konzept zu erwägen. 
Empfehlung 1: Neuere AfT-Strategien anderer Geberländer wie 
Finnland sollten zurate gezogen werden, um einen angemes-
senen Ansatz für die detaillierte Spezifizierung von Zielen und 
intendierten Wirkungen (Outcomes) der deutschen AfT zu 
entwickeln.
Empfehlung 2: In einem überarbeiteten AfT-Konzept sollte das 
BMZ nachhaltiges und integratives Wachstum stärker betonen, 
weil dies ein für die deutsche EZ relevantes Thema ist. 
Empfehlung 3: Deutschland sollte dem Beispiel anderer euro-
päischer Geber folgen und die möglichen Synergien zwischen 
Handels- und Entwicklungspolitik erörtern und nutzen. Auch 
sollte es verstärkt auf die Bedeutung der Handelsförderung 
– sowohl für die Entwicklung der Partnerländer als auch für 
deutsche Unternehmen – hinweisen und damit das Bewusst-
heit für die AfT Initiative stärken. Darüber hinaus sollten 
existierende Instrumente der Handelsförderung wie etwa 
der Import Promotion Desk in die deutsche AfT eingebunden 
werden. 
Empfehlung 4: Das AfT-Konzept des BMZ berücksichtigt kaum 
die allgemeinen (ordnungspolitischen) Rahmenbedingungen 
für die Steigerung von ausländischen Direktinvestitionen 
(z.B. geistiges Eigentumsrecht, Vertragsdurchsetzung und 
bürokratische Vorgaben), sondern erwähnt diese nur im 
Zusammenhang mit der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit lokaler 
Unternehmen. Trotz oder gerade wegen der hohen Sensibilität 
großer ausländischer Investitionen (zum Beispiel im Hinblick 
auf ihre ökologischen Folgen und Landraub) sollte das Thema 
in einem überarbeiteten AfT-Konzept mehr Beachtung finden. 
Dies könnte auch die Wirkung von EZ-Vorhaben erhöhen. 
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Forschungsfrage 2. War das Mainstreaming von AfT in BMZ-
Schwerpunktstrategien sowie Sektor-, und Länderkonzepte 
erfolgreich?
Schlussfolgerung: Vor allem BMZ-Länderkonzepte jüngeren 
Datums berücksichtigen Handelsaspekte in angemessener 
Weise, auch wenn der Begriff AfT selten auftaucht. Auch in 
BMZ-Sektorkonzepten und Schwerpunktstrategien, die die 
Förderung der Privatwirtschaft thematisieren, wurde das 
Thema „Handel“ erfolgreich verankert. Im Gegensatz dazu 
berücksichtigen die Konzepte des BMZ zu landwirtschaftlichen 
Themen Handelsaspekte tendenziell weniger, obwohl die 
analysierten Dokumente erst vor kurzem verfasst wurden. 
Empfehlung 5: Das BMZ sollte intern diskutieren, inwiefern 
regionaler und internationaler Handel zu landwirtschaftlicher 
Entwicklung und Ernährungssicherheit beitragen können. 
Forschungsfrage 3. Spiegelt das deutsche AfT Portfolio die 
strategischen Schwerpunkte des BMZ AfT Konzepts wider?
Schlussfolgerung: Daten aus dem OECD Creditor Reporting 
System belegen, dass Deutschland eines der wichtigsten 
bilateralen Geberländer von AfT ist. Allerdings lässt sich kein 
klarer Trend der deutschen AfT- und TRA-Ausgaben erkennen, 
da diese im Betrachtungszeitraum stark schwankten. Zum 
Beispiel nahmen Ausgaben für AfT zwischen 2008 und 2010 
erheblich zu, bevor sie wegen Kreditschwankungen für 
handelsbezogene Infrastruktur nach 2010 deutlich fielen. TRA 
stieg ebenfalls auf das höchste Niveau (835 Millionen USD) im 
Jahr 2009 und fiel 2012 dann auf nur 587 Millionen USD. Diese 
Schwankungen weisen auch auf eine geringe Steuerbarkeit 
der deutschen AfT und vor allem der TRA hin. Beide scheinen 
eher zu „geschehen“ als dass sie bewusst eingesetzt werden. 
Die Gründe dafür liegen teilweise nicht im Einflussbereich des 
BMZ: Internationale Monitoringregeln für TRA wurden erst 
nach dem Beginn der AfT Initiative definiert, wurden daher 
mit der Zeit geändert und sind weiterhin schwammig und 
unklar. Noch größere Herausforderungen bestehen allerdings 
bei der Steuerung von AfT im weiteren Sinne: Es umfasst ein 
breites Spektrum an EZ-Themen – von der Wirtschaftspolitik 
über Infrastruktur bis hin zu produktiven Kapazitäten – und 
damit fast ein Fünftel der deutschen ODA. Die AfT Initiative 
ist dabei nur einer von vielen Faktoren, die den Umfang dieser 
Aktivitäten beeinflussen. 
Andere Faktoren, die zu den großen Schwankungen beitragen, 
liegen jedoch im Einflussbereich des BMZ. Zum Beispiel 
wenden die Durchführungsorganisationen den Handelsmarker 
uneinheitlich an, was zu instabilen TRA-Zahlen führt. Da sich 
die deutschen Durchführungsorganisationen nicht auf genau 
definierte nationale Regeln zur Anwendung des Handelsmar-
kers stützen können, scheint jede Durchführungsorganisation 
ihren eigenen Ansatz entwickelt zu haben. Dies wirkt sich 
negativ auf die Vergleichbarkeit und die Planbarkeit der 
TRA-Zahlen aus. 
Empfehlung 6: Das BMZ sollte die Durchführungsorganisatio-
nen hinsichtlich der Anwendung des Handelsmarkers stärker 
lenken und vermehrt überprüfen. Hierfür sollte das Themen-
team Handel und Nachhaltigkeit wieder aktiviert werden. 
Schlussfolgerung: Für die vier im BMZ AfT Konzept definierten 
thematischen Schwerpunkte können – ohne weitere feldba-
sierte Studien – nur teilweise Schlussfolgerungen gezogen 
werden. Während der Bereich Handelserleichterung – zumin-
dest laut statistischer Auswertung der ODA-Daten – nicht 
die ihm zustehende Aufmerksamkeit bekommen hat, scheint 
das Thema Regionalintegration angemessen im Portfolio 
repräsentiert zu sein. Auch der dritte Bereich – Qualitätsinfra-
struktur – erscheint durch die Erhöhung des Portfolios der PTB 
seit Beginn der AfT Initiative gestärkt. Aufgrund der großen 
Reichweite des vierten Schwerpunktbereichs ist es schwierig, 
hier eine ähnlich positive Aussage zu treffen. Der Bereich 
umfasst regionale und globale Wertschöpfungsketten und 
andere Möglichkeiten, um Exportmärkte in die Entwicklung 
von produktiven Kapazitäten einzubinden. Die Analyse von 
GIZ- und KfW-Projektdokumenten ergab keinen Hinweis auf 
eine verstärkte Berücksichtigung von Handel in Projekten 
zu landwirtschaftlicher Entwicklung oder nachhaltiger 
Wirtschaftsentwicklung. Während Projekte oftmals heimische 
Wertschöpfungsketten fördern, berücksichtigen sie nur selten 
regionale und globale Wertschöpfungsketten. Diese Beobach-
tung lässt vermuten, dass das Ziel dieses vierten (ambitionier-
teren) Schwerpunkts nicht erreicht wurde.
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Empfehlung 7: Das BMZ sollte seine AfT-Schwerpunkte neu 
ausrichten oder anpassen. 
Schlussfolgerung: Deutschland konnte seine im AfT-Konzept 
festgelegte TRA-Verpflichtung über 220 Millionen Euro 
pro Jahr ab 2010 leicht erfüllen und leistete zwischen 2008 
und 2012 jährlich durchschnittlich 515 Millionen Euro TRA. 
Interessanterweise hätte die GIZ schon fast allein diese 
Verpflichtung erfüllen können. Dies wirft die Frage auf, ob 
die Zielgröße von 220 Millionen Euro jährlich ambitioniert 
genug war. Deutschland leitete seine TRA- Verpflichtung von 
einer auf EU-Ebene getroffenen Zusage ab, der keine genaue 
Analyse bisheriger TRA-Zahlen zugrunde lag. Das führte in den 
darauffolgenden Monitoring-Runden zu überraschend hohen 
TRA-Flüssen, sodass keine weiteren Mittel notwendig waren, 
um die Verpflichtung zu erfüllen. Hinzu kommt, dass internati-
onale Monitoringregeln und dabei vor allem die Entscheidung, 
die Projektwerte von TD-1-Projekten (Handelsmarker = 1) zu 
100 % als TRA zu zählen, die TRA-Zahlen künstlich aufgebläh-
ten. Dadurch werden oft sehr breit angelegte TD-1-Projekte 
mit entsprechend großem Mittelvolumen komplett als TRA 
gezählt, auch wenn nur ein kleiner Teil des Projekts wirklich 
handelsrelevant ist. 
Empfehlung 8: Diese Monitoringmethoden unterstreichen 
die Notwendigkeit, eine Analyse von AfT nicht alleine auf die 
Auswertung von Statistiken zu stützen, sondern die Inhalte 
der Projekte genau zu betrachten. Nur so lässt sich der reale 
Mehrwert der AfT Initiative ermitteln, der allerdings nur 
dann geschaffen werden kann, wenn Handel kontinuierlich in 
allen relevanten Projekten berücksichtigt wird – entweder als 
Projektindikator oder zumindest als Teil des Projektdesigns. 
Schlussfolgerung: Die Analyse einer Stichprobe von GIZ- und 
KfW-Projektdokumenten zeigte, dass es für die Durchfüh-
rungsorganisationen eine große Herausforderung darstellt, 
handelsrelevante Aspekte in allen entsprechenden Projekten 
zu berücksichtigen. Vor allem Landwirtschaftsprojekte bieten 
dafür deutliche Ansatzpunkte, die jedoch nur selten genutzt 
werden. Eine Ausnahme bilden einige neuere GIZ-Projekte, die 
speziell auf Handelsthemen ausgerichtet sind.
Empfehlung 9: Das BMZ sollte sicherstellen, dass die 
Durchführungsorganisationen solche Anknüpfungspunkte 
für Handel in Zukunft nutzen. Das erscheint wegen der 
verbreiteten Zuweisung von TD-1 und deren Auswirkungen auf 
deutsche TRA-Zahlen umso notwendiger, da ja alle mit TD-1 
gekennzeichnet Projekte vollständig zu TRA gezählt werden. 
Schlussfolgerung: Das Wissen über und Bekanntheit von AfT 
und Handel im Allgemeinen sind begrenzt. Eine beachtliche 
Anzahl von Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern im GIZ-
Kompetenzcenter Wirtschaftspolitik und Privatwirtschafts-
entwicklung beschäftigt sich mit Handelsthemen. Während 
Synergieeffekte zwischen den verschiedenen Einheiten dieses 
Kompetenzcenters im Arbeitsalltag genutzt werden, ist das 
Sektorvorhaben, in dem die Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter 
mit einer größeren Handelsexpertise angesiedelt sind, nicht 
direkt in die Konzipierung / Planung und Durchführung von 
AfT-Projekten involviert. Das gleiche trifft für das BMZ-Referat 
411 (Handelsbezogene Entwicklungszusammenarbeit) zu, das 
sich nur gelegentlich mit AfT-Projekten befasst, da Handel nur 
eines von vielen Themen in seinem Verantwortungsbereich 
darstellt. 
Empfehlung 10: Sollen Handelsthemen mehr Aufmerksamkeit 
in der deutschen EZ erlangen, wären entsprechend verstärkte 
Kapazitäten im BMZ und in den Durchführungsorganisationen 
notwendig. Obwohl das BMZ nicht direkt in Personalentschei-
dungen der Durchführungsorganisationen eingreifen kann, 
sollte es diese dazu ermutigen, Handelsexpertise aufzubauen 
– etwa indem es mehr Projekte mit einem Handelsschwer-
punkt beauftragt. Gleichzeitig sollte das Ministerium betonen, 
dass AfT kein vorübergehender politischer Trend ist, sondern 
ein strategischer Bestandteil der deutschen EZ. 
Schlussfolgerung: Bei der Zusammenstellung der für die Desk 
Studie benötigten Daten zeigte sich, dass nur wenig Infor-
mationen zum gesamten AfT-Portfolio und zu spezifischen 
AfT-Projekten verfügbar sind und diese weder zentral verwal-
tet werden noch generell bekannt sind. 
Empfehlung 11: Um aktuelle Daten zur deutschen AfT, 
zum TRA-Portfolio und weitere qualitative Informationen 
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bereitzustellen, wäre es nützlich, alle zwei Jahre AfT-Reviews 
durchzuführen. Diese würden idealerweise an internationale 
AfT-Veranstaltungen wie den AfT Global Review gekoppelt sein 
und könnten die Bekanntheit von AfT innerhalb und außer-
halb des BMZ erhöhen. Um das Verfassen solcher Reviews 
zu erleichtern und um einen direkten Vergleich zwischen 
Portfolios der technischen und finanziellen Zusammenarbeit 
zu ermöglichen, sollten die Portfolio-Daten direkt aus dem 
BMZ- internen DASY Datensystem gezogen werden können. 
Schlussfolgerung: Bisher wurde AfT durch „weiches“ Main-
streaming in die deutsche EZ eingebunden, etwa durch 
Bewusstseinsbildung und Überzeugungsarbeit. Dieser Ansatz 
war jedoch nur teilweise erfolgreich. Als alternative Strategien 
käme etwa in Frage, einen eigenständigen Schwerpunktbereich 
aufzulegen oder eine Sonderinitiative oder einen Sonderfonds 
zu etablieren. Im BMZ gibt es mit dem Monterrey Fonds2 
bereits einen Sonderfonds zu Handel. Nach einigen Jahren mit 
begrenztem Finanzvolumen hat das BMZ entschieden, dessen 
Budget für 2015 zu erhöhen. 
Empfehlung 12: Mit der Ausweitung des Monterrey Fonds 
im Jahr 2015 bietet sich die Gelegenheit, neue Aktivitäten 
mit einem klaren Handelsfokus anzustoßen und damit die 
Bedeutung von AfT zu unterstreichen. Nach anfänglicher 
Finanzierung durch den Monterrey Fonds sollten diese 
Aktivitäten in einem zweiten Schritt idealerweise als feste 
Bestandteile deutscher EZ-Programme weitergeführt werden. 
Dieses Vorgehen würde Insellösungen verhindern, die nur 
schwach mit anderen deutschen Aktivitäten verknüpft wären. 
Zudem könnte es das Mainstreaming von AfT unterstützen 
und verstärken. 
2 GIZ implementiert den Monterrey Fonds für das BMZ (http://www.giz.de/fachexpertise/html/5696.html, letzter Zugriff am 25. September, 2014).
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I
nternational trade has sharply increased over the past two 
decades. Trade is believed to play an important role in 
reducing poverty and, hence, in achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) through its potential contri-
bution to inclusive growth and employment (e.g. Hayashikawa, 
2009). However, trade liberalisation does not automatically 
lead to such positive effects. Instead, it has to be fostered 
by proactive national policies and supported through global 
framework conditions that are conducive to pro-poor trade in 
developing countries (e.g. McCulloch, Winters, & Cirera, 2001).
Since the 1940s, several rounds of multilateral trade 
negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) and later the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
achieved a substantial reduction in tariffs and other trade 
barriers in large parts of the world. However, these measures 
did not yield the expected positive results in many developing 
countries. Negotiating parties became increasingly aware of 
the importance of assisting these countries in making the 
most of trade agreements. As early as 1961, the Declaration 
of the Contracting Parties noted the necessity to promote 
production and marketing in developing countries. This 
acknowledgment was followed by the creation of the UN 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the 
International Trade Centre (ITC) three years later. 
During the 1980s, the trade agenda gained further momentum 
in developing countries because of the (highly contentious) 
attempts by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank to integrate the developing world into the 
global economy through liberalisation of trade-related and 
other policies. However, during the 1990s, these multilateral 
institutions refocused their strategy towards the implementa-
tion of national poverty reduction programmes. This resulted 
in a shift of development resources from trade, agriculture and 
infrastructure to education, health and public expenditure.
Trade as an important driver of economic growth has regained 
recognition since the launch of the WTO Doha Development 
Round in 2001 and, in particular, since the birth of the Aid for 
Trade (AfT) concept at the 2005 WTO Ministerial Conference 
in Hong Kong. This new initiative aims to support developing 
countries in realising potential welfare gains from trade 
liberalisation and to compensate them for disadvantages 
arising from the implementation of trade agreements. By 
recognising the existence of such implementation challenges, 
WTO members admitted that a broad range of conditions need 
to be met for trade liberalisation to have positive effects on 
developing countries (BMZ, 2011, p. 3). 
The precise definition, nature and value added of AfT have 
been fiercely discussed from the very beginning of the 
initiative. AfT is neither a new global development fund nor 
a new aid category. Rather, it is broad in scope and forms an 
integral part of a wide variety of regular Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) programmes. In fact, at the launch of the 
AfT initiative, a task force had been commissioned to elaborate 
a definition of AfT. It issued recommendations specifying 
that “Aid for Trade is about assisting developing countries to 
increase exports of goods and services, to integrate into the 
multilateral trading system, and to benefit from liberalised 
trade and increased market access” (WTO, 2006). In addition, 
it defined six distinct AfT categories (see Box 1), with catego-
ries one and two constituting Trade Related Assistance (TRA) 
or AfT in the narrow sense, while categories one to six are 
referred to as AfT in the broad (or wide) sense. 
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Box 1. AfT categories
 • “Trade policy and regulations”, including: 
Training of trade officials, analysis of proposals and positions and their impact, support for national 
stakeholders to articulate commercial interests and identify trade-offs, dispute issues, institutional 
and technical support to facilitate implementation of trade agreements and to adapt to and comply 
with rules and standards
“Trade policy and 
regulations” and 
“Trade development” 
(categories 1 and 2) 
constitute Trade Related 
Assistance (TRA) or AfT 
in the narrow sense.
All six categories 
constitute AfT in the 
broad sense.
 • “Trade development”, including: 
Investment promotion, analysis and institutional support for trade in services, business support 
 services and institutions, public-private sector networking, e-commerce, trade finance, trade 
promotion, market analysis and development
 • “Trade-related infrastructure”, including:  
Physical infrastructure such as transport, storage, communication and energy
 • “Building productive capacity”, including: 
Same aspects as under category 2, but less trade-focused
 • “Trade-related adjustment”, including: 
Assisting developing countries to put in place accompanying measures that help them to benefit from liberalised trade
 • Other trade-related needs
Source: based on WTO (2006)
The task force also emphasised that “additional, predictable, 
sustainable and effective financing is fundamental for fulfilling 
the Aid-for-Trade mandate” (WTO, 2006), but left open the 
exact interpretation of the term “additional”. This created a 
controversy about what “additional” entails precisely (OECD & 
WTO, 2009a; Stiglitz & Charlton, 2006). Developing countries 
insisted on an increase in funding additional to the existing 0.7 
percent target through which donor countries had promised 
to devote 0.7 percent of their Gross National Income (GNI) to 
ODA. By contrast, donor countries considered the 0.7 percent 
ODA pledge ample to accommodate AfT. 
Apart from the discussion on additionality, the approach for 
defining and measuring AfT funding has aroused suspicion: 
Some authors (e.g. Hallaert, 2013) argue that donor countries 
have an interest in defining AfT as broadly as possible to prove 
successful resource mobilisation. However, in the view of 
many developing countries, this further reduces the value of 
the AfT initiative. A considerable share of AfT and TRA funding 
reported by donors has, indeed, resulted from new interna-
tional monitoring rules through which trade-related activities 
were suddenly more thoroughly identified and reported 
(Voionmaa & Brüntrup, 2009). 
Disregarding its exact value in terms of additional funding, 
the AfT initiative has certainly led to some reorientation of 
development cooperation towards trade. But donors have 
not only committed some (limited) fresh funding; they 
have also reassessed their approaches for designing and 
implementing trade-related activities and formulated specific 
AfT donor strategies in order to improve the quality of these 
interventions.
1.1
Aim of the study and research questions
Based on its AfT concept, which was published in 2011 (BMZ, 
2011), Germany has put considerable effort into implementing 
the AfT initiative within its development cooperation struc-
tures. Germany is one of the three leading donor countries 
in terms of total AfT disbursements; the other two are Japan 
and the USA.3 Because of the volume of German AfT and the 
continuing debate on AfT’s effectiveness (e.g. Cadot et al., 
3  However, if total AfT disbursements are considered as a percentage of gross national income (GNI), Germany falls behind other donor countries such as Finland or the United Kingdom, but is listed 
ahead of the USA and Japan. 
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2014), it seems appropriate to review the implementation of 
the AfT approach now that almost a decade has passed since 
the launch of the initiative.
This desk study aims to inform the German Federal Ministry 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and 
German executing agencies about the development of 
German AfT since 2005, and to identify lessons learned, which 
may be useful when outlining Germany’s future approach to 
AfT. It is the first in-depth reassessment of German AfT since a 
study carried out by Petra Voionmaa and Brüntrup (2009) and 
the first comprehensive summary of the German AfT portfolio 
since the formulation of the BMZ AfT concept in 2011.
The first objective of this study is to assess whether the 
current German approach to AfT is adequate in terms of 
its targets and its conceptual and organisational setup. It 
also aims to provide an overview of the executing agencies’ 
portfolio of trade-related projects in order to assess whether 
AfT has been adequately mainstreamed as stipulated in the 
BMZ’s AfT concept. 
From these objectives, a set of research questions was derived:
1. In comparison with other donors’ AfT strategies, does the 
BMZ concept paper appropriately reflect the state of the 
art of international discussions on AfT (see Chapter 3)? 
2. Has AfT been successfully mainstreamed into BMZ priority 
area, sector and country strategy papers (see Chapter 4)? 
3. Does the German AfT portfolio reflect the priorities 
defined in the BMZ AfT concept (see Chapter 5)?
In addition, recommendations for shaping the future German 
AfT approach are formulated based on the findings of the 
study (see Chapter 6). 
1.2
Data and methodology
This study was conducted as a desk review based on available 
quantitative and qualitative data. Face-to-face discussions 
took place with Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 
(KfW) and Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB) and 
telephone calls were made with Deutsche Investitions- und 
Entwicklungsgesellschaft (DEG), Bundesanstalt für Rohstoffe 
und Geowissenschaften (BGR), and the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which mainly 
dealt with the organisation’s approaches and procedures for 
implementing and reporting AfT projects (see Chapter 5). In 
addition, the research drew upon the following methodologi-
cal approaches and data sources:
Box 2. Data sources applied to research questions
Data sources /questions Question 1 Question 2 Question 3
AfT evaluations and studies   
Donor AfT strategies   
BMZ concept papers   
AfT datasets from OECD CRS 
AfT project lists provided by German executing agencies 
GIZ and KfW project documentation 
AfT evaluations and studies
Recent AfT evaluations and related studies were analysed in 
order to provide a comprehensive overview of the current 
state of AfT research and evaluations and to inform the 
design of this study. All documents were thoroughly examined 
and summarised in a literature review. While there was no 
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ambition to be all-encompassing, the analysis includes, to 
the evaluation team’s best available knowledge, all recent 
donor-level evaluations relevant to this study (see Chapter 
2). These 12 evaluations and studies are listed in the Annex, 
Table 6. 
Donor AfT strategies 
An in-depth examination of the BMZ AfT concept – the main 
paper defining the German approach to AfT – serves as a start-
ing point for this study. As one core element of the analysis, 
the programme logic underlying the BMZ AfT concept was 
reconstructed. This was done only for Trade Related Assis-
tance, hence the narrow definition of AfT, since only this part 
specifically relates to international trade. The reconstruction 
drew upon the structure and content of the BMZ AfT concept, 
and the semantic links between its elements such as specific 
sentences. It proved difficult to distinguish between activities, 
outputs, outcomes, and impacts, because these terms are 
used in the AfT concept in a rather undifferentiated manner. 
Therefore, this analysis referred to other sources (e.g. OECD, 
2013) in order to identify these elements. 
In addition, a comparison with six AfT strategies of interna-
tional donors puts the German AfT concept into an interna-
tional context and highlights similarities and differences. A 
simple text analysis addressed the documents’ main focal 
areas in terms of content and approaches (see Section 3.3).4 
BMZ concept papers
In order to assess the degree to which AfT has been main-
streamed throughout BMZ policies, a number of its concept 
papers were analysed (see Chapter 4): 
 • seven BMZ thematic concept papers published since 20065,
 • seven BMZ country strategy papers published since 2006 
addressing the country samples of this study (see the 
selection of the country sample in Box 3 at the end of this 
chapter), and
 • nine priority area strategies published since 2008. 
Partner countries’ national development strategies were also 
reviewed in order to find out whether the trade focus of BMZ 
country strategy papers and priority area strategies correlates 
with the ownership of AfT demonstrated by partner countries. 
The analysis was carried out as a comprehensive desk review. 
A list of documents analysed can be found in the Annex, 
Tables 7 (BMZ thematic strategies), 8 (BMZ country strategy 
papers and priority area strategies), and 9 (partner country 
strategies). 
AfT datasets and project lists
Different sets of AfT data were examined: First, publicly availa-
ble OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) data for the period 
2008 – 2012 was used.6 No CRS data from before 2008 was 
analysed since the trade development marker (TD), necessary 
to delineate TRA from AfT in general, was only introduced in 
that year (see Section 5.1). The OECD CRS database includes 
comprehensive information on each AfT project, including 
project title, sector, country, starting year, disbursements by 
year, and TD (from 2008). This database lists more than 7,000 
German AfT projects between 2008 and 2012. 
One note of caution: BMZ funding accounts for only 54 
percent of total German ODA (OECD, 2010). The CRS data on 
German ODA discussed in this study is provided not only by 
BMZ but also by other ministries and by the German federal 
states (Länder). As a consequence, there may be an upward 
bias in the data compared to AfT disbursements by BMZ only. 
In addition to CRS data, lists of trade-relevant AfT projects 
were provided by all major German executing agencies which 
implement AfT as part of Germany’s financial cooperation 
(KfW: 356 projects) and technical cooperation (GIZ: 819 
projects, PTB: 39 projects, and BGR: 25 projects).7 DEG also 
provided information, but only aggregated figures on annual 
AfT disbursements. Time periods and definitions of trade-relat-
ed projects tend to differ from one organisation to another (for 
further information on the datasets, see Section 5.2). However, 
project lists include similar information (variables) such as 
4  It was decided to limit the analysis to six donor strategies due to time constraints and their specific relevance to the German strategy.
5  The AfT initiative was launched in December 2005. It is therefore assumed that AfT is reflected in policy papers dating from 2006 and later.
6  Available at: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=CRS1# (last accessed October 2014). 
7  While the information about the AfT portfolios of executing agencies should theoretically be available via the BMZ internal database (DASY), the evaluators did not have access to this database and 
therefore gathered the data separately from each executing agency.
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BMZ project number, country, time period, project name, 
sector, TD, and financial volume. Based on these project lists 
and the data retrieved from the CRS database, a descriptive 
analysis using the statistical software Stata was conducted to 
provide a comprehensive overview of Germany’s AfT support. 
GIZ and KfW project documentation
The executing agencies’ project lists described above provide 
only fairly general information which does not allow conclu-
sions to be drawn about the content and the actual trade focus 
of projects. Hence, in a second step, documents of projects 
implemented in the selected twelve partner countries (see Box 
3) were examined. 
GIZ provided project documentation for seven countries (see 
Section 5.2.2) and KfW for twelve countries (see Section 5.2.4). 
All documents were thoroughly analysed in a comprehensive 
desk review.
Box 3. Selection of the country sample
The selection of a country sample for the analysis 
undertaken in Chapters 4 and 5 was necessary to limit the 
enormous number of projects falling within the definition 
of AfT and TRA. The sampling process was applied to the 
three largest datasets (OECD CRS, GIZ, KfW) and the 
following sampling procedure was applied:
In a first step, countries were selected according to five 
criteria: 
1. Total Trade Related Assistance (TRA) disbursements  
(in USD million)
2. Number of TRA projects
3. Share of TRA disbursements in German ODA
4. Per capita AfT disbursements
5. The share of AfT disbursements in Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP)
The emphasis of the first three criteria lies on TRA (the 
narrow definition of AfT). These criteria aim to identify 
countries with clearly trade-relevant projects (as opposed 
to projects only included in the wider definition of AfT 
which do not directly deal with trade matters). However, 
total AfT forms the basis of criteria 4 and 5 since TRA 
flows proved too small to obtain a meaningful result there. 
Since the sample should be derived from a typical country 
selection, outlier countries are not considered as part of 
the selection; Afghanistan, Iraq and the BRICS countries 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) are therefore 
excluded.8 This should lead to more stable mean values of 
the overall sample. 
These five portfolio criteria were applied to data retrieved 
from the OECD CRS database and to the project lists 
provided by GIZ and KfW. It was assumed that a country 
would meet a criterion if its number or share was equal or 
larger than the mean across all countries.9 The number of 
achieved criteria was then summed up for each country. 
All 42 countries with a total score equal to or higher than 
three achieved criteria (higher than two for KfW data10) 
are listed in the Annex, Table 4. In a second step, countries 
were matched with BMZ priority areas relevant to AfT.11
Countries listed in at least two of the three databases 
(see Annex Table 4) and featuring an AfT-relevant BMZ 
priority area were preselected (20 countries). After further 
discussion, it was decided to focus on countries in Asia 
and Africa, which are priority regions of German AfT. All 
European and South American countries were therefore 
dropped from the sample. Conflict-affected countries and 
petroleum-exporting countries (Mali, Nigeria, the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip) were also omitted. The following 
twelve countries constitute the final sample (earlier 
approaches to the country selection are presented in the 
Annex, Table 5).
8  Outlier countries are defined as specific recipient countries (Afghanistan, Iraq) or large and fast-growing countries (BRICS). 
9  In a first step, only countries above the mean were taken into consideration. However, due to a small sample selection, countries at the mean were included too.
10  Setting the benchmark at a score higher than three in the KfW project list excludes Georgia, Namibia, Rwanda and Uganda. However, OECD CRS data and GIZ project lists reveal that three of 
these four countries are highly relevant to German AfT support. To increase the possible sample for further in-depth study, the benchmark of KfW data was set at the lower benchmark of two. 
11  Relevant areas for AfT include sustainable economic development, agriculture and rural development, sustainable resource management, and transport. The German priority areas in specific 
countries can be found on the BMZ website: http://www.bmz.de/en/what_we_do/countries_regions/index.html.
1.  |  Introduction 10
Table 1. Country selection based on OECD CRS, and KfW and GIZ project lists12
LDC LMIC Other LIC UMIC
Asia Laos, Nepal Mongolia Tajikistan
Africa Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Senegal, Uganda, Rwanda Ghana Namibia
Source: authors’ own calculations based on OECD CRS data and project information provided by GIZ and KfW, 2014
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The 
second chapter outlines recent donor evaluations on AfT, their 
main results, methodology, indicators, and limitations. The 
BMZ strategy on AfT is described and its programme logic 
is reconstructed and compared with other donor strategies 
on AfT in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 examines the success of AfT 
mainstreaming efforts within BMZ, e.g. through an analysis 
of various BMZ sector strategies. Chapter 5 describes the 
German AfT portfolio on the basis of aid statistics and project 
documentation. Chapter 6 briefly summarises the main results 
and makes recommendations.
12  As a robustness check for the country selection, the evaluation team added co-financed projects in the portfolio implemented by GIZ (91 projects), and trade-related projects commissioned by donor 
institutions other than BMZ in the case of the KfW portfolio (62 projects). As the country selection does not change, the evaluation team believes that this selection is representative of German AfT 
support.
2.
LITERATURE OVERVIEW: 
RECENT DONOR LEVEL 
EVALUATIONS AND RELATED 
STUDIES ON AFT
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V
arious AfT evaluations and related studies were 
recently carried out, each with a slightly different 
focus. The high volumes of ODA attributed to AfT 
and the much-debated linkages between trade 
liberalisation and poverty are some of the reasons which 
motivate such research. The methods and approaches applied 
provide insights into the state of the art in analysing AfT which 
formed a valuable basis for designing and carrying out the 
desk study at hand. 
Apart from donor-level evaluations, there are also aggregate / 
cross-country studies with a strong quantitative focus on 
econometric relations and project- or programme-level evalua-
tions. However, this section focuses exclusively on donor-level 
evaluations, because this study deals with AfT provided by 
Germany as one particular donor. 
Evaluations at the level of an entire donor portfolio and related 
studies are usually less quantitative compared to aggregate 
macro level studies and strongly focus on the country and in-
stitutional context. They typically apply a broader perspective, 
covering different sectors, country case studies, instruments 
and dependent variables (OECD & WTO, 2013). In contrast to 
project-level studies, donor evaluations do not focus on only 
one specific project or group of projects, but attempt to assess 
all AfT activities funded by one donor. 
Among the limitations of donor level evaluations is the lack of 
attention sometimes paid to the recipient country perspective, 
for example with regard to the effectiveness of service and 
delivery mechanisms. Furthermore, the analysis is largely 
carried out at individual project and programme level and 
cannot aggregate results on a country, regional or thematic 
level (OECD & WTO, 2013).
Donors that have commissioned such portfolio evaluations 
include Norway (Lindahl, 2011), Sweden (Goppers & Lindahl, 
2009), Finland (Bird, Turner, Rovamaa, Suokko, & Gathii, 2011), 
Switzerland (Finkel, Roloff, & Koopmann, 2013), the European 
Union (EU, 2013), and the United States (Hageboeck, 2011). 
Some of their findings and limitations are described below. 
The studies examined can be classified by the methodology 
used: desk reviews, country case studies and meta-evaluation. 
Some evaluations can be ascribed to several groups, which will 
be marked accordingly.
a) Desk reviews
Lindahl (2011) analysed the experience and results of Norwe-
gian support for TRA through multilateral organisations from 
2007 to 2010. The study was undertaken as a desk review, 
using existing reports and evaluations on AfT of nine multilat-
eral organisations. It discovered a vast discrepancy between 
the perception and reality of Norway’s role in delivering AfT. 
Norway could have a higher profile and visibility in trade 
development than is currently the case, because it is one of 
the main donors channelling funds through multilaterals. 
Furthermore, Lindahl found that surprisingly few evaluations 
on AfT focus on multilateral organisations. However, the study 
shows certain limitations in that it does not cover bilateral 
assistance, and although it proposes evaluation criteria, it does 
not develop evaluation indicators. 
The Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) at the 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducted a first assess-
ment of Dutch Trade-related Technical Assistance (TRTA) in 
2005 (IOB, 2005). It was conducted as a desk study, but also 
includes some field review elements on Burkina Faso, Tanza-
nia, Ethiopia and Yemen. The evaluation mostly concentrates 
on multilateral programmes in AfT category 1 (TPR; see Box 
1). When the study was written, Dutch technical assistance 
was mostly channelled through multilaterals. This raised the 
question whether the private or the public sector was more 
efficient and effective in delivering technical assistance. The 
authors observed that the design and implementation of TRTA 
activities pay too little attention to formulating and using 
measurable indicators. Furthermore, single-issue organisations 
were regarded as more transparent and efficient in delivering 
TRTA than large agencies. Since 2004, there has been a policy 
change in the Netherlands towards more bilateral support. 
There is also more emphasis on the role of international value 
chains, the Dutch private sector and foreign direct investment. 
Since 2012, “Aid and Trade” has been at the heart of Dutch 
policy and has been the responsibility of the Ministry for Trade 
and Development Cooperation. 
13 Literature overview: recent donor level evaluations and related studies on AfT  |  2.
13  Switzerland is one of the few countries where trade is a sector in its own right.
A desk study by Ingram (2006) illustrates the evolution of 
trade assistance provided by the World Bank from 1987 to 
2004. The World Bank is the largest multilateral provider of 
AfT. It reviews trade-related interventions in several countries 
through interviews and surveys with key stakeholders. The 
study focuses on the relevance and effectiveness of the World 
Bank’s trade assistance and examines its strategies and ob-
jectives. One of the results shows that more attention should 
have been paid to strengthening analytical tools, processes 
and systematic interactions in delivering trade assistance. 
Evaluation indicators used are only stated in general terms, 
while the study focuses on inputs, outputs, outcomes, and 
impacts. 
The evaluation of TRA carried out on behalf of the European 
Commission (2013) between 2004 and 2010 draws its findings 
from eleven country and three regional case studies. Eight of 
them involved field research in partner countries. The objec-
tive was to undertake a general and independent assessment 
of the EU’s TRA and to identify key lessons in order to improve 
TRA strategies and programmes. The study offers ten detailed 
findings, including the observation that the expanded EU TRA 
portfolio enables the EU to engage successfully and relevantly 
in diverse contexts. Furthermore, the authors consider the 
EU AfT strategy to be successful in supporting harmonisation 
and alignment among EU member states, although a certain 
weakening of this momentum had been observed. 
The Swiss AfT evaluation analyses the strategic, programmatic 
and portfolio levels of Swiss support from 2002 to 2012 (Finkel 
et al., 2013). The authors conducted country case studies in 
Viet Nam and Peru and interviews with stakeholders and 
beneficiaries. They found that the Swiss decision to establish 
trade as one separate priority area within its development co-
operation system13 had proved to be successful. On a negative 
note, they concluded that project quality varies significantly 
and that project monitoring remains a challenge due to the 
wide range of available monitoring models. 
In the case of Finland, Bird et al. (2011) provided an in-depth 
analysis of the Finnish AfT strategy. They chose 34 projects 
to draw an overall picture of Finland’s AfT. The sample was 
selected based on the availability of project documentation 
and the study covers the main areas of Finland’s AfT by 
sectors, topics and geographical focus. The authors undertook 
a comprehensive literature review and conducted interviews in 
the selected countries (Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, Laos, Thai-
land and Viet Nam) and with EU / multilateral organisations. 
The authors found that the “lack of conceptual clarification of 
AfT reduces the scope to promote cohesiveness and com-
plementarities among projects / programmes in collectively 
achieving trade-related performance targets at the outcome 
level” (p. 35). They also observed that AfT was fragmented into 
many different interventions and that there was no adequate 
inclusion of cross-cutting issues. The analysis was largely 
undertaken at the level of individual projects and programmes. 
Indicators were extensively defined and mostly focused on 
DAC evaluation criteria and on project design, but without 
attempting to measure impacts. The indicators are described 
in more general and qualitative terms such as “Evidence on 
any special Finnish features in promoting […] AfT” (p. 149). 
b) Case studies 
Goppers and Lindahl (2009) analysed 20 ongoing or complet-
ed Swedish TRA projects in Tanzania and Uganda undertaken 
since 2001. The study’s focus is on Sida’s larger TRA projects, 
covering the categories of Trade policy and regulations (TPR), 
Trade development, and Trade-related infrastructure (TRI).The 
findings show, among other things, that the TRA project out-
comes in terms of reaching their development objectives were 
unclear. Only one of the TRA projects reviewed appeared to 
have contributed to Sida’s overriding objective, the reduction 
of poverty (p. 9). Results chains could not be tested empirically 
due to problems of attribution and counterfactuals. 
The evaluation of the Trade Capacity Building (TCB) activities 
undertaken by the United States Agency for International De-
velopment (USAID) (Hageboeck, 2011) examines 256 projects 
and uses a vast array of methods such as quantitative econo-
metric modelling and e-surveys among USAID staff. The study 
aimed to examine results and impacts of TCB to learn from 
experience and to improve the design and implementation of 
such activities. Overall, the evaluation concludes that USAID 
has contributed substantially to global trade. The authors stat-
ed that it is essential to work towards more competitive public 
and private sector practices simultaneously. The evaluators 
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encountered a number of difficulties, e.g. in locating project 
documentation, and found errors in connecting annual funding 
entries to multi-year projects. While the study uses evaluation 
questions and criteria, it only applied programme indicators 
and did not develop indicators specifically for the evaluation. 
Khatun, Hossain, and Dewan (2013) carried out an evaluation 
for the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Devel-
opment (ICTSD). They tested the methodology matrix on AfT 
funds trajectory, ownership, alignment, coordination among 
donors, south-south cooperation, partner country limitations 
in absorptive capacities, coherence with environmental 
sustainability, and impact at the macro and micro level (see 
Adhikari (2011)). The findings based on eight country case stud-
ies show that AfT is most effective when it is predictable and 
additional and well mainstreamed into national development 
strategies with a high degree of ownership by the partner 
country. The evaluation also revealed a lack of awareness 
regarding the concept and practice of AfT. 
The evaluation of Japanese AfT by Yamagata (2012) includes 
two case studies in the focus countries, i.e. Laos and Viet 
Nam. The objective was to assess whether AfT could enhance 
productivity and reduce poverty. Unfortunately, the evaluation 
(at least in its English version) is weak in explaining results 
and offers only general statements on positive findings on 
consistency and effectiveness of Japanese AfT support. 
c) Meta-evaluation
Delpeuch et al. conducted a meta-evaluation of 162 evalua-
tions of projects in the transport and storage sectors in Ghana 
and Viet Nam via keyword search (Delpeuch, Jouanjean, Le 
Vernoy, Messerlin, and Orliac (2011)). The authors assessed 
whether these evaluations offer useful information for policy 
makers and proposed evaluation guidelines. Their results 
show that these evaluations do not say much about trade and 
are mostly vague and ill-focused, and that the identification 
of causal linkages is not possible. The authors cited some 
exemplary indicators that were used in the evaluations. 
To conclude, since the launch of the AfT initiative in 2005, AfT 
has become an important component of donors’ development 
cooperation. Several donors have evaluated their AfT support 
in fully-fledged evaluations, often including comprehensive 
country case studies. Some of the studies provide essential 
lessons for assessing German AfT, e.g. Bird et al. (2011) and 
Finkel et al. (2013) through their in-depth analyses of the 
Finnish and Swiss AfT strategies. The EU evaluation illustrates 
the broader historical setting of EU AfT, which has served as 
a major reference point for German AfT. Furthermore, several 
evaluations offer crucial insights into the reconstruction 
of their programme logic (e.g. EU, 2013; Finkel et al., 2013; 
Hageboeck, 2011; Ingram, 2006). Khatun et al. (2013) feature a 
detailed list of possible elements, indicators and information 
sources for analysing the effectiveness of AfT. In addition, 
results of the 2009 German Development Institute (DIE) study 
on German AfT provide helpful insights into the status of AfT 
in Germany before the introduction of the BMZ concept paper 
on AfT in 2011 (Voionmaa & Brüntrup, 2009). 
The overall impression from the evaluations is that much 
can still be done to improve donor countries’ AfT strategies, 
outcomes, and impact definition and indicators. Furthermore, 
several studies mention a lack of awareness among poli-
cy-makers and executing agencies of a concept which, at the 
time, was still relatively new. An important recommendation 
from these studies is that the private sector should be closely 
involved in AfT due to the obvious synergy effects. 
The structure of this study is largely determined by the ap-
proach taken in the evaluations and studies described above, 
specifically the desk reviews. For instance, both the German 
AfT concept and its portfolio will be examined. To a large 
extent, the conclusions are comparable to those of the other 
donor-level reviews of AfT, showing that the BMZ AfT concept 
poses similar challenges as other donors’ strategies.
3.
THE BMZ STRATEGY 
ON AID FOR TRADE
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T
he BMZ publication “Aid for Trade in German De-
velopment Policy” (BMZ, 2011) published in August 
2011 is the single official document guiding the 
design and implementation of AfT within German 
development cooperation.14 It is therefore the starting point 
for assessing the success of anchoring AfT within the German 
aid system. 
This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the content 
of this document, known as the “BMZ AfT concept” (in its 
English version). It deconstructs and reconnects the strategy’s 
different elements in order to reconstruct a programme 
logic (see Sections 3.1 and 3.2). In Section 3.3, various other 
donor strategies are briefly described and compared with the 
German approach with a view to enhancing our knowledge of 
the theoretical AfT frameworks used in various contexts and 
countries. 
3.1
Approach and contents 
As part of a regular exchange of AfT-related information 
among OECD countries, BMZ stated in 2009 that “internal 
procedures and steering instruments will be adapted with 
the aim of integrating AfT more systematically in planning, 
designing, implementing, evaluating and steering German 
sector strategies, programmes and projects” (OECD & WTO, 
2009b). The BMZ AfT concept was designed as the main tool 
for achieving this goal by increasing the awareness of trade 
both within BMZ and among German executing agencies. 
It was elaborated based on the findings of a study that 
had analysed past experience and best practice of German 
trade-related development cooperation to 2008 (Voionmaa & 
Brüntrup, 2009). The EU strategy on AfT (EU, 2007) served as a 
second important reference document.
As mentioned above, one of the primary purposes of the 
BMZ AfT concept was to anchor AfT firmly within German 
development cooperation. However, it was commonly feared 
that creating a new priority area (“Sektor”) for trade with 
stand-alone trade projects would fragment the German aid 
system and undermine the general tendency towards more 
comprehensive programming (Voionmaa & Brüntrup, 2009, p. 
102). For that reason, it was decided early on that trade should 
be mainstreamed by integrating it as a cross-cutting issue 
within the existing BMZ priority areas.15 Against this backdrop, 
this section determines the role and relevance of the BMZ AfT 
concept.
In its Section 1, the AfT concept broadly outlines the context 
and history of the AfT initiative and describes the role of AfT 
in achieving the MDGs. An entire paragraph is devoted to the 
interaction between trade and climate change, pointing to 
backing for this topic within BMZ during the drafting of the 
paper. 
Section 2 identifies a number of potential opportunities and 
constraints (“possible bottlenecks”) to trade. It highlights 
that a political commitment to gradual reform is required to 
tackle these bottlenecks. This is where – according to the AfT 
concept – AfT comes in: It supports such reforms as accompa-
nying development policy measures. This section repeatedly 
emphasises the regional dimension. Regional economic 
integration is mentioned both in the discussion of the poten-
tial opportunities and challenges of trade, demonstrating the 
importance of this topic to German development cooperation.
Section 3 specifies the priority goal of German AfT: “… to assist 
partner countries in successfully integrating themselves into 
the global economic system and regional economic commu-
nities, diversifying their economies and exports and using 
trade in goods and services and foreign direct investment to 
more effectively reduce poverty in the context of sustainable 
development” (BMZ, 2011, p. 6). Selected cross-cutting policy 
areas are mentioned: gender, environment, human rights, 
biodiversity and food security. Interestingly, climate change, to 
which a special paragraph is devoted in Section 1, is no longer 
included.
Section 4 outlines Germany’s financial commitment. At the 
launch of the WTO AfT initiative in 2005, the European Union 
(EU) had pledged to spend two billion euros per year on TRA, 
starting from 2010, with one billion euros coming from the 
European Commission and one billion from its member states. 
14  Within BMZ, the Trade-related Development Cooperation division (411) was the lead division in this context.
15  Most donor countries have pursued a similar approach, with Switzerland being one of the few exceptions (see Section 3.3 of this study). 
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Germany assumed that its share in the EU pledge should be 
as high as its contribution to the EU budget: about 22 percent. 
This financial commitment was incorporated into the BMZ AfT 
concept: BMZ promised to spend at least 220 million euros 
annually from 2010 on TRA (i.e. AfT in the narrow sense), in 
proportion to the growth in overall ODA. The reference to 
overall ODA increases was included in anticipation of concerns 
about possible negative effects of the AfT initiative on ODA 
allocations to social and other non-economic sectors. By 
linking AfT to overall ODA increases, it was at least formally 
ensured that AfT increases would not be to the detriment of 
other forms of ODA.
A geographic focus is brought in by earmarking half of the 
increase in TRA for the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
Group of States, particularly sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Hence, 
SSA is to some extent at the centre of German AfT. 
The same section includes a description of the main German 
activities carried out so far in the four main AfT categories: 
With regard to “Trade policy and regulations”, it is stated that 
Germany “employed a multi-level approach which focuses 
primarily on strengthening national and regional negotiation 
and implementation capacities and developing and imple-
menting environmental, social and technical standards” (BMZ, 
2011, p. 7). “Trade development” is described as the “priority” 
of German TRA. In this area, “trade-related institutions and 
implementation actors are enabled to strengthen the regional 
and international competitiveness of local companies and ag-
ricultural producers” (BMZ, 2011, p. 7). “Building productive ca-
pacity” entails “strengthening more efficient and socially and 
ecologically sustainable production structures and enhancing 
the competitiveness of productive sectors” (ibid.). While the 
AfT concept also identifies Trade-related infrastructure as a 
“key bottleneck in the practical functioning of trade” (BMZ, 
2011, p. 8), no specific German AfT approach is described. This 
rather brief discussion of Trade-related infrastructure might 
result from the rather minor role played by this AfT category in 
German development cooperation.
The core of the document is the discussion of the future 
direction of German AfT in Section 5. Four new priority 
areas are identified, which should guide future German AfT 
interventions: 
1. regional economic integration and the negotiation and 
implementation of Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs), 
2. trade facilitation, 
3. quality infrastructure, and 
4. regional and international value chains in agricultural and 
non-agricultural sectors and other ways of incorporating 
the potential of export markets into measures for develop-
ing productive capacities. 
In addition, BMZ commits to supporting its partner countries 
in integrating trade into their national policies, to pursuing an 
effective division of labour and coordination among donors 
and among German executing agencies, and to strengthening 
the results orientation and efficacy of the measures. 
All in all, the BMZ AfT concept corresponds to its role as a 
mainstreaming instrument. Some parts lack a clear focus and 
appear to be the result of several rounds of revisions within 
the Ministry, especially the extensive description of past AfT 
approaches in Section 4. The discussion of future priority 
areas could have benefited from greater clarity. This vagueness 
may be due to the role of the AfT concept as a mainstreaming 
tool. Since it was decided not to create a separate BMZ 
priority area for trade, AfT had to be integrated into existing 
areas. This required a rather flexible approach focused on 
awareness raising and persuasion. The BMZ AfT concept was 
not intended to lay out detailed directions for designing and 
implementing AfT but to raise the profile of AfT in-house 
and among executing agencies by “soft” means.16 It could be 
argued that this strategic consideration justifies its somewhat 
vague language. At the same time, it runs the risk of turning 
AfT in merely another cross-cutting topic that has to be taken 
into consideration when designing a project. The following 
sections of this paper shed more light on these questions by 
looking at the success of the German approach to anchoring 
trade firmly within development cooperation.
16  The concept uses more specific wording only once, in Section 5, where it states that “the activities of the implementing agencies will be directed more explicitly at trade issues and effects in the 
future…” (BMZ, 2011, p. 12). 
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3.2
Reconstruction of the programme logic
A programme logic17 links inputs, outputs and outcomes to 
expected impacts and can be used to describe and map the 
expected changes generated by an intervention. However, it 
does not usually specify the underlying mechanisms that are 
presumed to be responsible for these linkages.18 The existence 
of a clearly defined programme logic (or a similar concept) 
simplifies evaluations since it provides a description of the pol-
icy-maker’s intention against which the results achieved can 
be assessed. Hence, it constitutes an important benchmark for 
measuring success.
In the case of AfT, it is rather difficult to design and follow 
a programme logic because AfT covers a broad variety of 
interventions.19 As mentioned above, the BMZ AfT concept 
was not intended to give binding instructions. Hence, the 
definition of a specific programme logic or a similar framework 
may not have been deemed necessary or relevant. As a result, 
the BMZ AfT concept is written as a relative vaguely formu-
lated narrative without an explicit programme logic. While it 
identifies the constraints to trade and the goals and activities 
of German AfT, the links between these elements are not 
spelled out. Moreover, the wording of the BMZ AfT concept is 
often not very specific, making it difficult to extract clear-cut 
conclusions and statements on the objectives of German AfT, 
for example. Terms as “goal”, “approach” and “objective” are 
used interchangeably. 
Nevertheless, the DEval team attempted to reconstruct the 
logic underlying the AfT concept retrospectively. For pragmatic 
reasons, the focus is on TRA, i.e. the two first categories of AfT, 
and the programme logic was therefore only reconstructed 
for these two categories, based on the structure of the 
BMZ AfT concept and the semantic links between specific 
elements within the document. However, as mentioned above, 
activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts could not clearly be 
distinguished as these terms appear in the AfT concept in a 
rather undifferentiated manner. Hence, guidance from other 
sources was used to identify activities and results20, primarily 
by cross-referencing the German strategy with AfT-related 
evaluations and guidelines from other donors and multilateral 
institutions (e.g. OECD, 2013). This approach seems acceptable, 
because AfT contains quite a number of common features 
among Western donors. 
The intervention logic thus derived was condensed in order to 
provide an overview of the German AfT’s strategic approach. 
It was decided to exclude individual activities, as mentioned 
in Section 4 of the AfT concept, since they are usually only 
presented as “examples”. Links between elements on each 
level are not depicted as they can rarely be inferred from the 
document. The reconstructed programme logic mainly reflects 
what can be regarded as the main goals of German AfT on 
the various levels of the results chain. Figure 1 presents this 
stylised programme logic.
On the left-hand side, the programme is classified into four 
areas: activities, intermediate outcomes, final outcomes and 
impacts. As mentioned above, this programme logic is only 
based on narrow AfT, i.e. on the first two categories of the 
WTO’s AfT definition (category 1: TPR and category 2: Trade 
development). 
At the activity level of the programme logic, the typical 
multi-level approach pursued in German development 
cooperation on the macro, meso and micro levels, which is 
also reflected in the AfT concept, was adopted. It is based on 
Section 4 of the AfT concept (p. 7ff) which describes German 
AfT activities in terms of four areas of support: 
1. “Advising secretariats and regional organisations on eco-
nomic and trade policy” (intergovernmental macro level), 
2. “Assistance of partner governments in formulating, nego-
tiating, and implementing trade policies and regulations” 
(national macro level), 
3. “Support of business-oriented trade promotion organisa-
tions, public institutions, and private sector organisations“ 
(meso level), and 
17  Similar concepts are regularly referred to as intervention logic, logical framework or results chains. For a more detailed discussion, see Vogel (2012).
18  By contrast, a programme theory is an explicit theory or model of how a programme causes outcomes (Leeuw, 2003).
19  As AfT experts from the OECD explained, donors never intended to develop an internationally agreed, joint programme logic for AfT. Instead, they articulated their wish to remain flexible when 
designing their own programme logic and not to be forced into a constitutional AfT corset. 
20  In line with the OECD DAC definitions, results refer to “output, outcome or impact (intended or unintended, positive and / or negative) of a development intervention”.
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4. “Helping Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and small-
scale farmers” (micro level). As the fifth area of support, 
the meso and micro level (“Measures for capacity develop-
ment in productive sectors” are included (p. 8, p. 11)).21
Regarding the outcome levels, the strategy specifies that AfT 
can “improve the partner countries’ capacity to trade and thus 
its trade performance” [emphasis added].22 Trade capacity is 
implicitly mentioned on several other occasions, for instance 
when referring to “strengthened (trade) negotiation capacities 
and capacities for (trade) policy design” (p. 6) and “assistance 
of partner governments in formulating, negotiating, and 
implementing trade policies and regulations” (p. 6). However, 
the BMZ AfT concept does not define the terms “trade 
performance” and “trade capacity” which are both rather 
vague concepts and have not been coherently applied in 
international discussions.23 
Trade capacity is usually considered to be a necessary (but 
not sufficient) precondition for trade performance since it 
potentially leads to improved trade performance in the form 
of rising export volumes, greater export and import diversi-
fication, increased value added of exports, higher firm-level 
productivity, and reduced rent-seeking.24 These two terms are 
located at two different levels of the programme logic: “trade 
capacity” at the level of intermediate outcome, and “trade 
performance” as “final outcomes”. While this is fairly straight-
forward, trade capacity building obviously aims to develop a 
range of very distinct features: 
 • public sector capacity with respect to trade policy strategis-
ing and implementation, resulting in enhanced political and 
administrative capacity (macro level), 
 • private sector capacity, in the very basic sense of export 
production or competitiveness against imported products 
(= firm or farm production capacity on the micro level), but 
also in the sense of being able to articulate private sector 
demand in trade negotiations (meso level), or 
 • compliance with international norms and standards. 
As can be seen in Figure 1, the DEval team was unable to re-
construct the BMZ intervention logic more meaningfully than 
by putting five building blocks of AfT capacity development 
of very different types next to each other at the same level of 
intermediate outcomes although this might not be the exact 
representation of what policymakers had originally intended.
Finally, like other donors, BMZ aims at poverty reduction and 
sustainable development in partner countries as the ultimate, 
overarching goals of its AfT concept. Therefore, these two 
terms feature, as “impacts” at the top of the programme logic. 
The reconstruction of the programme logic is a first attempt 
to restructure the expected activities, outcomes and impacts 
of German AfT. However, for a fully-fledged impact evaluation, 
the depth of this analysis would have to be significantly 
increased. For example, the programme logic reconstructed 
from the BMZ AfT concept could be complemented with a 
comprehensive examination of AfT project documentation 
in order to identify their underlying intervention logics. This 
complementary analysis could fill the currently rather abstract 
programme logic with more specific content and thus provide 
a better basis for an AfT impact evaluation.
21  In the BMZ AfT concept, this fifth area of support is listed under the meso level. However, the evaluation team believes that these capacity building measures are also relevant on the micro level. 
22  This understanding of the AfT programme logic is in line with the logical framework for assessing the AfT Initiative identified by OECD (2013) and Gamberoni and Newfarmer (2009).
23  For example, the WTO refers to trade capacity as the “human, institutional and infrastructural capacity to participate effectively in international trade”.
24  For example, Gamberoni and Newfarmer (2009) use five different measures to evaluate trade performance: (i) real growth of exports of goods and services, (ii) change in export market share of 
goods and services, (iii) changes in competitiveness in existing goods markets (change in market share), (iv) demand structure (geography and products) of exports (change in market share) and (v) 
index of export concentration. As other potential indicators, they mention FDI inflows (as % of GDP), real growth in total trade (%) and number of products exported / imported.
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25  The term “intervention logic” will be used here, as this is used in the EU evaluation. 
3.3
Comparison with other donors’ AfT strategies 
This section depicts the variety of approaches pursued 
by AfT donors, with a view to identifying similarities and 
differences as compared to the German approach. Due to 
time constraints, not all AfT donors’ strategies could be 
analysed. Instead, six AfT strategies of donors which recently 
evaluated their AfT support were selected (EU, Finland, United 
Kingdom, Switzerland, USA and Japan). The review focuses 
on their thematic and geographic priorities as compared to 
the German strategy, their approach to specific quantitative 
and qualitative benchmarks, the method of accommodating 
AfT in overall development cooperation and their underlying 
programme logic.
3.3.1 European Union
The EU Strategy on Aid for Trade (EU, 2007) organises its 
actions under five pillars: 
1. increasing the aggregate volumes of EU AfT within the 
ambitious development commitments to raise overall EU 
aid gradually, 
2. enhancing the pro-poor focus and quality of EU AfT, 
3. increasing EU-wide and member states’ donor capacity in 
line with globally agreed aid effectiveness principles, 
4. building upon, fostering and supporting ACP regional 
integration processes with an ACP-specific angle of the 
Joint EU AfT strategy, and 
5. supporting effective AfT monitoring and reporting.
Since the EU Strategy concerns not only the European 
Commission but also EU member states, it provides the 
groundwork for the German approach to AfT. Germany as a 
major EU member was closely involved in its formulation. BMZ 
actually regarded it as a main starting point for the formula-
tion of its own AfT concept. In that sense, the two documents 
can be expected to be highly consistent with each other. There 
is, indeed, a strong overlap in terms of wording and content of 
objectives (“eradication of poverty in the context of sustain-
able development“) and goals and approaches (in particular 
strengthening trade policy formulation and negation capaci-
ties). Both the BMZ concept paper’s qualitative commitments 
(especially the pledge on TRA) and geographic focus (ACP) are 
clearly derived from the EU Strategy. 
A recent evaluation (EU, 2013) reconstructed the intervention 
logic25 of EU support to TRA from 2004 to 2010. This exercise 
resulted in a complex figure (Figure 2) that gives an idea of the 
TRA focus areas implemented by the EU and of its intended 
results and impacts. 
The EU intervention logic covers TRA, hence the narrow defi-
nition of AfT, and Trade-related adjustment. It is formulated on 
the basis of five intervention areas: areas of EC support, global 
impact, results, specific impacts, and intermediate impacts. 
The first level, areas of EC support uses AfT-related CRS 
codes, for instance trade facilitation, trade finance, and trade 
negotiations. Results are formulated at the next level for these 
support areas. Interestingly, most “areas of EC [European Com-
munity] support” emphasise the macro level approach while 
the BMZ AfT concept encompasses all three levels (macro, 
meso, and micro). Results for trade facilitation and support 
to trade policy and administrative management include 
“trade policy formulation enhanced and mainstreamed” and 
“trade-related quality infrastructure improved” – topics which 
are also among the German AfT priority areas. 
These results are condensed into seven specific impacts and 
two intermediate impacts under the heading “deepened 
integration into the rules-based world trading system”. 
Generally, the EU intervention logic strongly focuses on 
regional integration as one of its main TRA support impacts. 
Results and impacts are not limited to quantitative aspects but 
also include qualitative elements (for example, “increased and 
diversified trade in goods and services”). 
As in the case of German AfT, poverty reduction and sustaina-
ble development are envisaged as impacts. Although Figure 2 
only features support provided by the European Commission 
and not by the EU as a whole, the diversity and scale of TRA 
activities are still impressive and demonstrate the attention 
paid to trade-related topics in European development coop-
eration. This can at least partly be explained by the exclusive 
competence of the European Union in the area of European 
trade policy.Fi
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3.3.2 Finland
The title of the current Finnish AfT strategy “Creating jobs 
through private sector and trade development: Aid for Trade 
– Finland’s Action Plan 2012 – 2015 (Finland, 2012)” already 
hints at its focus: The private sector takes centre stage, as an 
intervention area (private sector development), as a partner 
and as a source of development financing. It features in 
the main objective, too: “The private sector creates decent 
employment and opportunities for entrepreneurship for all”. 
Four goals26 with two focus themes each substantiate this 
objective, all accompanied by (non-quantified) indicators. 
Finland pursues a human rights-based approach, specifically 
promoting economic, social and cultural rights, and when 
feasible, civil and political rights and freedoms. 
The relations between these elements and their link to the 
ultimate goal are depicted in a precise results framework in 
the strategy’s annex (Figure 3). This analytical underpinning 
stands in stark contrast to the rather narrative and less con-
crete BMZ concept paper (see Section 3.1). The human rights 
approach is also reflected in the ultimate goal: the “eradication 
of extreme poverty and securing a life of human dignity for all 
in accordance with the UN Millennium Development Goals” 
(p. 24). While this resembles the final goal of German AfT, its 
emphasis is slightly different (human dignity, eradication of 
extreme poverty instead of poverty reduction). In contrast 
to the German case, green issues feature prominently at the 
level below the final impact which aims, inter alia, to achieve 
“an inclusive green economy that promotes employment” (p. 
24) and “sustainable management of natural resources and 
environmental protection” (p. 24).
Finland did not define a specific geographic focus or quanti-
tative commitments for TRA or AfT as Germany did. This can 
partly be explained by the two documents’ different publica-
tion dates. The much more recent Finnish strategy may reflect 
the international trend away from an emphasis on quantitative 
AfT commitments towards an in-depth discussion of its quality, 
including its impacts. This development is also reflected in the 
prominent role of monitoring and evaluation in the current 
Finnish approach. In fact, the strategy paper is a follow-up 
to the 2008 – 20011 action plan, which was evaluated in 2011. 
By contrast, as in the case of its other sector strategies, BMZ 
did not set a deadline for evaluating and / or updating the AfT 
concept.
26  (i) A sound business-enabling environment promotes private sector activity, (ii) Developing countries benefit from international trade and investment, (iii) Economic activity is based on the 
sustainable use of natural resources, and (iv) People’s skills and knowledge produce innovative economic activity.
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3.3.3 United Kingdom
The Department for International Development (DFID) was 
one of the first donors to publish a strategy paper dedicated 
to AfT (DfiD, 2008), doing so in 2008. However, it only covered 
the period from 2008 to 2013 and has not been revised since.
The paper exhibits typical features of these early years of 
AfT, in that it formulates specific quantitative commitments, 
including a separate goal for TRA. It pledges to increase AfT 
spending to GBP 409 million a year by 2010, of which at least 
GBP 100 million a year would be spent on TRA. However, 
when defining priority AfT categories, it does not count trade 
development as a separate category, but subsumes it under 
“productive capacity building and adjusting” for which it 
earmarks 40 percent of total AfT27. It pledges to spend a high 
percentage (around 70 percent) of AfT through multilateral 
partners – a clear difference from the German approach. As in 
the case of Germany, the regional AfT focus is on Africa, where 
DFID planned to spend 55 percent of its AfT. DFID did not 
formulate an underlying analytical model for its AfT interven-
tions but, instead, refers to concepts from international AfT 
discussions.
3.3.4 Switzerland
The State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO, Staatsse-
kretariat für Wirtschaft) or, more precisely, its Sustainable 
Trade Promotion Department (WEHU) is in charge of Swiss 
AfT. Hence, in contrast to Germany, Swiss AfT is handled by an 
institution which specifically focuses on economic matters and 
is not part of general development cooperation. By the same 
token, AfT is not being mainstreamed into other priority areas 
but is treated as a field of its own within economic develop-
ment cooperation. Yet no separate strategy paper exists as the 
basis for AfT. Instead, the strategic direction of WEHU with 
regard to trade-related development assistance is described 
in a number of different papers. A recent evaluation (Finkel et 
al., 2013) was tasked with summarising and assessing WEHU’s 
strategic direction. This analysis draws on the Swiss approach 
as portrayed in that evaluation (see also Chapter 2).
WEHU carries out its interventions in accordance with three 
separate business lines (see the results model in Figure 4): 
1. ”Framework conditions” cover aspects similar to those 
pursued by German AfT such as strengthening capacities 
to negotiate, implementing trade policy and generally 
improving framework conditions. However, Switzerland 
deals more explicitly with competition law and intellectual 
property rights. Regional economic integration and border 
management receive less attention. 
2. “International competiveness” can be compared to the 
German AfT priority to incorporate the potential of export 
markets into measures for developing productive capaci-
ties. Like Germany, it attaches great importance to global 
value chains and international standards, but focuses more 
on green and resource efficient production. This raises 
the question whether international standards and quality 
infrastructure might, in fact, not be such a unique feature 
of German AfT as is commonly assumed. 
3. “Market access” aims to improve trade relations and 
developing countries’ access to foreign markets, particular-
ly Swiss and EU markets. This is a particularity of Swiss AfT 
not reflected in the German strategy.
27  In addition, 15 percent of total AfT are foreseen for “trade policy and regulation” and 45 percent for “economic infrastructure”. 
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Geographically, WEHU has focused on the middle-income 
countries Egypt, Ghana, South Africa, Indonesia, Viet Nam, 
Colombia and Peru since 2009. In 2013, Tunisia was added to 
this list. WEHU also operates in the Western Balkans, Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia. Upon request, it complements the 
activities of the Swiss Agency for Development in selected 
low-income countries. This approach is significantly different 
from the German one, which focuses on the poorest countries. 
Moreover, Swiss AfT is implemented through multilateral 
channels to a much larger extent than German AfT.
Below, the US and the Japanese approach to AfT will be de-
scribed, as the United States and Japan are among the largest 
AfT donors. However, as information on both donors is scarce, 
the knowledge gain for German AfT support is limited. 
3.3.5 USA
In contrast to the donor strategies described above, the US 
approach entails the full integration of AfT into its develop-
ment assistance framework and is not a stand-alone area. The 
Strategic Framework for Foreign Assistance regards AfT/ trade 
capacity building (TCB) as a priority objective for economic 
growth which, in turn, is one of the five main pillars of this 
strategic framework. On the basis of this strategic framework 
and on a US TCB strategy from 2003, the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID) formulated its “Economic 
Growth Strategy, Securing the Future: A Strategy for Eco-
nomic Growth” in 2008 which also touches upon AfT-related 
subjects. No separate AfT strategy paper exists. 
3.3.6 Japan
Japan announced its “Development Initiative for Trade” prior 
to the WTO Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in December 
2005 and the subsequent “Development Initiative for Trade 
2009” in July 2009.
As the English translation of the original text is not available 
online, the evaluation team extracted further information on 
the Japanese initiative from the OECD questionnaire and from 
the responsible Japanese International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA).28 Japan’s development cooperation has no separate 
trade sector; instead, trade activities are conducted as part 
of private sector development and are strongly aligned to 
private-public programmes. 
Traditional partner regions are South-East Asia and East Asia. 
However, Japan has recently pledged to double ODA to African 
countries. 
Discussion
To sum up, there are certain similarities between the (recon-
structed) programme logic of BMZ’s AfT concept and other 
donors’ AfT frameworks. For example, higher-level outcomes 
are mainly formulated as “poverty reduction and sustainable 
development”. Inputs and outcomes levels largely depend on 
the development intervention’s thematic focus. However, the 
specific donor approaches have diverged over time: While 
earlier AfT strategies still showed strong similarities and 
were tightly aligned to the international AfT initiative, some 
donors (Finland, Switzerland) have recently developed their 
own, more distinct approach. They have re-interpreted the AfT 
initiative and added their own political priorities (e.g. private 
sector development in the case of Finland) to the “classics” of 
AfT topics. 
By contrast, the BMZ AfT concept can be regarded as a “first 
generation paper”: It still incorporates the traditional AfT 
agenda and is strongly aligned to the WTO and EU approach-
es. As a major EU member, Germany was strongly involved 
in the formulation of the EU Strategy. While this alignment is 
desirable, some of the additional topics addressed by other 
donors could add value to a (revised) German AfT approach. 
For example, stronger integration of green and inclusive 
growth issues – provided this is in line with partner countries’ 
needs and demands – could ensure the sustainability and 
long-term perspective of trade-related interventions (Finkel 
et al., 2013). By the same token, social standards such as the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) core labour standards 
could be integrated into the BMZ AfT concept. 
Moreover, unlike some other European donor strategies, 
BMZ’s AfT concept does not address the coherence of Euro-
pean trade policy with development policy. However, access 
to EU and in particular to German markets is important to 
increase partner countries’ trading opportunities. Increasing 
28  Available at http://www.oecd.org/trade/aft/43149672.pdf and http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/thematic_issues/private/activity.html (last accessed 18 August 2014).
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access to German markets is proven to be beneficial for 
German consumers and producers as well (Martínez-Zarzoso, 
Nowak-Lehmann D., Klasen & Johannsen, 2013). No new 
policy instruments would need to be developed in order to 
build closer links to domestic and international markets. 
Instead, existing trade policy instruments such as the Import 
Promotion Desk should be integrated into the German AfT 
approach,29 automatically leading to higher synergies between 
different stakeholders in the field of trade policy. Furthermore, 
the BMZ AfT concept hardly considers the general (regulatory) 
frameworks for increasing foreign direct investment (e.g. 
intellectual property rights (IPR), contract enforcement, red 
tape), but mentions foreign direct investment only in the 
context of competitiveness of local enterprises. 
All in all, compared to other donors’ current AfT strategies, the 
BMZ German AfT concept appears highly consensus-based 
and partly lacking in focus, firm objectives and indicators 
(unlike the Finnish case, for example). It would therefore 
benefit from a revision which would also offer the opportunity 
to reflect on the possible inclusion of current topics such 
as green and inclusive growth, investment and coherence 
between trade and development policies. 
 
29  More information at: http://www.ixpos.de/IXPOS/Navigation/DE/Ihr-geschaeft-im-ausland/Abnehmer-und-partner-finden/Kontaktveranstaltungen/import-promotion-desk.html (last accessed 
25 September 2014). Other instruments may include the international manager training programme financed by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (http://www.ixpos.de/IXPOS/
Navigation/DE/Ihr-geschaeft-im-ausland/Abnehmer-und-partner-finden/Kontaktveranstaltungen/Exportinitiativen/managerfortbildungsprogramme.html (last accessed 25 September 2014).
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30 “The joint EU AfT strategy with a clear pro-poor focus and orientation to the MDGs is the baseline for German financial contributions, AfT approach, priorities and delivery mechanisms” (OECD 
Questionnaire, 2009).
M
ainstreaming AfT within BMZ was one of 
the main goals of the BMZ AfT concept and 
would ideally lead to the incorporation of 
trade-related aspects in all relevant BMZ 
policy papers that serve as the basis for designing and 
implementing German development measures. This chapter 
analyses whether this has actually happened with regard to 
BMZ thematic concept papers relevant to the AfT initiative 
(see Section 4.1) and BMZ country strategy papers and priority 
area strategies (see Section 4.2). It also briefly examines 
partner country strategies in order to verify whether the trade 
focus of BMZ country strategy papers correlates with partner 
countries’ ownership of AfT. 
Although the BMZ AfT concept was designed as a main tool 
for integrating AfT into German development cooperation, it 
was never intended to bring a swift change of development 
policy course. Instead, it is one step in a continuous process to 
embed trade in aid. This is suggested by the German answers 
to OECD AfT questionnaires between 2007 and 2013, which 
are relatively similar over time. Goals and approaches did not 
change abruptly but have remained comparatively stable since 
2007, despite the preparation of the AfT concept in 2011. There 
are two main reasons for this continuity: First, there was a 
significant time gap between the elaboration of the GDI study 
(Voionmaa & Brüntrup, 2009), which served as a basis for the 
BMZ AfT concept, and the publication of the strategy in 2011. 
The results of the GDI study were, however, slowly incorpo-
rated into German development cooperation even before 
the publication of the official AfT concept and are reflected 
in the questionnaires from 2009 onwards. Second, the BMZ 
AfT concept is strongly oriented towards the 2007 EU AfT 
strategy, which served as the guiding document for German 
AfT prior to 2011 (OECD Questionnaire, 2007 and 2009).30 As a 
result, the general goals and approaches of German AfT have 
not radically changed with the adoption of its own strategy. 
This fact also underlines the aim of the strategy to serve as a 
communication tool for mainstreaming trade within German 
development cooperation rather than to formulate a new AfT 
approach. 
Below, BMZ thematic concept papers, country strategy 
papers, and priority area strategies are analysed to assess 
the success of mainstreaming AfT within BMZ, focusing on 
documents published after the launch of the AfT initiative in 
December 2005. A simple content analysis was applied to the 
documents. A count of keywords such as “trade”, “exports”, 
“quality infrastructure” and “regional integration” provided a 
first overview of the papers’ structure. In a second step, the 
sections where the keywords appeared disproportionately 
often were subjected to a more thorough examination. They 
were read and interpreted in detail to identify whether and 
how they take into account trade and other aspects related 
to international economic relations. The analysis of country 
strategy papers and priority area strategies was confined to 
a sample of countries selected for the purpose of this study 
(see Box 3). Mainstreaming is regarded as successful if trade 
was (sufficiently) taken into account, provided that such a 
trade dimension could have reasonably be expected in that 
particular case. 
4.1
BMZ thematic concept papers
Seven thematic concept papers published after the launch 
of AfT in December 2005 were identified as relevant to AfT 
due to their overlap with trade-related topics mentioned in 
the BMZ AfT concept (see Annex Table 7 for a list of analysed 
papers). With the exception of one paper on pro-poor growth 
(2006), all date from 2011 or later, which means that they were 
published after the implementation of the BMZ AfT concept.
Two papers focus specifically on poverty issues, one on 
pro-poor growth (2006) and another more generally on 
poverty reduction (2012). The first does not incorporate trade 
or other issues related to the international economy, possibly 
due to its relatively early publication date. However, its 
approach appears consistent with the basic idea of AfT, namely 
to reduce poverty by integrating the poorest into (global) 
markets. A detailed discussion of international issues may 
have been beyond the scope of this fairly brief paper but could 
still have added a valuable perspective to the discussion. The 
paper dealing with poverty reduction on a more general basis 
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includes some references to international economic relations. 
It emphasises the need to strengthen the capacity of policy 
makers to foster growth and trade in order to include as many 
people as possible, and in particular poor people, into national 
and international economic exchange. In other words, without 
specifically mentioning AfT, the paper seems to be mindful of 
the trade dimension.
Aid for Trade has a low profile throughout the two papers on 
agriculture, both of which lack any discussion of the potential 
afforded by regional trade. The concept paper on the devel-
opment of rural areas and their contribution to food security 
(2011) touches only marginally upon international markets 
and trade policy. A similar point can be made regarding the 
concept paper on sustainable agricultural development 
(2013). While international and EU policy are mentioned, as is 
cooperation with international companies, a more in-depth 
discussion of the possible contribution of trade to agricultural 
development could have been expected from this very recent 
paper.
By contrast, the other three documents deal in-depth with 
mainstreaming of AfT. The strategy paper on extractive re-
sources in German development cooperation (2011) devotes an 
entire chapter to trade in natural resources and the potential 
role that development cooperation can play through AfT. 
The term “Aid for Trade” is mentioned on two occasions. The 
paper dealing with the private sector as a development policy 
partner (2011) also includes a long reference to Aid for Trade. 
Similarly, one of the key papers, the sector concept on private 
sector promotion (2013), makes specific reference to AfT, for 
example when describing its strategic approach to improve the 
framework conditions for foreign investment and trade. It also 
refers to regional economic integration and to global value 
chains. This extensive coverage of trade is very welcome in this 
core paper for German AfT, which is an important reference 
document for projects in the area of sustainable economic 
development. 
To conclude, AfT has been successfully mainstreamed in the 
papers dealing with private sector development. However, it 
has encountered stronger resistance within the agriculture 
community since related papers do not sufficiently consider 
the potential of regional and international markets.
4.2
BMZ country strategy papers and priority area 
strategies 
As mentioned above, this study only analyses country strategy 
papers on the twelve countries included in the sample after 
the launch of the AfT initiative in December 2005 (see Annex, 
Table 8, for the list of papers). They include seven country 
strategies on Asia and Africa.31 All these countries have a 
trade-related BMZ focus area such as sustainable economic 
development, rural development, or private sector develop-
ment and are therefore relevant to German AfT. However, 
only one country strategy paper (Mongolia 2012) dates from 
after the official release of the BMZ AfT concept in 2011 and 
can thus be expected to take into account the AfT priority 
areas defined in the AfT concept. The six other papers were 
written between 2006 and 2010, i.e. after the launch of the AfT 
initiative in December 2005, but before the publication of the 
BMZ AfT concept. 
Although the term “Aid for Trade” is not mentioned in any 
paper, all the papers refer to related terms such as “trade”, 
“exports”, “quality infrastructure” and “regional integration” 
(the simple search method is shown in Table 8). The Senegal 
document (2006) covers trade aspects in an analysis of the 
economic framework conditions, not as a German priority. 
The early date of publication may be the reason for the still 
relatively weak integration of AfT. The Namibia strategy paper 
(2006), an equally early document, emphasises regional 
economic integration. The Mozambique strategy paper (2007) 
is one of the papers with the least focus on trade aspects, 
making no mention at all of related issues. The overall aim 
of German development cooperation in Ethiopia (2008) is to 
enhance the productivity and competitiveness of the economy, 
with trade barriers such as high trading costs and complicated 
trading procedures being some of the elements taken into 
account. Trade and regional economic integration are dealt 
with in the analysis of the framework conditions in Rwanda 
(2009), but are not a specific focus of German development 
31  Four country strategy papers were written in 2005 or earlier and are therefore not included in the analysis: Tajikistan (2005), Burkina Faso (2005), Uganda (2004), and Ghana (2005). 
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cooperation. The case of Nepal is of particular interest since 
it is the only country worldwide where trade is defined as 
a priority area of German development cooperation (BMZ 
website32). However, the country strategy paper dates back to 
2010, before this priority area had been chosen, and does not 
reflect this priority. The aim of the strategy paper for Mongolia 
(2012), which is the most recent paper reviewed, is to support 
sustainable, broad and resource-based economic growth, 
for example through integration into international resource 
markets. Trade and related international aspects thus appear 
to be well accounted for.
In addition, nine priority area strategies for seven countries 
were analysed.33 While the strategies on agriculture and pri-
vate sector development in Ghana date back to 2004 and are 
not relevant for this study, the strategies on Rwanda, Senegal, 
Mozambique, Laos, Namibia, Burkina Faso and Ethiopia were 
written between 2009 and 2012 (see Annex, Table 8 for the list 
of strategies). 
Trade-related terms do not feature in the transport strategy 
for Namibia and in the agriculture strategies for Burkina Faso 
and Ethiopia. The Laos rural development strategy mentions 
trade only once in the context of challenges and opportunities. 
Conversely, all strategies on sustainable economic devel-
opment incorporate trade aspects to a certain degree, even 
though the term “AfT” is only mentioned in the case of Senegal 
(2009). However, the focus in Senegal is not on trade-related 
issues, as already noted above. The Namibia strategy on 
sustainable economic development (2012) does not specif-
ically highlight the German engagement in trade-related 
activities either. By contrast, the Mozambique (2012), Rwanda 
(2009) and Laos (2011) strategies on sustainable economic 
development refer to trade-related activities several times. 
Interestingly, the Mozambique strategy highlights various 
trade aspects, while the country strategy does not refer to any 
of them. One of the aims of German development cooperation 
with Mozambique – defined by two trade-related indicators 
– is to improve trade prospects for the private sector. Even 
though the Rwanda strategy dates back to 2009, it clearly 
incorporates indicators on trade and brings up trade-relevant 
aspects related to quality infrastructure, resource manage-
ment, and macroeconomic consulting. The priority area 
strategy that sets the framework for German–Lao cooperation 
on sustainable economic development (2011) refers to the 
potential for and obstacles to trade several times, including a 
discussion of the demand for food and agriculture products in 
regional markets. It pursues a highly innovative approach by 
defining a number of objectives and indicators for German-Lao 
cooperation, including some on trade-related matters.34
National development strategies
To complement the analysis of BMZ country strategy papers 
and priority area strategies, the way in which these partner 
countries integrate trade into their own national strategies 
was reviewed (see Annex, Table 9). This sheds light on the 
question whether BMZ’s emphasis on trade matters corre-
sponds with the demand voiced by partner countries in their 
national strategies. Certainly, such an approach has some 
limitations in terms of portraying the real needs of partner 
countries as opposed to only the stated intention of their gov-
ernments. Nonetheless, since national development strategies 
ought to be and generally are the outcome of comprehensive 
national efforts, they can be regarded as an indication of the 
importance attached by the country concerned to trade. 
Some partner countries demonstrate clear ownership of AfT in 
their national development strategies by dealing extensively 
with trade in these documents. Ghana, Laos, Nepal, Uganda 
and Rwanda formulated a clear strategy on trade and / or 
integrated trade issues in their overall development plans. 
This includes the definition of trade targets and an analysis of 
the main obstacles to trade. In four other countries (Burkina 
Faso, Ethiopia, Senegal and Tajikistan), development plans 
take trade into account, but to a lesser extent. Surprisingly, 
given the importance of exports for their national economies, 
Mongolia, Mozambique and Namibia integrate trade poorly or 
32  http://www.bmz.de/en/what_we_do/countries_regions/index.html (last accessed October 2014). 
33  No priority area strategies were provided for the other five countries included in the country selection. 
34  For example, two objectives of the Lao-German Joint Strategy for the Priority Area “Sustainable Economic Development”:
i.  “The share of small and medium-scale enterprises, especially in promoted industries and / or value chains, which export either directly or via trading firms, has risen from 3 % (2009) to 10 %.” 
(Source: Enterprise Surveys, 2011, 2013, 2015).
ii.  “The share of small and medium-scale enterprises in Laos which apply internationally recognised environmental and social standards has increased from xx % (2011) to yy %” (Source: Specific 
study to determine initial value, to be integrated into subsequent enterprise surveys).
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very poorly into their national development plans. Overall, it 
is important to note that the importance paid to international 
trade varies depending on the partner country’s size, level of 
development, economic structure, and resource endowment.
When analysing the success of AfT mainstreaming in German 
development cooperation, the degree of partner countries’ 
ownership has to be kept in mind since aid allocation decisions 
should first and foremost be guided by partner country needs 
and less so by donors’ political benchmarks. The German 
approach to AfT in countries with weak integration of trade in 
their own national policies is therefore expected to differ from 
that applied in countries where trade is clearly high on the 
national agenda. There is some evidence of this correlation: 
The strong trade focus of national development strategies 
in Laos, Nepal and Rwanda is reflected in BMZ’s strategies 
for these countries. This alignment can also be observed in 
the case of Senegal, where both BMZ and Senegal put their 
emphasis on issues other than trade, at least if these policy 
documents are regarded as a single indicator of national 
priorities. By contrast, Mozambique places little emphasis 
on trade-related aspects, whereas the German-Mozambican 
strategy on sustainable economic development highlights 
activities in this field. 
To conclude, trade aspects seem to have been successfully 
mainstreamed in BMZ thematic concept papers and priority 
area strategies on sustainable economic development, but 
feature to a much lesser extent in strategies dealing with 
agriculture. This suggests that, while much has already been 
achieved, room for improvement exists in the area of agricul-
tural development. However, no final conclusion can be drawn 
with regard to country strategy papers since their analysis is 
based on a relatively small sample size (seven mostly out-of-
date documents). They therefore do not provide comprehen-
sive information on the integration of AfT in German develop-
ment cooperation. Future research on German AfT may also 
benefit from looking at regional strategy papers. Likewise, 
while the analysis of partner country strategies provides some 
interesting insights, it should be complemented by a more 
multi-dimensional analysis of partner countries’ needs and 
of the in-country division of labour among donors. This is of 
importance because a sufficient coverage of trade issues by 
other donors would justify a German focus on matters other 
than trade. 
5.
THE GERMAN AFT  
PORTFOLIO
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T
his chapter gives an overview of international and 
German AfT support throughout the period from 
2008 to 2012. It is intended to provide insights into 
whether BMZ has succeeded in guiding the German 
ODA portfolio towards priority regions35 and topics36 defined 
in its AfT concept. It focuses on the period since 2008, when 
the trade development marker (distinguishing narrow from 
broad AfT) was introduced.
As trade is not a separate sector of German development 
cooperation, data on AfT funding is not centrally collected and 
analysed. OECD CRS data37 (see Section 5.1) and executing 
agencies’ project information (see Section 5.2) were used 
as primary sources for the quantitative part of the analysis. 
While the main analysis focuses on German AfT flows, a brief 
discussion of international AfT data serves as a reference point 
for comparison with the German contribution. 
In addition to quantitative data, Section 5.2 draws on various 
forms of documentation (project proposals / offers, progress 
reports, evaluations) of BMZ-funded KfW and GIZ projects. 
Due to the wealth of information, the analysis was limited to 
projects in twelve financial cooperation and seven technical 
cooperation countries and to the two executing agencies (KfW 
and GIZ) (for a discussion of this methodology, see Section 1.2).
5.1
The German AfT portfolio according to  
OECD CRS data
The OECD CRS database collects aid statistics on a compara-
ble basis for all major donors and is the most comprehensive 
source of statistics on aid, including AfT.38 Data is collected at 
individual project level. 
When working with OECD CRS data, several limitations need 
to be considered: There is no detailed disaggregation at the 
level of executing agencies. This means that the organisation 
through which AfT is channelled cannot be reliably identified. 
Moreover, it must be borne in mind that BMZ funds only 
account for 54 percent of total German ODA (OECD, 2010). As 
discussed in this analysis, ODA is provided not only by BMZ 
but also by other ministries and by the German federal states 
(Länder). This difficulty in interpreting the data at a more 
detailed level is exacerbated by the fact that fields for project 
description entries, where the projects ought to be briefly 
described, are often empty or entries do not adequately depict 
the project or are meaningless. 
Furthermore, the CRS database only lists concessional flows 
and is limited to OECD DAC member countries, excluding 
donors such as China and Russia. In addition, CRS data only 
contains non-core multilateral contributions, rather than 
covering all multilateral contributions.39 As data on non-core 
multilateral flows did not prove sufficient for a thorough analy-
sis of multilateral AfT support, the following analysis primarily 
covers bilateral German ODA. A word of caution should be 
added to the above comments and the statistical explanations 
below: The statistical analysis of AfT is only one side of the 
coin; qualitative evidences, e.g. in project documents, is the 
other. Statements made in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 below should 
be treated with caution, as they were derived solely from 
statistics (except for the document analysis in Sections 5.2.2 
and 5.2.4). 
Having said that, the CRS database is certainly the most com-
prehensive source for an analysis of AfT at a more aggregate 
level. From 2008, it provides access not only to data on total 
AfT but also on TRA (the narrow definition of AfT). This was 
made possible through the introduction of the trade devel-
opment marker (TD). It was needed because, by definition, 
AfT categories two (“Trade development”) and four (“Building 
productive capacities”) comprise projects with the same CRS 
codes. The difference between the two comprises the extent 
35  In line with the EU Strategy on AfT, Germany pledged to make available at least half of the increase in TRA funding (from the baseline year 2005) for the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
Group of States, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (BMZ, 2011, p. 7).
36  Regional economic integration and EPAs, trade facilitation, quality infrastructure, incorporation of the potential of regional and international export markets into measures for developing produc-
tive capacities e.g. through the value chain approach (BMZ, 2011, p. 10 f).
37  By definition, the following CRS codes and their sub-categories belong to the broader AfT definition: 331xx (“Trade policy and regulations”), 240xx (“Banking and financial services”), 250xx (“Business 
and services”), 31xxx (“Agriculture, forestry, and fishing”), 32xxx (“Industry, mining, construction”), 33210 (“Tourism policy and administrative management”), 210xx (“Transport and storage”), 220xx 
(“Communication”), and 230xx (“Energy”). For more information, see WTO (2006) and http://www.oecd.org/trade/aft/aid-for-tradestatisticalqueries.htm. 
38  An up-to-date analysis of AfT at the European level, based on figures from 2012, can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/piebalgs/multimedia/pdf/eu-accountability-re-
port-2014-on-financing-for-development_en.pdf (last accessed 26 September 2014). 
39  ODA earmarked for a sector, theme, country, or region and channelled through a multilateral institution is reported as bilateral ODA and referred to as non-core multilateral ODA or multi-bi ODA 
(http://www.oecd.org/dac/aid-architecture/Germany_Non-Core_20130513.pdf (last accessed 18 August 2014). 
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to which the projects explicitly target trade: Category two 
includes only projects that are considered directly relevant 
to trade, while all others are attributed to category four. 
Thanks to the TD, the trade-related projects with relevant CRS 
codes can be marked as TD-0 (trade-neutral), TD-1 (trade as 
secondary goal) or TD-2 (trade as main goal). A few CRS codes 
such as 25010 (“Business support services and institutions”) 
are automatically assigned TD-2. All projects marked as TD-1 or 
TD-2 are allocated to AfT category two, i.e. TRA. 
When interpreting CRS data on TRA, it must be borne in mind 
that the term “trade relevance” as a basis for setting the TD 
is vague and that its specific scope is difficult to grasp. Let’s 
take the example of CRS code 25010: It is overly optimistic 
to assume that all efforts to support business services, 
including SMEs and the informal sector, are by definition of 
high (TD-2) relevance to international trade. Moreover, as will 
be seen in Section 5.2, the TD setting tends to differs among 
German stakeholders, and its implementation is not reviewed 
internationally.40 While it is important to keep in mind these 
challenges in applying the TD, the purely quantitative analysis 
in Section 5.1 still has to rely on the data which donors report 
to the OECD, regardless of their different practices when 
self-interpreting the TD and the resulting effects on the size of 
their TRA portfolios.
The analysis of CRS data below includes a description of 
international and German AfT data with regard to their overall 
AfT development, followed by a breakdown of German AfT 
support into regions, priority areas, types of aid, and multi-
lateral versus bilateral channels. All data in Section 5.1 was 
retrieved from the OECD CRS database and complemented 
by information from the OECD/ WTO global AfT review report 
2013 (OECD & WTO, 2013). 
Putting German AfT into perspective: The development  
of international AfT 
Although the declaration issued at the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in 2005 called for additional financial resources for 
AfT, partner countries and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) repeatedly question whether this additionality has 
really materialised (see Chapter 1). However, OECD and WTO 
(2013) confirm that donor countries have actually delivered 
additional resources, at least with regard to the wide definition 
of AfT and the period to 2011: AfT funding increased by 57 
percent in 2011 compared to the AfT average between 2002 
and 2005. OECD and WTO (2013) also indicated that, in 2011, 
the G20 group failed to meet the target announced at the 
G20 Summit in Seoul one year earlier where they had agreed 
to at least maintain AfT levels at the average of the period 
2006 – 2008 beyond 2011 (OECD & WTO, 2013, p. 75). In fact, 
AfT funding provided by the G20 was down by 24 percent in 
real terms (USD 7.3 billion) compared to 2010. 
Generally, international ODA slowed in 2011, also affecting AfT 
disbursements (Figure 5). With regard to fluctuations of single 
AfT categories, disbursements to “Trade-related infrastruc-
ture” and “Building productive capacity” (including “Trade 
development”) increased until 2010. In 2011, ODA dedicated to 
“Building productive capacity” remained at 2010 levels while 
disbursements to “Trade-related infrastructure” decreased 
compared to 2010. This was still due to the global financial 
crisis (OECD and WTO (2013, p. 22). 
To put these figures into perspective, a number of important 
qualifications have to be made. Taking the data in Figure 5 at 
face value, it would seem that the AfT category “Trade policy 
and regulations” is negligible, marginalising an undisputed core 
dimension of AfT. This is probably not an accurate picture. Such 
projects often provide less costly technical assistance, which 
can be very effective when the right advice is given and taken 
up by partner governments. Its efficiency might be near-infinite 
when introducing “stroke-of-the-pen” (= almost no cost) 
reforms, provided they go in the right direction and are not 
simply furthering outright trade liberalisation. On the other 
side of the balance sheet, all projects dealing with investment 
promotion or other aspects of productive capacity building are 
conventionally labelled AfT. The same applies to all physical 
infrastructure – transport, communications, energy etc. – 
whether or not the rail or road built leads to the border, or the 
telephone or electricity transmission line crosses into a neigh-
bouring country. This invites occasional misunderstandings as 
to whether AfT also covers trade in the intra-national sense or 
even retail trade – cases that will be revisited below. The AfT 
philosophy is that if a country ultimately has more firms and 
better infrastructure, this boosts exports and imports.
40  The OECD directive on TD setting can be found at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/39961177.pdf (last accessed 24 September 2014). 
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The consequences of taking such a bold approach to the defi-
nition are obvious: Trends in AfT categories may well reflect 
evolutions in the international aid business which occur more 
or less independently of the initial AfT agenda. The overall 
increase in funding for “Building productive capacity” until 
2010 reflects the donor countries’ giving priority to private 
sector development in the second half of the decade, including 
activities in the agriculture, fishery and forestry sectors. 
Indeed, after the 2007 / 2008 food crisis, donors started to 
rediscover agriculture proper and to increase their support 
for the agricultural sector, re-emphasising the importance of 
rural development and food security (OECD & WTO, 2013, p. 
63). Similarly, considerably increasing infrastructure spending, 
despite the downturn in 2011, may reflect recent concerted 
efforts to close “Africa’s infrastructure gap”. Only the near-ab-
sence of AfT category 5 “Trade-related adjustment” accurately 
depicts the fact that structural adjustment like spending for 
trade-related purposes has scarcely taken place and was often 
not desired by developing countries.
Development of total German AfT 
Although all the caveats on AfT definitions should be kept 
in mind, Germany is nominally one of the three leading AfT 
donor countries worldwide, outperformed only by Japan and 
the USA based on their reported figures. It contributed 8 
percent of global AfT disbursements between 2006 and 2011, 
totalling USD 14 billion (OECD & WTO, 2013). 
German ODA as a percentage of GNI has been rising since the 
early 2000s (Figure 6). The only exceptions are decreases in 
2009, due to reduced debt relief and in 2012, when ODA fell 
from 0.39 percent to 0.37 percent of GDI.41
Although AfT is not a separate sector within German develop-
ment cooperation, it is allocated a relatively high proportion 
of GNI (between 0.03 percent and nearly 0.09 percent). In 
comparison, global health-related ODA is targeted at 0.1 
percent of GNI. 
The German target to spend at least EUR 220 million per year 
on TRA from 2010 was easily met with average TRA flows of 
EUR 515 million per year between 2008 and 2012. However, 
TRA fluctuated significantly over time. It rose to its highest 
level (USD 835 million) in 2009 and then started to decrease to 
as low as USD 587 million in 2012.42 
41  The authors could not reconstruct the ODA/ GNI share shown in Figure 6 by using overall German ODA disbursements and GNI figures from the German Federal Statistical Office. Variances 
between the official German ODA and that included in CRS may be due to data differences in bilateral and multilateral disbursements (as mentioned in BMZ official statistics). This analysis 
therefore relies on the official figures provided by BMZ. 
42  German TRA disbursements over time: USD 712 million (2008), USD 835 million (2009), USD 718 million (2010), USD 673 million (2011), USD 587 million (2012). Source: authors’ own calculations, 
based on OECD CRS, 2014.
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The BMZ AfT concept also stipulates that TRA should rise in 
proportion to overall ODA (BMZ, 2011, p. 7) in order to miti-
gate the risk that other sectors could be adversely affected by 
an increase in aid for trade-related projects. Because TRA / GNI 
has slightly fallen since 2009 and ODA / GNI has experienced 
an overall increase in the same period, non-TRA sectors do not 
seem to have been negatively affected.
Nearly half the German AfT portfolio targets “Trade-related 
infrastructure” (Figure 7).43 Funding for “Building productive 
capacities” and “Trade development” makes up the other 
half, while funding for “Trade policy and regulations” appears 
marginal at about 1 percent of the total German AfT portfolio, 
if judged by financial data alone. While the BMZ AfT concept 
emphasises its role at the intergovernmental macro level, 
aiming to strengthen partner countries’ negotiation capacities 
in international trade, the engagement for trade policy and 
regulation appears marginal from a financial point of view. At 
this level, however, the data is difficult to interpret, because 
this AfT category contains much technical assistance, which is 
less costly than large-scale financial projects, but is potentially 
no less effective in terms of trade performance.
On the other hand, “Trade development” includes the CRS 
code “Business support services and institutions” (25010) to 
which TD-2 (trade as primary goal) is automatically assigned. 
While up to one third of German funding for “Trade develop-
ment” carries this CRS code, it is questionable, as mentioned 
above, whether all or even many of these projects really 
focus on trade since they may have been attributed to “Trade 
development” solely due to the automatic assignment of the 
TD. It is likely, therefore, that in reality, some parts of German 
TRA have little direct relevance to trade. This skewed reporting 
hypothesis will be analysed in more detail in Sections 5.2.2 and 
5.2.4. 
Generally, CRS data reports an increase in German AfT for 
“Building productive capacity” (category 4) over time.44 
German disbursements to “Trade-related infrastructure” 
(category 3) doubled in 2010 compared to earlier years but 
slightly decreased in 2011 and 2012, almost reaching the levels 
of 2008 / 2009 (similar to international trends in trade-related 
infrastructure). Two cost-intensive projects seem to have 
pushed up disbursements for “Trade-related infrastructure”: 
In 2010, there was a USD 660 million project on renewable 
energies, categorised as “Bilateral unspecified” (administrative, 
research costs not allocable to specific countries). This project 
may be explained by the rise in AfT due to the UN Climate 
43  The following analysis is limited to disbursements of German AfT. 
44  German disbursements for “Building productive capacity” are only slightly lower in 2011 than in 2010. 
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Change Conference in Copenhagen in 2010 and the related 
commitment to start providing climate finance for renewable 
energies (OECD & WTO, 2013). In 2011, Germany built a coal-
fired power station in India. 
Figure 8 gives a more detailed overview of disbursements 
per sector. It shows that most German AfT disbursements 
are allocated to the CRS code “Energy” (230xx, being part 
of “Trade-related infrastructure”) followed by “Banking 
and financial services” (240xx, part of “Building productive 
capacity”). “Agriculture” (311xx, part of “Building productive 
capacity”) is another important sector for German AfT.
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German disbursements on TRA (narrow AfT) have decreased 
since 2009, mainly due to reduced disbursements for “Trade 
development” (Figure 7, category 2). By contrast, funding for 
“Trade policy and regulations” (category 1) have remained 
almost stable at a low level. Most TRA disbursements are 
assigned to CRS codes “Banking and financial services” (240xx) 
and “Business support services and institutions” (25010; both 
are counted as “Trade development”). 
AfT by region
Most international AfT commitments have been allocated to 
Asia, but there has also been a focus on Africa (Figure 9). In 
fact, Africa has received much of the increase in AfT funding in 
recent years, with a 64 percent rise in commitments compared 
to the 2002 – 2005 average (OECD & WTO, 2013, p. 72). 
However, AfT committed to Africa in 2011 fell sharply due to 
lower commitments to energy and transport projects. 
In comparison, most German bilateral AfT has been channelled 
to Asia (Figure 10), which has received almost half of total Ger-
man AfT over time. The focus on Asia can largely be explained 
by the high percentage of development loans granted to Asian 
compared to African countries. German AfT to Africa has 
only started to increase recently, while disbursements to all 
other regions have fallen. The peak in support to unspecified 
countries in 2010 results from a USD 660 million renewable 
energy project. 
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The BMZ AfT concept pledges to spend at least half of the 
increases in TRA on ACP states, particularly sub-Saharan Af-
rican countries. In fact, TRA to all African countries increased 
between 2010 and 2012, with decreasing TRA to Asia, Europe 
and America (see Figure 10).45 However, Figure 11 shows that 
German TRA disbursements to sub-Saharan African countries 
declined between 2008 and 2010, before returning to 2008 
levels. This raises doubts as to whether the promise made in 
the BMZ AfT concept to devote half of the TRA increases to 
SSA was met. Overall, TRA disbursements to SSA countries are 
only a fraction of overall German TRA support. 
Broken down into AfT categories, the geographic distribution 
of German AfT tells a more nuanced story. Whereas “Trade-re-
lated infrastructure” received the majority of funding in Asia, 
“Building productive capacity” was the highest category in 
Africa. Funding for “Building productive capacity” for Asia and 
45  German TRA disbursements to Africa increased from EUR 78 to 144 million. TRA disbursements to America fell from EUR 57 to 21 million and to Asia from EUR 170 to 113 million (2010 – 2012). 
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Africa was broadly similar, reflecting the growing emphasis on 
private sector development in Africa. 
As shown in Figure 12 (left), five of the 10 largest bilateral 
recipients of German AfT are African countries, though only 
three are sub-Saharan African countries. The 10 largest AfT 
recipients include Ethiopia as the only least developed country 
(LDC), Kenya as the only low-income country (LIC), four low- 
and middle-income countries (Egypt, Georgia, Indonesia and 
Morocco) and four upper-middle-income countries (UMICs) 
(Serbia, Turkey, Chile, and Namibia). 
The 10 largest TRA recipients (Figure 12, right) include two 
LDCs (Ethiopia and Mozambique), five LMICs (Philippines, 
Ghana, Indonesia, Armenia and Nigeria) and three UMICs 
(Serbia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan). Thus, compared to total AfT, 
TRA – including more direct trade-related support measures 
– seems to focus slightly more on lower-income countries. 
Five out of the 10 largest TRA recipients are also listed in the 
country case selection (see Box 3): Ghana, Ethiopia, Mozam-
bique, Burkina Faso, and Tajikistan. High volumes of German 
AfT to Mozambique correspond with the prominent position 
of trade in the relevant BMZ strategy papers, as was shown in 
the analysis of these documents in Section 4.2. For countries 
other than Mozambique, not enough BMZ documents were 
analysed to draw a firm conclusion. 
German priority areas: trade facilitation and regional 
integration 
The BMZ AfT concept (BMZ, 2011) designates four German 
priority areas (see Chapter 3): Trade facilitation, regional 
integration / EPAs, quality infrastructure, and the incorporation 
of the potential of regional and international export markets 
into measures to develop productive capacities. 
OECD and WTO (2013, p. 38) observe that trade facilitation 
has increasingly been stated as a top priority among partner 
countries in recent years. Moreover, at the Ninth WTO 
Ministerial Conference in Bali, Indonesia, in December 2013, 
after almost 10 years of negotiations, WTO members passed 
the Trade Facilitation Agreement as part of the overall “Bali 
Package”.46 This agreement includes provisions for faster and 
46  More information at: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/tradfa_e.htm (last accessed 16 July 2014). 
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more efficient customs procedures and for technical assistance 
and capacity building. A preparatory committee was estab-
lished to make appropriate arrangements for, and guarantee 
the implementation of, the agreement.
No conclusions about German support for trade facilitation 
can be drawn from statistical figures alone. The definition of 
the CRS code for trade facilitation (33120) is too narrow to 
draw meaningful conclusions. Because projects usually deal 
with trade facilitation as only one of several issues, they may 
be assigned a broader CRS code rather than the code “Trade 
facilitation”. So it is not surprising that the OECD CRS data 
in Figure 13 shows no extensive German support for trade 
facilitation.47 While trade facilitation may in fact be underrep-
resented in CRS data, it may soon be possible to obtain a more 
precise picture from German data because multiple CRS codes 
have been assigned to projects implemented by GIZ for some 
years. If consistently applied by the other German executing 
agencies as well, this could help to solve this analytical 
problem (see Box 4).
In contrast to the low numbers of trade facilitation projects ac-
cording to aid data, aid flows to regional integration recorded 
a constant rise between 2008 and 2012 and a sharp increase 
in 2012. While the 2012 rise is mainly due to the “Capacity de-
velopment in regional integration” project (USD 6.04 million), 
the more long-term positive development demonstrates the 
recent emphasis on regional approaches in German develop-
ment cooperation, especially its growing support for regional 
economic communities in many parts of the world. 
Box 4. Assignment of multiple CRS codes 
The OECD CRS website explains: “Each activity can 
be assigned only one purpose code. This is to avoid 
double-counting when summing up activities in different 
ways. For activities cutting across several sectors, either a 
multi-sector code or the code corresponding to the largest 
component of the activity is used.”48
In German development cooperation, it has been possible 
to assign multiple CRS codes since 2009. The multiple 
assignment is useful to show the diversity of programmes 
47  For more information on trade and transport facilitation by German executing agencies, please refer to: http://www.giz.de/expertise/downloads/gtz2010-en-trade-transport-facilitation.pdf (last 
accessed 25 September 2014). 
48  More information at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/crsguide.htm (last accessed 16 July 2014).
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which often focus on several thematic areas. However, 
the lists of AfT projects provided by German executing 
agencies demonstrate that only GIZ uses multiple 
assignments of CRS codes. 60 out of 819 trade-related pro-
jects reported by GIZ are assigned a second CRS code, 29 
projects a third, and 13 projects a fourth code. The second 
and third CRS codes of these AfT projects do not have to 
be trade-related.49
To the evaluation team, it is unclear whether and how 
multiple German CRS codes are translated into the 
OECD CRS database. Multiple assignments of CRS codes 
should be a topic for further discussion between German 
executing agencies and the BMZ divisions 411 and 412 
(World Bank Group; IMF; debt relief).
Types of aid
ODA is composed of various types of aid, including grants, 
loans and equity investment. According to the 1978 OECD DAC 
Recommendations of Terms and Conditions of Aid, the annual 
average grant component of overall ODA commitments should 
be at least 86 percent for LDCs.50 To grasp the real contribu-
tion made by German development cooperation to reducing 
poverty through AfT in LDCs, it is necessary to analyse the 
composition of AfT with respect to grants. This is especially 
important, because many countries are unable to repay loans, 
potentially perpetuating a cycle of debt and poverty. 
Latest reports on international AfT funding (OECD & WTO, 
2013) show that half of AfT is disbursed as grants and the other 
half as concessional loans (Figure 14). This composition has 
been more or less constant over recent years. 
Figure 15 depicts the situation in German development 
cooperation. While grants were relatively stable throughout 
the period from 2008 to 2012, loans fluctuated sharply. In 
some years (especially in 2010 and 2011), loans clearly received 
more funding than grants, leading to a high German share 
of loans in total AfT. In fact, the development of German 
AfT appears to have been driven mainly by changing levels 
of credits (loans). A possible explanation for the high level 
of loans in German AfT could be the KfW development and 
promotion credits with a high share of costs borne by KfW. 
Equity investment was lower in 2009 and 2010, but returned to 
2008 levels in 2011 and 2012. 
The analysis of German AfT shares by ODA type to least devel-
oped countries shows that almost 100 percent of German AfT 
are grants (Figure 15). Only recently, since 2012, has a marginal 
49 For enhanced comparability between German executing agencies (and because less than 10 percent of all GIZ projects are assigned a second code), only the first CRS codes were used in our analysis.
50 More information at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/crsguide.htm (last accessed 16 July 2014).
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part (about 2 percent) been provided as equity investment. 
Germany has easily met the 1978 OECD DAC recommendation 
to provide at least 86 percent of ODA commitments to LDCs 
in the form of grants. 
Discussion
To summarize this chapter: German AfT and TRA have 
recently decreased – AfT since 2010 and TRA since 2009 – with 
significant fluctuations over time. However, both remain at 
a high level, and the German TRA pledge has easily been 
met. Within TRA, support for regional integration and quality 
infrastructure has increased. By contrast, it is difficult to draw 
conclusions about trade facilitation and regional and global 
value chains due to statistical limitations.
Concerning the regional distribution of German AfT (according 
to OECD CRS data), three of the 10 largest bilateral recipients 
are sub-Saharan African countries. However, overall AfT 
funding to SSA only recently returned to 2008 levels. These 
findings confirm that much still needs to be done to make SSA 
the focus region of German AfT support in accordance with 
the BMZ AfT concept. 
5.2
The German AfT portfolio according to project 
information
This section provides an overview of the trade-related financial 
and technical cooperation implemented by the main AfT 
executing agencies (GIZ, PTB and BGR for technical coopera-
tion; KfW and DEG for financial cooperation). It also analyses 
a sample of BMZ-funded projects in more detail. It pinpoints 
the major differences in the executing agencies’ reporting 
methods (see Box 5). As it was not possible to access the BMZ 
internal database (DASY), information was gathered from 
each executing agency separately. Since this data is not fully 
comparable, trade-related technical and financial cooperation 
is described in separate categories, based on the executing 
agency concerned.
During the meetings with the executing agencies and BMZ, 
a number of interesting issues were raised with regard to the 
application of the trade marker and the related coordination 
between BMZ and the executing agencies. Although these 
issues were merely a compilation of points collected in 
informal talks, they may be a useful starting point for further 
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discussions between these agencies and BMZ on the fine-tun-
ing of the German approach to AfT. The following issues were 
brought up: 
Although the term “trade relevance” is essential 
for the attribution of the TD, it has not been clearly 
defined by international stakeholders, nor has its 
implementation been reviewed. Some limited guidance 
is offered by several general remarks from the OECD 
on setting the TD. At national level, the application of 
the TD is supposed to be checked by the BMZ division 
for Trade-related Development Cooperation (BMZ 
division 411). However, due to the high number of 
trade-related projects and general resource constraints, 
the setting of the TD has often not been (sufficiently) 
reviewed. A German manual on AfT (GIZ & BMZ, 2012) 
includes some technical information on the TD and 
provides examples of when trade should be defined as 
“significant” (TD-1) or “principal” (TD-2). Overall, due 
to the many different trade-related projects run by 
German executing agencies, a definition of the term 
“trade-related project” is not available. As there is no 
further guidance on setting the TD, executing agencies 
developed their own understanding of the TD and its 
assignment. The approaches applied to assign the TD 
to projects seem to differ widely (see Box 5). A certain 
amount of caution therefore needs to be applied when 
comparing the project lists across executing agencies. It 
is difficult to revise development markers once they are 
set. Executing agencies should therefore be trained to 
assign the TD correctly and consistently. 
From initial discussions with executing agencies, it became 
clear that a number of issues are unresolved and require fur-
ther discussion between BMZ’s division 411 and the executing 
agencies, including the issue of validating the TD assigned 
by executing agencies. In addition, executing agencies51 and 
BMZ have limited capacity to deal with trade-related matters. 
If trade is to receive higher attention within German devel-
opment cooperation, these capacities will have to increase. 
Although BMZ cannot directly interfere with the executing 
agencies’ staffing choices, it can motivate them to build up 
trade-related know-how by insisting on more trade-related 
projects and by emphasising that AfT is not a short-term trend 
but a long-term strategic component of German development 
cooperation. In addition, a continuous exchange on AfT-related 
topics would be helpful, for example on setting and co-signing 
the TD or the attribution of multiple CRS codes (see Section 
5.1). It would also be advisable to revitalise the “Thematic Team 
Trade and Sustainability”. 
When analysing the German AfT portfolio on the basis of 
project information, the specific information provided by 
the executing agencies has to be kept in mind: First, the 
time periods covered vary significantly. Because the TD was 
officially introduced only in 2008, no conclusions regarding 
the AfT category “Trade development” and TRA can be drawn 
for earlier years. The analysis of CRS data therefore focuses 
on 2008 to 2012. However, some executing agencies seem to 
apply the TD retrospectively to some projects that had started 
before the introduction of the TD in 2008. 
GIZ provided information on 819 projects for the period 1980 
to 2014, while the KfW project list covers 1998 to 2013. In both 
cases, the TD was set retrospectively. DEG made available 
aggregated AfT figures for 2005 to 2012. The PTB AfT portfolio 
includes 39 projects for 2009 to 2012. Finally, the BGR provided 
a project list comprising 25 AfT projects from 1989 to 2013.
As described in Section 5.1, the TD may be assigned only to 
codes related to AfT category 4 “Building productive capacity”. 
Within this category, the CRS codes 25010 (“Business support 
services and institutions”) and 33210 (“Tourism”) are automat-
ically marked with TD-2 as they are assumed to significantly 
contribute to a country’s trade development. The other CRS 
codes in category 4 are TD-0 (trade-neutral), TD-1 (trade as 
secondary goal) or TD-2 (trade as main goal).
Box 5 presents the actual state of German executing agencies’ 
TD setting, highlighting the difficulties encountered in 
implementing official international procedures. This overview 
is the first of its kind. 
51  This seems to be the case for GIZ to a lesser extent; here, a considerable number of staff positions are devoted to trade in its Competence Centre on Economic Policy and Private Sector Development. 
While synergies between the different parts of this competence centre are being exploited on a daily basis, the sector programme, where the staff with more specific trade expertise can be found, is, 
however, not directly involved in the design or implementation of most GIZ projects. 
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Box 5. Setting the trade development marker
The executing agencies use various guidelines on TD 
setting, which partly explains their different approaches to 
assigning the TD. 
GIZ
GIZ’s TD guidelines (GIZ, 2009) not only include examples 
of trade-relevant projects but also define what is meant 
by pursuing trade as a project’s main or secondary goal. 
According to the GIZ definition, an intervention promotes 
“Trade development” (TD-2 or TD-1) if it improves the 
ability of the partner to 
1. formulate and implement a trade development strategy 
or to generate a trade-promoting environment to increase 
the volume and value added of exports and to diversify 
export products and target markets, or to increase foreign 
investment for an increase in trade and the creation of 
jobs; or 
2. to stimulate the trade of domestic companies and to 
promote the investment of trade-related industries (GIZ, 
2009, p. 2). 
GIZ additionally introduced a dash (“—”) which indicates 
that the TD is not relevant to specific CRS codes (GIZ, 
2013), even though the rules of the CRS system do not 
require any marker for AfT categories 1 and 3, as projects 
in these categories are automatically recorded as AfT 
without a marker. 
However (in contrast to the GIZ guidelines that clearly 
define when TD-0 and TD “dash” need to be assigned), GIZ 
does not, in practice, appear to make a clear distinction 
between TD-0 and “dash”. The project list provided by 
GIZ includes both TD-0 and “dash” projects in CRS codes 
21010, 21040, 22040, 23010, 23020, 23030, 23040, 23065, 
23068, 23081 and 33110 (categories 1 and 3; according to 
the WTO definition, these categories would not include 
any TD). Furthermore, TD-0 is set for projects in category 
4 (as originally in WTO definition). 
KfW Entwicklungsbank
In the case of KfW, CRS codes and TD are assigned 
irrespective of specific thematic sectors. For instance, 
trade development markers are allocated to projects with 
CRS codes “Biodiversity” (41030) and “Rural development” 
(43030) if these projects are regarded as trade-relevant. 
All projects that are assigned the TD are counted as 
trade-relevant (or “AfT”) projects. Projects without TD-1 or 
TD-2, such as projects in WTO categories 3 and 4, are not 
counted as trade-relevant. These projects are therefore 
not marked as trade-relevant by KfW and are possibly only 
later categorised as AfT by BMZ for further reporting to 
the CRS database. 
Within KfW, there are doubts about the existence of a 
specific KfW/BMZ manual on setting the TD because 
no such document is in use in KfW’s daily routine work. 
Furthermore, the decision as to what exactly should be 
regarded as trade-relevant poses challenges since a large 
number of projects financed by KfW on behalf of BMZ 
fall within the AfT definition without necessarily directly 
targeting trade. 
DEG
A DEG position paper on AfT describes how the share of 
trade-related projects has been determined since 2009 
(DEG, 2010). To allocate the TD to projects, the cumulative 
proportion of exports and imports to the total turnover 
of the company supported by the project is measured: 
A project with a share below 25 percent is regarded as 
trade-neutral (TD-0). If the share lies between 25 and 
50 percent, a project is assumed to have trade as its 
secondary purpose (TD-1). Finally, if the share is above 50 
percent, the project is identified as targeting trade as its 
main purpose (TD-2). 
Only DEG equity investments and quasi-equity loans 
to DAC countries are accounted for in German AfT 
statistics.52
52 “DEG’s risk capital (equity and quasi-equity loans) is reported as ODA; long-term loans and guarantees by DEG are reported as Other Official Flows (OOF)” (DEG, 2010, p. 2).
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PTB
Similar to the GIZ procedures, PTB introduced a dash (“”) 
to identify cases in which the TD is not relevant to specific 
CRS codes, even though the rules of the CRS system do 
not require any marker for AfT categories 1 and 3. The 
projects in these categories are automatically recorded as 
AfT (GIZ 2013, p. 9). For instance, AfT category 1 projects 
(“Trade policy and regulations”) are assigned a dash. TD is 
not set retrospectively. Therefore, projects starting before 
2009 are assigned “not specified” (“keine Angabe”). In 
the trade-related portfolio (2009 – 2012), no projects are 
assigned TD-0, although the TD is assigned to a project in 
category 3. 
BGR
Compared to the executing agencies mentioned above, 
BGR conducts very few projects that are counted as AfT. 
Out of 25 listed AfT projects, seven projects are assigned 
the TD. The TD is only allocated to projects with CRS code 
32210 (“Mineral / mining policy and administrative man-
agement”) in the AfT category “Trade development”. There 
is no other assignment than TD-1 or TD-2, i.e. projects are 
not assigned TD-0.
The following sections summarise information on executing 
agencies’ AfT portfolios. 
5.2.1 Technical cooperation: overview53
5.2.1.1 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammen arbeit (GIZ)
The list of projects implemented by GIZ includes 819 projects 
for the period from 1980 to 2014. Nine projects are not 
assigned any CRS code and are therefore not part of the over-
view below. 38 percent of technical cooperation AfT projects 
fall within the category “Trade development” and 6 percent 
being categorised as “Trade policy and regulations” (Table 2). 
TRA thus represents 44 percent of the total GIZ AfT portfolio, 
indicating that “narrow AfT” accounts for a larger share of 
technical cooperation (GIZ) than of the overall German 
AfT portfolio. The second largest category is “Trade-related 
infrastructure” with 32 percent of all projects. 
Generally, projects implemented by GIZ are not evenly distrib-
uted across the AfT-related CRS codes. Instead, certain codes 
account for a disproportionately high number of projects. For 
instance, in AfT category 1, 63 percent of projects are con-
ducted under “Trade policy and administrative management” 
(33110). In category 2, most projects (52 percent) belong to the 
category “Business support services and institutions” (25010). 
In category 3, the emphasis is on energy-related projects (84 
percent; 230xx), while the majority of projects implemented by 
GIZ (55 percent) in category 4 run under “Agriculture, forestry, 
and fishing” (310xx). 
Table 2. Technical cooperation projects implemented by GIZ in AfT categories 1 – 5
CRS Codes No of projects Percentage of total projects
33110 (Trade policy and administrative management) 33 4.1 %
33120 (Trade facilitation) 6 0.7 %
33130 (Regional trade negotiation) 13 1.6 %
Total: Trade policy and regulations 52 6.4 %
240xx (Banking and financial services) 21 2.6 %
310xx (Agriculture, forestry, fishing) 78 9.6 %
320xx (Industry, mining, construction) 33 4.1 %
33210 (Tourism policy and administrative management) 9 1.1 %
25010 (Business support services and institutions) + 25020 (Privatisation) 164 20.2 %
53  In the following analysis of the AfT portfolios of GIZ, KfW, PTB, and BGR, total project disbursements are assigned to the first project year and are not (in contrast to the method applied in the CRS 
data) spread over the whole project period. 
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CRS Codes No of projects Percentage of total projects
Total: Trade development 305 37.7 %
210xx (Transport and storage) 33 4.1 %
220xx (Communication) 8 1.0 %
230xx (Energy) 218 26.9 %
Total: Trade-related infrastructure 259 32.0 %
240xx (Banking and financial services) 40 4.9 %
310xx (Agriculture, forestry, fishing) 105 13.0 %
320xx (Industry, mining, construction) 32 4.0 %
25020 (Privatisation) 7 0.9 %
32210 (Mineral / mining policy and administrative management) 6 0.7 %
Total: Building productive capacity 190 23.5 %
33150 (cat.5)(Trade-related adjustment) 4 0.5 %
Total 810 100.0 %
Source: GIZ, 2014; authors’ own calculations
With regard to BMZ sectors, most GIZ AfT disbursements54 
between 2005 and 2012 were implemented under “Sustainable 
economic development” (EUR 854 million), with “Energy” 
ranking second (EUR 565 million), and “Agriculture and food 
security” third (EUR 426 million). 
AfT category 2 (“Trade development”) accounted for the 
highest disbursements during the same period (Figure 16). As 
expected, financial flows are lowest for “Trade-related adjust-
ment” (category 5), which received some funding, with four 
projects being listed, totalling EUR 11.5 million. Disbursements 
to “Trade policy and regulations” (category 1) are also relatively 
low as this category mainly includes advisory and consulting 
services with low financial volumes. 
54  GIZ provided a project list stating the project values (“Projektwert”). For reasons of consistency, this study continues to use the term “disbursements”. 
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Overall, AfT implemented by GIZ (in disbursements) has 
almost doubled since the launch of the AfT initiative in 2005 
(Figure 17), from about EUR 200 million in 2005 to more than 
EUR 450 million three years later. Since then, disbursements 
fell to EUR 305 million in 2011 but increased again to over EUR 
370 million in 2013. Similarly, GIZ TRA disbursements have 
risen since the inception of AfT, with a peak of almost EUR 
250 million in 2010 and relatively stable disbursement levels 
of EUR 170–180 million thereafter (Figure 17). These figures 
indicate that the German TRA pledge was close to fulfilment 
by 2010, even if only TRA implemented by GIZ is counted. 
AfT disbursements between 2005 and 2013 account for 8 
percent of all AfT disbursements from 1990 to 2013, indicating 
that more resources were allocated to trade-related CRS codes 
after the launch of the AfT initiative in 2005. Similarly, 89 
percent of TRA were disbursed between 2005 and 2013. 
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Disbursements are highest to Africa, reflecting BMZ’s focus 
on this continent (Figure 18). Interestingly, this conclusion 
differs from the analysis of total German AfT (see Section 5.1) 
which had indicated that the majority of German AfT flows to 
Asia. Asian regions and countries are actually only the second 
most important recipients of German technical cooperation 
AfT (GIZ).55 An analysis of the trend over time shows that 
disbursements to Africa and Asia have decreased in recent 
years, while those to Europe and the Middle East have largely 
remained stable. 
Ethiopia received the major share of GIZ’s AfT disbursements 
from 2005 to 2012 (Figure 19, left). In the top 10, there are five 
African, three Asian, and two Latin American countries. Large 
countries such as Indonesia and Brazil received high amounts 
of funding, but the top 10 also includes smaller economies 
such as Tajikistan. Expanding the selection to the top 20 
55  Disbursements categorised as “bilateral unspecified” peaked in 2008 due to a project on infrastructure and energy.
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countries leads to more countries from sub-Saharan Africa and 
Asia featuring in the list. 
Ukraine is the only European country on the top 20 TRA list. 
The top 10 list of GIZ TRA recipients includes more sub-Sa-
haran African countries than for AfT, and includes Nigeria, 
Cameroon, Mozambique and Burkina Faso (Figure 19, right). 
Overall, the GIZ AfT and especially the TRA portfolio tend to 
focus on sub-Saharan Africa.
The regional economic community receiving the highest fund-
ing in the period from 2005 to 2012 is the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC; EUR 20.9 million), followed 
by the East African Community (EAC; EUR 11.3 million), and 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN; EUR 
9.8 million). 
5.2.1.2 National Metrology Institute (PTB)
The PTB project list includes 39 projects from 2009 to 2012 
(indicating the starting year of the project).56 More than 60 
percent of the projects fall under AfT category 1 (“Trade policy 
and regulations”). Projects in AfT category 2 (“Trade develop-
ment”) account for about 25 percent.
Table 3. PTB AfT projects per category (2009 – 2012)
AfT category Number of projects Percentage
1 24 61.5
2 10 26
3 1 2.5
4 4 10
Total 39 100
Source: PTB, 2014; authors’ own calculations
56  Earlier projects (starting before 2009) are not part of the overview, as PTB introduced the TD in 2009. 
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Since the launch of the AfT initiative in 2005, the majority of 
projects implemented by PTB have been conducted in cate-
gory 1 (“Trade policy and regulations”), under CRS codes 33110 
and 33130 (“Trade policy and administrative management” and 
“Regional trade agreement”), thus indicating an increasing 
emphasis on this core AfT category. Previously, the majority of 
projects had fallen under industry-related codes such as 32181 
and 32182 (“Technical research and development”). Since most 
projects implemented by PTB form part of “Trade policy and 
regulations” (category 1), which does not have to be assigned 
any TD to be counted as TRA, it is not surprising that most PTB 
projects carry no trade marker. TD-2 (TD-1) is only assigned to 
four (seven) out of 39 projects between 2009 and 2012. Only 
one project falls under category 3, “Trade-related infrastruc-
ture” (23010).
Overall disbursements have been relatively stable since 2009, 
with a peak in 2012. In total, PTB disbursements add up to 
EUR 29.57 million from 2009 to 2012. 
Disbursements are highest to African countries and regions 
(EUR 9.36 million), followed by Latin America (EUR 7.45 
million) and Asia (EUR 4.5 million). Sub-regional projects have 
sharply increased since 2009: disbursements have more than 
tripled from EUR 0.4 to 1.42 million (Figure 21). 
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Since PTB is a single-issue organisation and deals solely with 
issues related to quality infrastructure, all projects can be 
regarded as falling within this AfT priority area. However, a 
more specific trade angle has been added to PTB projects over 
time to complement the core issues of quality infrastructure. 
Projects have increasingly focused on regional economic com-
munities and have thus had a bearing on another AfT priority 
area, namely regional integration. This makes PTB one of the 
most relevant German executing agencies for AfT, despite its 
small size and limited thematic scope. It also shows that the 
BMZ AfT mainstreaming approach has at least partly achieved 
its goal of increasing the trade dimension of relevant projects. 
5.2.1.3 Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural 
Resources (BGR)
The list provided by BGR includes 25 AfT projects (1989 – 2013) 
covering CRS codes 23xxx (Energy, 2 projects) and 322xx (Min-
eral resources, 23 projects). Most BGR projects are conducted 
in AfT categories 2 and 4 (“Trade development” and “Building 
productive capacities”). Recently, there were no projects in 
“Trade-related infrastructure”. Overall, AfT disbursements add 
up to around EUR 18 million. 
The highest total disbursements are channelled through 
regional programmes, followed by the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo as the top receiving country (Figure 22). Other 
national projects are implemented in Namibia, Laos, and 
Mongolia. In total, around EUR five million are deployed in 
African countries.
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5.2.2 Technical cooperation: analysis of project 
documentation57
This section analyses trade-related technical cooperation 
projects in selected countries (see sample selection in Box 3) 
in more detail. The aim is to determine whether trade has been 
appropriately mainstreamed in technical cooperation projects. 
The analysis focuses especially on the attribution of the TD 
in order to establish whether the degree of trade relevance 
attributed through the TD is reflected in project design. 
The selection was limited to projects implemented by GIZ 
due to their number and volume. Certainly, PTB is also highly 
relevant with probably the clearest trade focus of all German 
executing agencies. However, as a single-issue organisation 
focusing solely on matters related to quality infrastructure – a 
core topic of AfT – its projects can generally be assumed to 
mainstream trade appropriately and were therefore not taken 
into account in this analysis.
Documentation of 38 AfT projects58 implemented by GIZ in the 
following seven countries was examined: Ethiopia (8), Burkina 
Faso (4), Ghana (9), Laos (7), Nepal (2), Tajikistan (6), and 
Uganda (2). Not all 12 countries included in the overall sample 
(in Box 3) were chosen due to the large amount of information 
to be processed per project. In addition, TD-0 projects are in-
cluded in this sample, provided that they fall within the broad 
definition of AfT. The detailed list of projects is presented in 
the Annex, Table 10.
In a first step, the TD attribution was compared with the 
extent to which trade is taken into account according to the 
project documents: 11 projects are marked with TD-159 and an-
other 12 with TD-2.60 Eight projects marked with TD-2 carry the 
CRS code 25010 “Business support services and institutions” 
(see Annex, Table 11, for a detailed list of codes per project) 
which means that, in line with internationally agreed rules, 
TD-2 was assigned automatically here. This raises the question 
whether these projects really cover trade: The analysis of 
project documentation shows that, with the exception of one 
project in Laos (“Human resource development for a market 
economy”), these 25010 projects do indeed incorporate trade 
issues, but to varying degrees and rarely with trade as the 
main goal as required for a TD-2 allocation. 
57  Units of analysis in Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.4 are single projects and not German development programmes (“EZ-Programme”) for practical reasons and due to various sub-projects within the 
programmes with no trade relevance. 
58  The analysis covers current and completed projects. Successor and predecessor projects are treated as individual projects since CRS codes and TD often change over time. 11 projects have successor 
projects.
59  Seven of the 12 projects deal with agriculture, two with banking and financial services, one with industry, and one with forestry. 
60  The other 18 projects carry TD-0 (see Annex, Table 10). 
5.  |  The German AfT portfolio 56
Four projects carry TD-2 and CRS codes other than 25010. 
These are cases where TD-2 was not automatically assigned 
but after an assessment of the projects’ trade relevance. Two 
of these four projects show some clear links to trade: One 
project supported agricultural development in Ghana (CRS 
31191), including export-oriented value chains, and another 
focused on quality management in Ethiopia (CRS 32120), 
leaving little or no doubt about their international trade 
relevance. By contrast, the attribution of TD-2 to two other 
projects appears less straightforward: One Tajik microfinance 
project (CRS 24030) and one Tajik project in support of SME 
development (CRS 32130) do not deal even remotely with 
trade although both carry TD-2. This may be explained by 
the context in which the TD was assigned: As these projects 
had started before the introduction of the TD in 2008, the 
marker was attributed retrospectively. Both projects have a 
common successor project (aiming to improve the framework 
conditions and financing of private sector development) which 
carries the code 25010, which is automatically associated with 
TD-2. Although this contradicts the rules for setting the TD, 
the CRS code of the successor project may have determined 
the TD assigned to its predecessor projects. 
In a second step, the documents were examined to determine 
whether they take into account trade issues and whether 
their trade focus changed over time. An increased emphasis 
on trade over recent years would indicate that AfT has been 
successfully mainstreamed. 
The term AfT itself is only mentioned in three projects. One 
TD-2 project on quality infrastructure in Ethiopia discusses AfT. 
In addition, a TD-1 project on sustainable agricultural devel-
opment in Burkina Faso refers to AfT in a discussion of the 
effectiveness of development cooperation. One TD-1 project 
on market-oriented agriculture in Ghana mentions AfT as 
well, but only in the context of setting the trade development 
marker.
In total, seven out of 38 projects cover trade in their indi-
cators: Three projects in Ethiopia deal partly or wholly with 
quality management and quality infrastructure and feature 
trade prominently in their indicators. The indicators of two 
agriculture projects in Ghana aim to increase export activities 
and certification of products in compliance with international 
standards. Similarly, one agriculture project in Burkina Faso 
includes an indicator on rising sales in international markets. 
Finally, one project in Tajikistan features several indicators 
relating to cross-border trade with Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan 
(value of exported goods, number of cross-border markets, 
and proposals for removing trade barriers). However, while the 
two projects in Ethiopia and Tajikistan are still ongoing, the 
other projects in Ghana and Burkina Faso were replaced by 
successor projects, most of which do not feature trade-related 
indicators. 
Value-chain approaches are widely incorporated into agricul-
tural projects and also feature in some sustainable economic 
development projects. Some export-oriented value chains61 
are supported (sesame and cashew in Burkina Faso; mango, 
pineapple and citrus fruits in Ghana; honey and medical and 
aromatic plants in Nepal; fruits and vegetables in Tajikistan). 
However, while the design of these projects clearly incorpo-
rates trade-related elements, their indicators often address 
purely domestic aspects (e.g. an increase in production or in-
come) and only rarely target international issues (e.g. increase 
in exports or certification of products). Many agriculture 
projects seem to neglect another potentially relevant angle: 
With the exception of one Tajik project, they generally do not 
address the regional trade potential. This is rather surprising 
since, in many cases, GIZ implements trade-related projects at 
the level of the corresponding regional economic community, 
offering an obvious entry point for creating synergies between 
national and regional projects. 
Apart from projects supporting more traditional AfT areas 
such as agriculture and sustainable economic development, 
one TD-1 project deals with forest management in Laos. Its 
focus is highly relevant: It supports the local forest industry 
in adjusting to the EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance 
and Trade (FLEGT) process, including EU import regulations. In 
addition, it addresses regional trade within ASEAN, including 
the processing of wood imported from other ASEAN countries 
for later export to other parts of the world. 
61  It is important to note that value chain promotion does not automatically translate into the promotion of exports and international trade. There is an important distinction between domestic and 
regional / global value chains.
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With regard to how comprehensively trade aspects are taken 
into account, no clear trend can be identified and in some 
cases, the trade focus has decreased over time: While the 
predecessor of the Ghanaian project on market-oriented 
agriculture still featured indicators on GlobalGAP certification 
and export increases, the current project does not. Hence, it 
carries a lower TD than its predecessor (TD-1 instead of TD-2). 
Similarly, the indicators for the agro-business promotion 
project in Burkina Faso do not include export increases, 
unlike its predecessor.62 On the other hand, the innovative 
forest project in Laos, mentioned above, which started in 2012 
possibly indicates a trend towards a stronger focus on trade 
in some national resource projects. In addition, two highly 
relevant projects are not included in the sample analysed 
because they were launched only very recently; one focuses on 
Laos’ integration into ASEAN, while the other deals with trade 
promotion in Nepal. 
To conclude, from the admittedly relatively small sample it 
appears that it is still difficult to include trade aspects within 
wider programmes. At the same time, a few stand-alone trade 
projects were recently launched. This trend may be the result 
of a deliberate strategy to deal with trade in projects specifi-
cally devoted to this issue (both at the national and perhaps 
even more so at the regional level), instead of mainstreaming 
it across a wider range of issues. While this is a valid approach, 
it raises questions as to whether it really corresponds with the 
mainstreaming approach advocated by BMZ in its AfT concept. 
Overall, however, it does demonstrate the commitment of 
German technical cooperation to provide AfT.
5.2.3 Financial cooperation: overview 
5.2.3.1 Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)
The list of projects financed by KfW on behalf of BMZ com-
prises 356 trade-related projects from 1997 to 2013 (indicating 
the starting year of the project), all of which fall under AfT 
category 2 (“Trade development”) and thus meet the definition 
of TRA.63 In KfW’s case, total AfT disbursements equal total 
TRA disbursements. Surprisingly, KfW does not count projects 
in AfT categories 3 and 4 as trade-relevant, so the following 
analysis will refer to its TRA portfolio only. In this sober 
treatment of its projects in categories 3 and 4, KfW deviates 
from the agreed but questionable AfT practice of treating 
every infrastructure or productive capacity project as relevant 
to international trade and AfT, perhaps underrating the bank’s 
actual contributions in this field. The evaluation team differ-
entiates between three types of finance for KfW AfT projects: 
(i) pure budget funds (grants funded from the German Federal 
Government’s budget), (ii) promotional loans (purely funded 
by KfW on capital markets), (iii) development loans (including 
interest rate subsidies, composite and mixed financing – fund-
ed both from the budget of the German Federal Government 
and from KfW funds raised on capital markets64). 
More than 83 percent of the projects are listed under CRS 
codes “Banking and financial services” (24xxx) and 11 percent 
under “Agriculture, forestry, fishing” (31xxx). Only a few 
projects carry other CRS codes. The KfW list also marks 
projects on “Biodiversity” (41030) and “Urban development 
and management” (43xxx) as trade-relevant. Only 26 projects 
are allocated TD-2; all other projects are allocated TD-1 (330 
projects).65 
Similar to technical cooperation in AfT, most trade-related dis-
bursements are allocated to the sector “Sustainable economic 
development”. Very few funds are devoted to other sectors.66
Disbursements peaked in 2012. Only a few projects prior to 
2005 were identified as TRA: disbursements from 2005 to 2012 
account for 99 percent of all AfT disbursements (Figure 23). 
62  However, a recent project modification (“Änderungsangebot”) proposed an additional emphasis on promoting the export of sesame, e.g. by improving the existing trade information system and 
providing training for exporters.
63  There was only one project in 1997 and in 2003. In 2004, there were three projects. Projects are only selected if BMZ was the public contracting authority. 
64  Definitions based on https://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/International-financing/KfW-Development-Bank/Tasks-and-goals/Unsere-Finanzprodukte/ (last accessed 20 October 2014). 
65  In the following sections, projects carrying CRS codes other than AfT-relevant codes are dropped from the sample. 
66  The KfW project list calls disbursements “total disbursements” (“Auszahlung gesamt”). In cases where no information on disbursements is available, this study relies on the other financial 
information variable: budget resources (“Haushaltsmittel”). Projects with no information on disbursements are excluded from the sample. 
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Most disbursements are allocated to Europe and the Caucasus, 
followed by sub-regional and sub-Saharan Africa projects 
(Figure 24).
When only examining disbursements of pure budget funds, 
most disbursements are made to sub-Saharan Africa, followed 
by Europe / Caucasus, and Asia (Figure 25). 
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More economically advanced countries such as Serbia and Tur-
key are among the top 10 recipients with regard to the overall 
KfW AfT portfolio. Funding for Turkey is mostly directed to 
SMEs. European countries such as Ukraine, Serbia, Kosovo and 
Bulgaria are among the top 20 recipients. Three sub-Saharan 
African countries are among the top 10, and seven already 
feature in the top 20 recipients of TRA. 
The share of SSA countries rises when only projects of pure 
budget funds are analysed (Figure 26): six of them are among 
the top 10 recipient countries. 
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5.2.3.2 Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungs-
gesellschaft (DEG)67
The figures provided by DEG do not distinguish between broad 
and narrow AfT but are available only as aggregate figures 
due to the sensitivity of bank data. The aggregate figures 
cover the period from 2005 to 2012; those for 2005 – 2007 
are taken from Voionmaa and Brüntrup (2009). On average, 
AfT disbursements throughout the years 2005 to 2008 were 
higher than AfT disbursements between 2009 and 2012. 
Following the general downward trend of AfT flows in 2011, 
DEG’s AfT disbursements were lower in 2011 than in 2010, but 
still higher than in 2009. This decline can largely be explained 
by the financial crisis, which put downward pressure on DAC 
members’ ODA budgets (OECD & WTO, 2013, p. 22). In 2012, 
AfT disbursements were up again. 
5.2.4 Financial cooperation: analysis of project 
documentation
As with technical cooperation, project documentation of 
trade-relevant68 financial cooperation was studied to assess 
the attribution of the TD and the success of mainstreaming 
AfT (see Annex, Table 12, for a list of projects studied). The 
analysis comprises 58 projects financed by KfW on behalf 
of BMZ in Ethiopia (1), Burkina Faso (7), Ghana (9), Laos (1), 
Mongolia (2), Mozambique (17), Namibia (3), Rwanda (5), Nepal 
(1), Senegal (6), Tajikistan (2) and Uganda (4). No finalised 
documentation was available for 12 projects which are still 
in their conceptual phase. Due to the confidentiality of bank 
data, it was not possible to obtain and analyse documentation 
for DEG projects.
Most projects financed by KfW on behalf of BMZ belong to 
the BMZ priority area “Sustainable economic development” 
(46 out of 58), while 12 can be attributed to “Agriculture and 
food security”. 46 out of 58 projects are implemented under 
the CRS code 240xx (“Banking and financial services”; see 
Table 13). Within this category, the sub-category “Formal 
sector financial intermediaries” (24030) is most common (35 
out of 46), followed by five projects on “Informal / semi-formal 
financial intermediaries” (24040) and “Education and training 
in banking and finance” (24081), respectively. Twelve projects 
are allocated to “Agriculture, forestry and fishery”. This analysis 
does not include any trade-related infrastructure projects as 
they do not form part of TRA and are therefore not regarded 
as trade-relevant within KfW. However, KfW has implemented 
67  While DEG is officially part of KfW, this evaluation addresses it separately because its business model and its relationship with BMZ differ substantially from that of other KfW activities. DEG 
provides loans and equity finance to private companies. Its equity and equity-like financing activities are considered ODA-eligible and therefore qualify as AfT as certain criteria are fulfilled. Its 
lending activities are also of fundamental interest for AfT since DEG loans target export-oriented enterprises, which are encouraged to trade in order to generate foreign exchange and thus reduce 
exchange rate risks (Voionmaa & Brüntrup, 2009).
68  A project is considered trade-relevant if it carries a related CRS code and if a special focus on trade was identified by KfW programme managers through the trade marker. However, to complement 
the analysis, TD-0 projects financed by KfW in the same countries were also examined. 
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a (limited) number of clearly trade-related infrastructure pro-
jects, e.g. the rehabilitation of the port of Douala in Cameroon. 
This trade-related investment in ports and cross-border roads 
reflects donors’ division of labour. 
TD-2 was only allocated to a project on micro, small and 
medium enterprise (MSME) financing in Nepal, which was 
launched in 2014. This implies that trade promotion is a 
primary goal of this project only. More precisely, this project 
provides refinancing for loans to SSMEs active in value 
chains, particularly in rural areas. However, the attribution 
of TD-2 seems not to have been completely straightforward, 
because the first project proposal69 had proposed that TD-1 be 
allocated. This categorisation was apparently modified in the 
final stages of project development. The hesitation to attribute 
TD-2 is understandable since the project does not define which 
value chains it will promote and does not clarify whether 
export-related sectors will be covered. By contrast, trade 
is mentioned in another part of the project proposal which 
includes a reference to the under-exploited export potential of 
some products of importance for the national economy.
TD-1 is allocated to all other 57 trade-relevant projects. How-
ever, a specific reference to trade is found very rarely in the 
descriptive parts of the projects. Generally speaking, projects 
promoting agricultural development seem to integrate trade 
slightly more easily into their project design. For example, an 
outgrower scheme in Ghana focuses on the production of nat-
ural rubber and deals with export promotion. In addition, one 
(not yet approved) project in Uganda appears to be trade-rel-
evant since it focuses on the refinancing of loans to small 
and medium farmers and SSMEs with a view to transforming 
Uganda into the food basket of the region. However, while 
these references to trade can be found through a thorough 
examination of project documents, no explicit discussion of 
any trade-related matter is included.
The attribution of TD-1 appears even less evident in projects 
supporting microfinance banks and other financial institutions. 
While final beneficiaries are usually (S)SMEs in rural and / or 
urban areas, their economic activity is normally not limited 
to a certain sector, making a reference to export-oriented 
products more difficult. A link to trade is especially hard to 
establish in the case of microfinance projects, which naturally 
target very small-scale local economic activities. Even so, most 
microfinance projects carry TD-1 (Ghana, Namibia, Mongolia, 
Rwanda, Uganda), with the exception of Senegal where 
TD-0 was attributed but not consistently over time.70 This 
exemplifies the difficulties encountered when interpreting and 
applying the TD. 
Sometimes, doubts remain as to whether the German word 
“Handel” was correctly interpreted as “cross-border trade” and 
not as “retail” when setting the trade development marker. For 
example, a project in Mozambique supporting SME financing 
argues that it should carry TD-1 since 60 percent of all SMEs 
are active in the trade sector (“Handelssektor”) which, 
furthermore, is the second biggest sub-sector after agriculture. 
Likewise, a Senegalese project argues for TD-1 due to its 
envisaged positive effects on regional trade in Senegal, raising 
the question whether the term “regional” actually means 
sub-national here. However, the latter project is one of the 
more interesting ones since it supports the development of a 
mobile banking system which is intended to support the trans-
fer of remittances from abroad, among other things. While the 
project does not target trade finance as such, a mobile banking 
system set up to transfer international remittances could also 
facilitate international trade transactions. 
To conclude, very few of the analysed projects financed by 
KfW on behalf of BMZ have clear and direct links to trade 
issues even though they were assigned a positive TD (TD-1 
in all cases apart from one). The TD appears to be a weak 
indicator of a project’s trade relevance. A slightly positive 
trend can be observed over time, with the more recent and not 
yet approved projects taking trade into account to a slightly 
higher degree. No trade-related indicators were found in any 
project. This may result from the fact that these indicators 
often target a highly aggregate level and are therefore difficult 
to substantiate, even more so in projects dealing with financial 
services in which credits are granted to enterprises irrespec-
tive of whether they engage in trade or not. It could also be 
interpreted as a sign of the secondary role accorded to trade 
in the projects’ design and implementation. Room for more 
69  “Kurzstellungnahme”
70  Although the project retains the same project number over the years in question, its reports for 2009 and 2010 indicate “TD yes”, while those for 2010 and 2011 state “TD-0”. “TD yes” is not a 
standard method of labeling AfT projects but is assumed to mean TD-1 or TD-2.
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specific references to trade certainly exist, e.g. in the area of 
agricultural development or trade finance / mobile banking, 
and should be made use of. This appears even more necessary 
considering the apparently extensive practice of attributing 
TD-1 and the effect this has on German TRA statistics, given 
that 100 percent of TD-1 project values are counted as TRA. 
Overall, there are some projects financed by KfW on behalf 
of BMZ which pay too little attention to trade, and others in 
which the attention paid to trade is overestimated (e.g. SMEs). 
Finally, when taking an in-depth look at the AfT portfolio 
implemented by the various executing agencies, it becomes 
clear that only a few projects marked as trade-relevant have a 
specific focus on trade. Furthermore, the definition and setting 
of the trade development marker tend to differ between 
executing agencies, which all have their own understanding of 
trade relevance. A comparison of projects prior to 2011 – when 
the BMZ AfT concept was published – and later ones does not 
reveal any upward trend in integrating trade aspects in devel-
opment projects. Hence, at the level of executing agencies, the 
success of mainstreaming AfT seems limited. 
6.
CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
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F
or those who expect a fully-fledged assessment of 
the current state of German AfT, a word of caution is 
in order: A desk study can only offer limited insights 
into issues as complex and broad as AfT. The quality of 
the data analysed suffers from a number of limitations caused 
by the broad scope of the topic and more specific challenges 
related to the monitoring of AfT and especially TRA (see 
Chapter 5). 
That being said, the following conclusions and recommenda-
tions can be drawn in relation to the study’s three research 
questions. 
Research question 1: In comparison with other donors’ AfT 
strategies, does the BMZ concept paper appropriately reflect 
the state of the art of international discussions about AfT (see 
Chapter 3)?
Overall, the BMZ AfT concept is in line with the general logic 
and approach formulated in the international debate on AfT. 
For instance, its basic assumptions largely correspond to the 
analysis by the WTO task force (WTO, 2006) and the EU AfT 
strategy (2007); indeed, it uses the same wording in various 
instances. This is not surprising, given that Germany as a major 
EU member was closely involved in the formulation of the EU 
AfT strategy.
Since the BMZ AfT concept was primarily designed as a tool 
for communication and mainstreaming trade within German 
development cooperation, it does not specify quantifiable 
indicators against which progress could be monitored, except 
for the target for TRA. In some ways, however, this conflicts 
with the importance which the concept attaches to monitoring 
and accountability in its Section 4. In addition, the concept 
paper would benefit from a clear definition of the higher-level 
aggregate impacts which it envisions. Outcomes are also 
usually formulated as the increased “capacity” of partners 
or SMEs which ought to result in higher trade performance. 
By contrast, clear expected outcomes at the level of “trade 
performance” are often missing, making it difficult to recon-
struct specific indicators to assess trade-related impacts. The 
non-existence of clearly defined outcomes and indicators in 
the BMZ AfT concept also translates into a low representation 
of trade-related indicators at the project and implementation 
level. 
Recommendation 1: Consulting recent AfT strategies of donor 
countries such as Finland could help to identify a suitable 
approach for specifying goals and outcomes of German AfT in 
greater detail. 
In contrast to the high relevance of green and inclusive growth 
and social standards in development cooperation, BMZ has 
not incorporated sustainable trade and resource efficiency 
into the goals and actions defined in its AfT concept to any 
great extent. Not only have such issues gained more and more 
importance internationally, but a stronger integration of green 
and inclusive growth issues – provided this is in line with 
partner countries’ needs and demands – could also ensure 
the sustainability and long-term perspective of trade-related 
interventions (Finkel et al., 2013). 
Recommendation 2: BMZ should place stronger emphasis 
on the integration of green and inclusive growth issues into 
its AfT concept as this is a highly relevant topic in German 
development cooperation. 
Unlike some other European donors71, BMZ does not address 
the coherence of European trade policy with development pol-
icy in its AfT concept. However, access to EU and especially to 
German markets is important in increasing partner countries’ 
trading opportunities. Increasing access to German markets is 
proven to be beneficial for German consumers and producers 
as well (Martínez-Zarzoso, Nowak-Lehmann D., Klasen, & 
Johannsen, 2013). This omission may be explained by the fact 
that Germany’s AfT concept was formulated by BMZ while the 
overall competence for trade policy matters lies with other 
German (and EU) institutions. However, this does not justify 
the exclusion of any reference to Germany’s internal policy 
coherence. Other European donors show that the alignment of 
domestic trade with trade-related development issues can be 
addressed in AfT strategies. 
71  For example, the Swiss strategy on AfT aims to establish stable trading relationships between Switzerland and the EU and to improve access to Swiss and EU markets for small and medium enter-
prises (SMEs) from partner countries (Finkel et al., 2013, p. 9). The Finnish AfT strategy takes into account the potential role played by the private sector as a partner at various levels of development 
cooperation. According to information provided by IOB, Aid and Trade is at the heart of the Dutch policies pursued by the Ministry for Trade and Development Cooperation.
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Recommendation 3: Germany should follow the example of 
other European donors and explore and take advantage of the 
potential synergies between domestic trade and trade-related 
development. Furthermore, highlighting the importance of 
trade promotion for German companies and for the develop-
ment of partner countries would help raise awareness of the 
AfT initiative. Existing trade policy instruments such as the 
Import Promotion Desk should be integrated into the German 
AfT approach. 
Recommendation 4: At present, the BMZ AfT concept gives 
little consideration to the general (regulatory) frameworks for 
increasing foreign direct investment (e.g. intellectual property 
rights, contract enforcement, red tape), mentioning foreign 
direct investment only in relation to local enterprises’ com-
petitiveness. Despite or due to the sensitivity of large-scale 
foreign investment in terms of land grabbing and environmen-
tal impacts, for example, the issue deserves more attention 
and could potentially multiply the impact of aid interventions.
The BMZ AfT concept clearly reflects the main focus of the 
discussions during the AfT initiative’s early years. Moreover, 
in line with international practice, AfT was incorporated into 
German development cooperation through the “soft” means 
of mainstreaming, i.e. through awareness raising and persua-
sion rather than by creating a separate priority area devoted to 
trade. In that sense, when it was written, the BMZ AfT concept 
was an appropriate tool for incorporating AfT into German de-
velopment cooperation. However, compared to other donors’ 
current AfT strategies, it appears very consensus-based and, to 
some extent, lacking in focus, firm objectives and indicators. 
In that sense, it would benefit from a revision, which would 
also offer an opportunity to reflect on the inclusion of current 
topics such as green and inclusive growth, investment and 
coherence between trade and development policies. 
Research question 2: Has AfT been successfully mainstreamed 
into BMZ’s priority area, sector and country concept papers 
(see Chapter 4)?
More recent BMZ country strategies incorporate the trade 
dimension in an appropriate manner, even though the term 
AfT is rarely used. Likewise, trade issues have successfully 
been mainstreamed into BMZ’s thematic and priority area 
strategies covering private sector-related issues. By contrast, 
recent BMZ strategy papers on agriculture tend to disregard 
trade issues, even though the documents analysed were 
published quite recently. 
Recommendation 5: BMZ should start an internal discussion on 
the potential contributions of regional and international trade 
to agricultural development, including food security.
Research question 3: Does the German AfT portfolio reflect 
the strategic priorities defined in the BMZ AfT concept (see 
Chapter 5)? 
OECD CRS data confirms that Germany is one of the most 
important bilateral AfT donors. However, no clear trend in 
AfT or TRA number could be identified since funding sharply 
fluctuated over the period under investigation. For example, 
AfT disbursements substantially rose between 2008 and 2010, 
followed by a sharp decrease since 2010 due to fluctuations in 
loans for trade-related infrastructure. Similarly, TRA first rose 
to its highest value (USD 835 million) in 2009 before falling 
to as low as USD 587 million in 2012 (see Section 5.1). These 
fluctuations hint at a low degree of steerability of German 
AfT and especially TRA. They both tend to “happen” instead 
of being deliberately deployed. Some related challenges are 
outside of BMZ’s control: International rules for monitoring 
TRA were defined only after the birth of AfT and, hence, have 
evolved over time. Moreover, they remain ambiguous. Steering 
AfT in the wide sense is even more challenging: It covers a 
wide range of activities – from economic policies to infrastruc-
ture and productive capacities – that make up almost one 
fifth of German ODA. The AfT initiative is only one of many 
determinants impacting the scale of these activities.
However, other factors are within the scope of BMZ’s influ-
ence: For example, executing agencies seem to apply the trade 
development marker incoherently, which leads to an unstable 
financial volume of TRA. Since German executing agencies 
cannot rely on precise internationally or nationally agreed 
rules for interpreting the TD, each executing agency seems 
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to have developed its own specific approach, with negative 
repercussions for the comparability and predictability of TRA 
numbers. 
Recommendation 6: BMZ should improve its guidance and 
supervision of executing agencies with regard to the TD 
application. To maintain a continuous exchange on AfT-related 
topics, such as the setting and co-signing of the TD or the 
attribution of multiple CRS codes, it may be useful to revitalise 
the “Thematic Team Trade and Sustainability”. 
German AfT has been primarily channelled to Asia. The 
Asian focus of German development cooperation can largely 
be explained by the high percentage of development loans 
granted to Asian as compared to African countries. Overall, 
German AfT and TRA to SSA actually declined between 2008 
and 2010, before returning to 2008 levels (analysis based 
on OECD CRS data). This development raises doubts as to 
whether the promise of the BMZ AfT concept to devote half of 
TRA increases to SSA was actually fulfilled (see Section 5.1).
As to the four AfT priority areas stipulated in BMZ’s AfT 
concept, only partial conclusions can be drawn. While trade 
facilitation does not seems – at least statistically – to have 
received the attention that it deserves, the picture definitely 
looks more positive in the case of regional integration (see 
Section 5.1). As PTB has succeeded in scaling up its portfolio 
since the launch of AfT in 2005, the third area – quality 
infrastructure – also appears to have been strengthened (see 
Section 5.2.1.2). Due to its scale, it is difficult to make a similar 
observation for the fourth area, which comprises regional 
and global value chains and other ways of incorporating the 
potential of export markets into measures to develop pro-
ductive capacities. However, the examination of GIZ and KfW 
project documentation (see Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.4) could 
not confirm a trend towards an increased emphasis on trading 
opportunities in projects which support agricultural or sustain-
able economic development. While domestic value chains are 
often part of project implementation, the same cannot be said 
of regional and global value chains. This finding suggests that 
the purpose of this (more ambitious) fourth priority area has 
not been achieved.
Recommendation 7: BMZ should realign or adjust its priority 
areas in German AfT support based on the above findings. 
The TRA pledge of EUR 220 million per year starting in 2010, 
which was stipulated in the AfT concept, was easily met with 
an average of EUR 515 million per year between 2008 and 2012 
(see Section 5.1). Interestingly, this pledge would have almost 
been reached with GIZ contributions alone (see Section 5.1.1.1). 
This raises the question whether the German TRA pledge was 
ambitious enough. Of course, the German pledge was derived 
from a European Union commitment which was made without 
proper knowledge of past TRA levels. This led to surprisingly 
high TRA levels in subsequent monitoring exercises, with no 
need for additional funding in order to fulfil the pledge. TRA 
numbers were also boosted by internationally agreed monitor-
ing rules, especially the decision to assign 100 percent of TD-1 
project values to TRA. As a result, all the often very large-scale 
and therefore expensive projects marked as TD-1 are counted 
as TRA, even though only one small proportion of them is 
linked to trade. 
Recommendation 8: These monitoring practices underline the 
need not to confine any AfT analysis to aid statistics alone 
but, instead, to look more closely at project design in order 
to identify the AfT initiative’s real value added. That can only 
be created, if trade is continuously taken into account in all 
relevant projects – either as project indicators or at least as an 
element of project design.
An analysis of a sample of GIZ and KfW project documentation 
(see Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.4) revealed that taking trade into 
account in all relevant projects seems to be a challenge for 
both executing agencies, with the exception of some recent 
GIZ projects, which are more specifically devoted to trade. In 
particular, agricultural projects offer obvious entry points, but 
these were rarely exploited. 
A more positive trend can be observed over time in the case 
of KfW, with the more recent and not yet approved projects 
taking trade into account to a slightly higher degree. In the 
case of GIZ, the trend seems to be towards designing more 
stand-alone trade projects, instead of mainstreaming trade 
in larger interventions. If this observation, which is based on 
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a small number of project documents, is substantiated by a 
larger sample, it would indicate a certain diversion from the 
general mainstreaming approach chosen by BMZ in its AfT 
concept.
Recommendation 9: BMZ should ensure that the executing 
agencies make use of these entry points in the future. This 
is even more necessary considering the extensive practice 
of attributing TD-1 and the effects this has on German Trade 
Related Assistance statistics, given that 100 percent of any 
TD-1 project are counted as Trade Related Assistance.
Knowledge and awareness of AfT and, more generally, trade 
are limited. A considerable number of staff positions in GIZ’s 
Competence Centre on Economic Policy and Private Sector 
Development are devoted to trade. While synergies between 
the different sections of this Competence Centre are being 
exploited on a daily basis, the sector programme, where 
the staff with more specific trade expertise can be found, 
is not directly involved in the design or implementation of 
most GIZ projects. The same is true of BMZ’s Trade-related 
Development Cooperation division, which is only occasionally 
concerned with AfT projects since trade is only one of many 
topics within its sphere of responsibility. 
Recommendation 10: If trade issues should receive more 
attention within German development cooperation, BMZ’s 
and executing agencies’ trade-related capacities would have 
to increase.. Although BMZ cannot directly interfere with the 
executing agencies’ staffing decisions, it should encourage 
them to build up expertise on trade issues by commissioning 
more trade-related projects and by emphasising that AfT is 
not a short-term trend but a strategic component of German 
development policy. 
With regard to knowledge management of German AfT, it 
became apparent during the collection of data for this review 
that little information is available on the overall German AfT 
portfolio and on specific projects, and that the information 
that is available is not collected centrally or widely known.72 
Recommendation 11: To provide up-to-date data on German 
AfT, the TRA portfolio and more qualitative information on 
trade-related projects, German AfT reviews – in two-year-
cycles – could prove effective. Ideally, they would be linked 
to international AfT events such as the AfT Global Review. 
This type of review would contribute to raising awareness, 
both within and outside BMZ. To facilitate the writing of such 
reviews, portfolio figures should be drawn from BMZ’s internal 
DASY database, facilitating direct comparisons between the 
portfolios of financial and technical cooperation. 
So far, AfT has been incorporated into German development 
cooperation through “soft” mainstreaming, including 
awareness raising and persuasion. However, this approach 
has only been partly successful. Alternative strategies would 
entail the launching of trade as a priority area of its own, (as 
in Swiss development cooperation) or a special initiative or 
fund. The widely accepted poverty-reducing and sustainable 
growth-generating effects of trade could justify this new 
approach. A special fund for trade already exists within BMZ 
in the form of the Monterrey Fund. After some years with only 
limited funding, BMZ decided to increase its budget for 2015.
While a shift away from mainstreaming toward stand-alone 
treatment of trade would certainly increase the visibility of 
AfT, it would also pose substantial challenges. Generally, such 
a move would lead to a fragmentation of German develop-
ment cooperation and counter the trend to design broad and 
multi-topic programmes instead of more narrow and isolated 
projects. A new priority area of “trade” would contradict the 
holistic approach embedded in the AfT initiative with its broad 
range of trade-related topics, including productive capacities 
and infrastructure – topics which are covered under different 
priority areas. From an administrative point of view, setting 
up a special initiative poses challenges related to the neces-
sary division of funding between BMZ divisions (most AfT 
projects – with the exception of those under the Monterrey 
Fund – have so far been financed by BMZ country and regional 
divisions and not by the division dealing with trade). More-
over, a special AfT initiative might set a precedent for other 
cross-cutting topics whose proponents would understandably 
request similar treatment for “their” topic, further accelerating 
the fragmentation of German development cooperation. 
72  The DASY database may be an exception. 
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Recommendation 12: The expansion of the Monterrey Fund in 
2015 will highlight AfT by initiating and testing new activities 
that specifically focus on trade. After initial funding through 
the Monterrey Fund, these activities should ideally be rolled 
out as integral parts of German development programmes in 
a second step. Doing so will avoid the creation of isolated solu-
tions which are only weakly coordinated with other German 
activities and will, instead, support and reinforce the general 
mainstreaming approach of German AfT.
Regardless of how AfT is anchored in German development 
cooperation, the most decisive impetus for promoting the 
topic would come from partner countries themselves. Only if 
they actively voice their need and demand for AfT, especially in 
government consultations, will AfT receive the attention and 
legitimacy necessary to feature more prominently in German 
development cooperation than it has done so far. This again is 
more likely to happen if German development cooperation is 
known for its expertise and willingness to support trade-relat-
ed topics. Such should be the basic logic and the entry point 
for a renewed discussion of the German approach to AfT.
Options for a possible follow-up analysis of German AfT73
The results of this desk study can be further substantiated in 
one of the following ways: 
i) Fully-fledged evaluation of German AfT
A comprehensive evaluation of German AfT –e.g. in three 
years’ time as a follow-up to this study – by DEval or by 
external consultants, including several case studies in the field, 
could provide useful insights into how German AfT operates 
in-country and which possible high-level outcomes and 
impacts of specific projects it achieves. Recent evaluations of 
donor countries and organisations prove that a comprehensive 
analysis of AfT support is possible. However, most of these 
evaluations do not show any results on the higher outcome 
and impact level due to missing baseline data, attribution 
problems or untested results chains.
Due to the vast definition of AfT, the evaluation could focus 
on one specific aspect of AfT such as “Trade policy and 
regulations” (or even more narrowly on “Regional integration 
or trade facilitation”) or “Trade development”. 
ii) Larger review of project documentation 
The methodology applied in this review has taken a relatively 
casual approach. While the evaluation team believes that the 
country sample selected is largely representative of German 
AfT, it may be useful to undertake a more nuanced analysis, 
e.g. by analysing further AfT project documents. However, 
this would make considerable demands on executing agencies 
required to provide information. 
iii) Regular two-year reviews of German AfT
Every second year, BMZ could commission a relatively short 
review on various aspects of German AfT to provide a regular 
update and to position AfT more prominently within BMZ 
and executing agencies. This review could be connected to 
the Global Review of AfT or other international AfT events, 
and could be undertaken by DEval or by external consultants. 
Enough time and personnel resources for the collection of 
necessary documentation need to be scheduled for such a 
review exercise.
73  These options could also be pursued concurrently.
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Table 4.  Five portfolio criteria – country case selection
OECD CRS (score >=3) KFW (score >=2) GIZ (score >=3) #*
1     Albania 1
2 Armenia     1
3 Azerbaijan     1
4   Chile   1
5 Costa Rica     1
6 Egypt     1
7 El Salvador     1
8 Kosovo     1
9 Kyrgyz Republic     1
10 Macedonia, FYR     1
11   Mauretania   1
12 Moldova     1
13 Morocco     1
14     Myanmar 1
15 Philippines     1
16     Zimbabwe 1
17 Tunisia   Tunisia 1
18   Turkey   1
19 Uzbekistan     1
20 Algeria   Algeria 2
21 Ethiopia   Ethiopia 2
22 Bolivia   Bolivia 2
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina Bosnia-Herzegovina   2
24 Georgia Georgia   2
25 Laos   Laos 2
26 Mali Mali   2
27 Mongolia   Mongolia 2
28 Namibia Namibia   2
29 Nepal   Nepal 2
30 Nigeria Nigeria   2
31 Serbia Serbia   2
32 Tajikistan   Tajikistan 2
33 Uganda Uganda   2
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OECD CRS (score >=3) KFW (score >=2) GIZ (score >=3) #*
34 Ukraine Ukraine   2
35 Mozambique Mozambique 2
36 West Bank & Gaza West Bank & Gaza 2
37 Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Burkina Faso 3
38 Thailand Thailand Thailand 3
39 Ghana Ghana Ghana 3
40 Montenegro Montenegro Montenegro 3
41 Rwanda Rwanda Rwanda 3
42 Senegal Senegal Senegal 3
* # indicates how many times specific countries are listed throughout all databases
Source: OECD DRS data; KfW and GIZ project lists, 2014
Table 5. Earlier approaches to the selection of country case studies
Regional and country-level analysis Keyword search
The evaluation team conducted simple descriptive statistics on regional 
and country-level distributions of German and international AfT and TRA 
flows. The original aim was to generate country rankings by various crite-
ria (e.g. overall disbursements/commitment on AfT/TRA flows) to derive 
a potential country selection. Various country rankings were developed 
by region (e.g. 1.South Africa, 2.Nigeria and 3.Ghana in the case of total 
TRA disbursements from 2006 to 2011 in sub-Saharan Africa). Another 
example is the country ranking TRA per capita disbursements from 2006 
to 2011 (e.g. 1. Namibia, 2. Zambia and 3. Lesotho in the region South 
of Sahara). The evaluation team tried to identify patterns from these 
diverse country rankings. However, due to the large amount of countries 
and no systematic limitation to specific indicators, it was not possible to 
select the final countries.
Following earlier studies on AfT (e.g. Delpeuch et al., 2011), the evaluation 
team tried to select specific projects via a keyword search in the CRS 
data. However, even when selecting a large variety of keywords such as 
“trade”, “export”, “import”, “customs”, “tariffs”, “private sector” etc. (and 
interconnecting those with CRS-codes and/or the trade marker), the 
selection of projects did not reflect a typical sample of AfT projects. This 
is because so-called “long descriptions” of projects often do not include 
more information than simple titles. Further, many titles are not titles 
per se but rather formulated objectives or goals of projects. The search is 
further complicated as titles and long descriptions are inter-changeably 
recorded in English, German or French. Due to these complicating factors 
and no meaningful results, the evaluation team refrained from conducting 
a systematic keyword search of the CRS data.
In the process of selecting an adequate methodology to the AfT evaluation, the evaluation team developed different approaches 
to analyse CRS data. Finding patterns in regional and country-level analysis and keyword search were the two approaches that 
were rejected during the process.
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Table 6. Donor level evaluations and studies on AfT and TRA
Donor / 
agency
Author / title Period Data collection Main objectives Main findings (examples) Limitations
1. Norway Lindahl 
(2011)
2007 – 2010  • desk review
 • assessment of nine mul-
tilateral organisations 
and their evaluation 
reports on AfT
 • provide experience and 
results of Norwegian 
support for Trade 
Related Assistance 
through multilateral 
organisations
 • discrepancy between 
perception and reality 
of Norway’s role in 
delivering AfT; 
 • independent project 
evaluations in multi-
lateral organisations 
are surprisingly few, 
mainly due to financial 
considerations
 • neither covers bilateral 
assistance nor includes 
the broader AfT 
categories “Trade-relat-
ed infrastructure” and 
“Building productive 
capacity”; 
 • does not consider 
the recipient country 
perspective 
2. Sweden Goppers 
and Lindahl 
(2009)
1995 – 2008  • 20 projects either 
ongoing or completed 
after 2001, 2 country 
case studies (Tanzania 
and Uganda); focus on 
Sida’s larger projects; 
projects cover the three 
categories of TRA 
 • assess the outcome of 
Sida’s Trade Related 
Assistance; assess 
the relevance of such 
assistance 
to assess appropriate-
ness of Sida’s results 
information system and 
of the management of 
TRA
 • based on the available 
results from the projects 
under examination, 
outcomes of the TRA 
projects are unclear in 
terms of reaching their 
development objectives, 
 • such as influence on 
trade policy, provision 
of services to the trade 
sector, improvement of 
competitiveness and 
increase in trade; 
 • in only one of the 
reviewed TRA projects 
it is concluded that the 
project has contributed 
to Sida’s overriding 
objective reduce 
poverty. (p. 9)
 • only using secondary 
documentation;
 • “Results-chains have not 
been tested empirically 
in the reviewed reports, 
nor would such tests 
be possible in most of 
the projects. The higher 
in the chain of results 
such assessments are 
attempted, the greater 
are the problems of 
attribution and coun-
terfactuals, besides the 
issue of time when such 
impact can be expected 
[…]”. (p. 10)
3. Finland Bird et al. 
(2011)
2006 – 2010  • Literature review, inter-
views in-country, visits 
to international/multi-
lateral organizations; 
 • 34 projects (bilateral, 
multilateral, multi-bi) 
in East / Southern Africa 
and Asia; 
 • assessment at policy/
strategic and program-
matic level, sample 
was chosen based on 
available documenta-
tion; in line with main 
areas of Finnish AfT 
by sector/themes and 
geographical focus
 • provide overall 
picture of Finland’s 
AfT in order to further 
improve and enhance its 
effectiveness 
 • lack of conceptual 
clarification of AfT 
reduces the scope to 
promote cohesiveness 
and complementarities 
among projects / pro-
grammes in collectively 
achieving trade-related 
performance targets at 
the outcome level; 
 • fragmentation of 
AfT and no adequate 
inclusion of cross-cut-
ting issues
 • analysis is largely at the 
level of individual pro-
jects and programmes; 
 • unavailability of 
documents
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4. The 
Netherlands
IOB (2005) 1997 – 2004  • desk study and field 
review in Burkina Faso 
and Tanzania, Ethiopia 
and Yemen (2 large 
and country-based 
programmes); 
 • 7 case studies in the 
field;
 • mostly concentrates on 
WTO category 1 (“Trade 
policy and regulations”) 
and focused on multilat-
eral programmes;
 • Dutch policy supported 
technical assistance 
mainly through 
multilateral channels at 
that time.
 • assess results of 
selected multilateral 
TRTA programmes and 
intergovernmental 
organisations/NGOs 
supported, to enable 
policy-makers to (i) 
account for funding for 
such assistance to the 
Dutch Parliament, and 
(ii) determine whether 
such commitments 
should be larger, smaller 
or different in the future;
 • the focus of the evalua-
tion was on the question 
whether the private or 
public sector is more 
efficient and effective in 
delivering AfT
 • design/implementation 
of TRTA activities show 
too little attention 
to formulating / using 
measurable indicators; 
 • for TRTA to single-issue 
organisations in non-
LDCs efficient/effective; 
 • multilateral TRTA 
programmes targeting 
LDCs not efficient/
effective; 
 • weak country 
ownership; 
 • private sector much 
more efficient in 
delivering TRTA support.
 • difficult to measure 
effects on poverty: study 
focuses on lower rungs 
of a goal-means-effect 
hierarchy
 • Since 2004, there has 
been a policy change 
in the Netherlands 
towards more bilateral 
support. There is more 
emphasis on the role 
of international value 
chains, the role of 
the (Dutch) private 
sector and foreign direct 
investments. The latest 
AfT policy document 
is the most elaborated 
one so far. Since 2012, 
Aid and Trade is on 
the heart of the Dutch 
policy (“Minister for 
Trade and Development 
Cooperation”).
5. World 
Bank
Ingram 
(2006)
1987-
2004
 • desk study to identify 
evolution of trade 
assistance (1987 – 2001; 
2001 – 04)
 • review of trade-related 
interventions in India, 
Indonesia, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Senegal, 
and Zambia; 
 • interviews and surveys 
with key stakeholders
 • assess development 
effectiveness of the 
Bank’s trade assistance 
(lending and non-lend-
ing activities, such as 
research and advocacy);
 • evaluate whether stated 
strategies and objectives 
have been reached
 • findings on two main 
evaluation questions in 
2 periods (1987 – 2001 
and 2001 – 2004): Was 
the Bank’s assistance 
relevant? Was the Bank’s 
assistance effective? 
More attention should 
have been given to 
strengthening the 
analytical tools, pro-
cesses, and systematic 
interactions 
6. USAID USAID 
(2007)
2002 – 
2006;  
later 
2007 – 
2009
 • 256 projects; 
 • literature review, project 
documentation, e-survey 
among USAID staff; 
 • qualitative / quantitative 
data analysis
 • examines results and 
impact of trade capacity 
building activities for 
the purpose of learning 
from experience to 
improve the design and 
implementation of this 
assistance
 • important to work 
toward more com-
petitive public and 
private sector practices 
simultaneously; 
 • synergies are also found 
in combining training, 
analysis, technical 
advice, and equipment 
to deliver an integrated 
assistance package. 
(p. xi)
 • errors in connecting 
annual funding entries 
to identify multi-year 
projects; 
 • difficulties in locating 
project documents
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7. ICTSD Khatun et al. 
(2013)
Adhikari 
(2011)
2002 – 
2009
 • 8 country studies; 
 • methodology matrix 
developed by ICTSD on 
AfT funds trajectory, 
ownership, alignment 
etc.
 • Task Force report 
emphasises the need 
for concrete and visible 
results on the ground
 • AfT most effective when 
additional and predicta-
ble, mainstreamed into 
national development 
strategy and owned by 
partner country; 
 • lack of awareness of the 
AfT initiative in concept 
and practice
 • no way of aggregating 
into a conclusive 
statement of AfT 
effectiveness in a given 
country
8. OECD Delpeuch et 
al. (2011)
1999 – 2008  • 162 evaluations in 
transport and storage 
sectors in Ghana / Viet 
Nam; 
 • examination of key 
words
 • assessment whether 
evaluations offer useful 
information for policy 
makers; 
 • proposition of evalua-
tion guideline
 • AfT evaluations do not 
say much about trade; 
 • evaluations did not 
clarify policy linkages; 
 • vague and ill-focused; 
 • lacking adequate 
timeframe for measuring 
results; 
 • no identification of 
causal links possible
 • total number of 
operations conducted 
by DAC members in this 
time period was 61,677
9. Japan Yamagata 
(2012)
2005 – 2011  • case studies in Viet Nam 
and Laos; 
 • document review, 
hearings
 • evaluation of Japan’s 2 
AfT initiatives; 
 • verification whether 
enhanced productivity, 
reduced poverty etc. 
were achieved in coun-
tries where Japanese AfT 
was implemented
 • only general statements 
on consistency, 
effectiveness 
 • English translation only 
very general
10. EU EU (2013) 2004 – 2010  • out of originally pre-se-
lected 23 countries and 
five regions, 11 countries 
and three regions were 
selected for further 
in-depth desk research; 
 • web-survey; 
 • 8 case studies in the 
field
 • overall and independent 
assessment of the EU’s 
TRA in third countries; 
 • identify key lessons in 
order to improve current 
and future strategies 
and programmes of 
the EU
 • an expanded TRA 
portfolio enabled the EU 
to engage successfully in 
diverse contexts;
 • the joint EU AfT strat-
egy of 2007 supported 
harmonisation and 
alignment efforts, but 
momentum has recently 
been weakening (in total 
10 detailed conclusions)
 • TRA definition problem 
(trade-marker);
 • assessment of EU 
contribution
ODI
Not an own 
evaluation 
but research 
on AfT 
effectiveness
Basnett and 
Engel (2013)
 • examining Aid for Trade 
sequentially and through 
a political economy 
analysis lens; 
 • 4 stages: determining 
AfT priorities, 
structuring AfT delivery, 
design and implemen-
tation, monitoring and 
evaluation (M+E)
 • This review paper on 
AfT aims to identify and 
provide an overview of 
the impact of AfT, what 
has worked and what 
some of the barriers 
are to improving its 
effectiveness
 • AfT impact varies 
considerably depending 
on type / income level/
geographic region/sec-
tor of AfT; 
 • SSA is one of the regions 
most likely to benefit 
from AfT; 
 • aid to infrastructure 
is more effective in 
LDCs, while aid flows 
to business sectors are 
more effective in higher 
income developing 
countries
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Donor / 
agency
Author / title Period Data collection Main objectives Main findings (examples) Limitations
11. 
Switzerland
Finkel et al. 
(2013)
2002 – 2012  • semi-structured inter-
views with stakeholders 
and beneficiaries of 
programmes; 
 • 2 country case studies 
Viet Nam and Peru
 • assess the relevance of 
the strategic approach 
to AfT on a strategic / 
programmatic and on a 
portfolio level
 • trade as an own field 
works well; 
 • project quality is 
varying (challenges 
are institutional and 
business environment in 
i.e. Viet Nam); 
 • monitoring is challenge 
as many different imple-
menters with different 
monitoring models 
 • no results model that 
aggregates project 
level outcomes into a 
coherent country level 
results model; 
 • mix up between differ-
ent levels of results and 
objectives in strategies; 
 • standardised reporting 
that links project out-
comes to country-level 
outcomes has not been 
introduced
Table 7. BMZ thematic concept papers analysed
Publisher Year Title Mentions of 
“AfT”
Mentions of 
“Handel”
Pages (without 
cover)
Mentions 
“Handel” per 
page
BMZ 2006 “Pro Poor Growth” – Das entwicklungspolitische 
Thema Breitenwirksames Wachstum, BMZ Spezial 142.
0 0 9 0
BMZ 2010 Entwicklungspolitisches Strategiepaper Extraktive 
Rohstoffe, BMZ Strategiepapier 4 / 2010.
2 20 23 0.87
BMZ 2011 Entwicklung ländlicher Räume und ihr Beitrag zur 
Ernährungssicherheit, BMZ Strategiepapier 1 / 2011.
0 5 18 0.28
BMZ 2011 Märkte entwickeln, Wohlstand schaffen, Armut 
reduzieren, Verantwortung übernehmen – Die 
Wirtschaft als Partner der Entwicklungspolitik, BMZ 
Strategiepapier 3 / 2011.
1 8 15 0.53
BMZ 2012 Armut wirksamer bekämpfen – weltweit! Übersektora-
les Konzept zur Armutsreduzierung, BMZ Strategiepa-
per 6 / 2012.
0 2 18 0.11
BMZ 2013 Förderung einer nachhaltigen Landwirtschaft – 
entwicklungspolitisches Konzept, BMZ Strategiepapier 
3 / 2013.
0 8 23 0.35
BMZ 2013 Sektorkonzept Privatwirtschaftsförderung, BMZ 
Strategiepapier 9 / 2013.
1 10 30 0.33
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Table 8. BMZ country strategy papers and priority area strategies (“Schwerpunktstrategien”) analysed
BMZ COUNTRY STRATEGY PAPERS
Publisher Year Title
BMZ 2006 Länderkonzept Senegal
BMZ 2006 Namibia. Länderkonzept zur Entwicklungszusammenarbeit
BMZ 2007 Mosambik. Länderkonzept 2007 – 2009
BMZ 2010 Länderkonzept Nepal
BMZ 2012 Länderstrategie Mongolei
BMZ 2008 Länderkonzept Äthiopien74
BMZ 2009 Rwanda Länderkonzept
PRIORITY AREA STRATEGIES
Publisher Year Title Mentions of 
“trade”
Pages 
(without 
cover)
Mentions 
per page
BMZ 2008 Priority Area Strategy Paper Sustainable Land 
Management
0 12 0
Deutsch-Senegalesische Zusammenarbeit 2009 Schwerpunktstrategiepapier Senegal Nachhaltige 
Wirtschaftsentwicklung
3 9 0.3
BMZ 2009 Schwerpunktstrategiepapier Ruanda Nachhaltige 
Wirtschaftsentwicklung
10 12 0.8
BMZ 2009 Burkina Faso. Promotion d’une agriculture durable. 
Document de stratégie pour le pôle prioritaire 
d’intervention
0 10 0
BMZ 2010 Schwerpunktstrategiepapier Transport in Namibia 0 12 0
Lao-German development cooperation 2011 Joint Strategy for the Priority Area “Sustainable 
Economic Development”
8 13 0.62
Lao-German development cooperation 2011 Joint Strategy for the Priority Area “Rural Develop-
ment in Poor Regions of the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic (PDR)”
1 16 0.06
Namibian-German development 
cooperation
2012 Schwerpunktstrategiepapier Nachhaltige Wirt schafts-
entwicklung in Namibia
5 10 0.5
Deutsch-Mosambikanische 
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit
2012 Schwerpunktstrategiepapier Nachhaltige Wirt schafts-
entwicklung 2012 – 2015
22 12 1.8
74  Even though “trade“ („Handel“) is not mentioned in the Ethiopian country concept, the word “export” is mentioned eight times.
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Table 9. Partner countries’ national development strategies
Publisher Country Year Title
Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Development
Ethiopia 2010 Growth and Transformation Plan 2010 / 11–2014 / 15 – Volume I
Committee for Planning and Investment Laos 2006 National Socio-Economic Development Plan (2006 – 2010)
Ministry of Planning and Investment Laos 2011 The Seventh Five-Year National Socio-Economic Development Plan 
(2011 – 2015) 
Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Trade 
Development Facility
Laos 2011 Trade Facilitation Strategic Plan for Lao PDR (2011 – 2015)
Government of Mongolia Mongolia 2004 Poverty Reduction Strategy Implementation Progress Report
Republic of Mozambique Mozambique 2006 Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty 2006 – 2009
Republic of Mozambique Mozambique 2011 Poverty Reduction Action Plan (PARP) 2011 – 2014
Office of the President,
National Planning Commission
Namibia Namibia’s Fourth National Development Plan 2012 / 2013 – 2016 / 2017
Government of Nepal, Ministry of 
Commerce and Supplies
Nepal 2010 Nepal Trade Integration Strategy 2010. Executive Summary and Action 
Matrix
National Planning Commission Nepal 2005 An Assessment of the Implementation of the Tenth Plan. Second Progress 
Report on the Road to Freedom from Poverty
Republic of Rwanda Rwanda 2013 Shaping our Development: Economic Development and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy 2013 – 2018
Republic of Senegal Senegal 2006 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
Republic of Senegal Senegal 2012 National Strategy for Economic and Social Development 2013–2017
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Table 10. Project documents received for analysis from GIZ
Number BMZ-Number Project Title Country CRS code TD
1 2011.2217.5 Support to quality infrastructure Ethiopia 25010 2
2 2004.2060.4 Sustainable utilisation of natural resources for improved food security Ethiopia 31130 0
3 2012.9761.3 Agriculture Ethiopia 31130 0
4 2011.2134.275 Sustainable land management Ethiopia 31130 1
5 2008.2077.976 Sustainable land management Ethiopia 31130 1
6 2012.9766.2 Implementation of participatory forest management (PFM) in or adjacent 
areas of the SLM-programme
Ethiopia 31220 0
7 2008.2076.1 Engineering capacity building programme (ECBP Ethiopia 32110 1
8 2005.2029.6 Engineering capacity building programme (ECBP) Ethiopia 32120 2
9 2012.9752.2 Erosion and soil fertility protection and recuperation of degraded surface Burkina Faso 31120 0
10 2005.2182.3 Agricultural development programme Burkina Faso 31120 1
11 2011.2047.6 Agricultural development programme Burkina Faso 31120 1
12 2008.2171.077 Agricultural development programme Burkina Faso 31120 1
13 2006.2108.6 Reform of public finance Ghana 24010 0
14 2009.9082.0 Innovative insurance products for adaptation to climate change Ghana 24010 0
15 2009.2047.0 Programme for sustainable economic development Ghana 24040 1
16 2006.2007.0 Programme for sustainable economic development Ghana 25010 2
17 2011.2205.0 Promotion of market-oriented agriculture Ghana 31110 1
18 2011.9758.1 Climate change adaptation of agro-ecosystems in Ghana Ghana 31110 0
19 2012.2105.0 Promotion of market-oriented agriculture Ghana 31110 1
20 2007.2180.3 Market-oriented agriculture Programme Ghana 31191 2
21 2005.2027.0 FORUM Forest protection and resource use management project, Volta 
region
Ghana 31220 0
22 2008.2044.9 Microfinance in rural areas – access to finance for the poor Laos 24040 0
23 2009.2295.5 Microfinance in rural areas – access to finance for the poor Laos 24040 0
24 2002.2478.2 Development of market economy with a special focus on the development 
of human resources
Laos 25010 2
25 2006.2112.8 Development of market economy with a special focus on the development 
of human Resources
Laos 25010 2
26 2009.2296.3 Development of market economy with a special focus on the development 
of human resources
Laos 25010 2
27 2008.2045.678 Climate protection through avoided deforestation (REDD in Laos) Laos 31210 0
28 2012.2256.1 Forest law enforcement, governance and trade Laos 31210 1
29 2008.2024.1 Inclusive development of the economy Nepal 25010 2
75 This project is marked as a co-financed project.
76 This project is marked as a co-financed project.
77 This project is marked as a co-financed project.
78 This project is marked as a co-financed project.
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Number BMZ-Number Project Title Country CRS code TD
30 2012.2201.7 Inclusive development of the economy Nepal 25010 2
31 2008.2168.6 Support of microfinance services in rural areas Tajikistan 24030 2
32 2003.2207.3 Support of microfinance services in rural areas Tajikistan 24040 0
33 2010.2106.2 Framework and finance for private-sector development in Tajikistan Tajikistan 25010 2
34 2012.9756.3 Adaptation to climate change through sustainable forest management Tajikistan 31220 0
35 2008.2169.4 Support of SMEs in Tajikistan Tajikistan 32130 0
36 2004.2208.9 Support of SMEs in Tajikistan Tajikistan 32130 2
37 2010.2054.4 Financial system development in Uganda Uganda 24010 1
38 2007.2054.079 Programme financial system development in Uganda Uganda 24010 0
Source: GIZ project list, 2014
Table 11. Project CRS codes and trade development marker (GIZ)
CRS Code Description Number of projects 
implemented by GIZ
TD 1 TD 2
24010 Banking and financial services – financial policy and administrative management 4 1
24030 Banking and financial services – formal sector financial intermediaries 1 1
24040 Banking and financial services – informal / semi-formal financial intermediaries 4 1
25010 Business and other service – business support services and institutions 8 8
31110 Agriculture – agricultural policy and administrative management 3 2
31120 Agriculture – agricultural development 5 3
31130 Agriculture – agricultural land resources 3 2
31191 Agriculture – agricultural services 1 1
31210 Forestry – forestry policy and administrative management 1 1
31220 Forestry – forestry development 3
32110 Industry – industrial policy and administrative management 1 1
32120 Industry – industrial development 1 1
32130 Industry – small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) development 2 1
Total 38 11 12
Source: GIZ project documents, 2014
79 This project is marked as a co-financed project.
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Table 12. Project documents received for analysis from KfW
No Project No Project title German Project title English Country CRS Trade marker
1 20195 PEJU I PEJU I Senegal 24040 TD 1
2 20604 Inwertsetzung von Talauen (VP) Enhancement of floodplains (VP) Burkina Faso 31140 TD 1
3 21415 Katastrophenvorsorge-Finanzsektorpro-
gramm (Inv.)
KV-Programme Financial system (Inv.) Mozambique 24030 TD 1
4 21416 SOCREMO – MSC SOCREMO − MSC Mozambique 24030 TD 1
5 21531 Aufbau von Finanzinstitutionen 
(Schwerpunktprogramm Finanzsektor 
Namibia) (Inv.) (VP)
Organisation of finance institutions 
(Focus programme financial system 
Namibia) (Inv.) (VP)
Namibia 24030 TD 1
6 21541 Programm Beschäftigungsförderung für 
Jugendliche im städtischen Raum
Programme Employment promotion for 
the youth in urban areas
Senegal 24040 TD 1
7 21638 KKU-Förderung (Kapazitätsaufbau für 
Wirtschaftsentwicklung)
SME-Promotion (capacity building 
economy development)
Ethiopia 24030 TD 1
8 21978 Mikrofinanzierung II 
(KfW-Treuhandmittel)
Microfinance II (KfW-Trust) Ghana 24030 TD 1
9 21981 Förderung Fina Mikrofinanzbank 
(KfW-Treuhandmittel)
Promotion finance microfinance bank 
(KfW-Trust)
Rwanda 24040 TD 1
10 22116 Katastrophenvorsorge-Finanzsektorpro-
gramm (BM)
KV-Programme Financial system 
(accompanying measures)
Mozambique 24030 TD 1
11 22162 Aufbau von Finanzinstitutionen (FV) Organisation of finance institutions (FV) Namibia 24081 TD 1
12 22176 Eigenkapitalbeteiligung an der Mikrofi-
nanzbank (THB) (KfW-Treuhandmittel)
Microfinance bank: participation in 
equity capital (THB) (KfW-Trust)
Namibia 24030 TD 1
13 22335 Programm Entwicklung des 
Finanzsektors
Programme Development of the financial 
system
Uganda 24010 TD 1
14 22558 Katastrophenvorsorge-Finanzsektorpro-
gramm Banco Terra (THB) (Inv.)
KV-Programme Financial system Banco 
Terra (THB)(Inv.)
Mozambique 24030 TD 1
15 22559 KV-Finanzsektorprogramm Banco Terra 
(BM)
KV-Programme Financial system Banco 
Terra (accompanying measures)
Mozambique 24030 TD 1
16 22567 KfW-Treuhandbeteiligung an der mongo-
lischen Mikrobank XAC (BM) (THB)
KfW-Trustholding Mongolian Rural Bank 
XAC (accompanying measures) (THB)
Mongolia 24030 TD 1
17 22642 Mikrofinanzierung II Wholesale 
Microfinance Facility
Microfinance II 
Wholesale Microfinance Facility
Ghana 24081 TD 1
18 22643 Mikrofinanzierung II MFI (AF) Microfinance II MFI (AF) Ghana 24081 TD 1
19 22837 PEJU I (A+F) ACEP PEJU I (A+F) ACEP Senegal 24081 TD 1
20 23160 Förderung der Finanzsystementwicklung 
("Mobile Banking") (Inv.)
Promotion of financial service develop-
ment (“mobile banking”) (Inv.)
Senegal 24030 TD 1
21 23196 Nachhaltige Agrarwirtschaftsförderung Promotion of sustainable agrarian 
economy
Burkina Faso 31120 TD 1
22 23209 Katastrophenvorsorge-Finanzsystement-
wicklung / Mikrofinanzprogramm II
KV-Financial system development/
microfinance programme II
Uganda 24030 TD 1
23 24000 Förderung des Hypothekarkreditwesens 
(BM)
Promotion of the hypothecary credit 
system (accompanying measures)
Mongolia 24030 TD 1
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24 24470 Fonds zur Förderung der marktorientier-
ten Landwirtschaft Phase II (VPT)
Funds to promote market-oriented 
agriculture phase II (VPT)
Ghana 31120 TD 1
25 24933 Ländliche Finanzdienstleistungen Rural financial services Ghana 31193 TD 1
26 24934 Ländliche Finanzdienstleistungen (BM) Rural financial services (accompanying 
measures)
Ghana 31193 TD 1
27 25196 Inwertsetzung von Talauen II Enhancement of floodplains II Burkina Faso 31140 TD 1
28 26679 Programm Wirtschafts − und Be-
schäftigungsförderung − Förderung 
Mikrofinanzsektor
Programme Economy and employment 
promotion – promotion of the microfi-
nance System
Rwanda 24030 TD 1
29 26763 Banco Terra (Treuhand) Banco Terra (Trust) Mozambique 24030 TD 1
30 27495 Kleinbewässerung im Großraum West Small-scale irrigation west Burkina Faso 31120 TD 1
31 27506 Challenge Fund II (VPT) Challenge Fund II (VPT) Rwanda 24040 TD 1
32 27742 Förderung der Finanzsystementwicklung 
("Mobile Banking") (BM)
Promotion of financial system develop-
ment („mobile banking“) – accompanying 
measures
Senegal 24030 TD 1
33 27946 Nachhaltige Agrarwirtschaftsförderung Promotion of sustainable agrarian 
economy 
Burkina Faso 31120 TD 1
34 28491 Fonds zur Förderung der marktorientier-
ten Landwirtschaft Phase II (BM)
Funds to promote market-oriented 
agriculture phase II (accompanying 
measures)
Ghana 31120 TD 1
35 28631 Challenge Fund (A&F) Challenge Fund (A&F) Rwanda 24040 TD 1
36 28670 Finanzsektorprogramm (Investition) Programme Financial sector (investment) Tajikistan 24081 TD 1
37 28671 Finanzsektorprogramm, BM Programme Financial Sector (accompa-
nying measures)
Tajikistan 24030 TD 1
38 28723 Förderung von erneuerbaren Energien 
und Energieeffizienz
Promotion of renewable energy and 
energy efficiency 
Senegal 24030 TD 1
39 28936 Nachhaltige Wirtschaftsentwicklung − 
KKMU Förderung
Programme Development of sustainable 
economy – promotion of SSMEs
Mozambique 24030 TD 1
40 29520 Programm Nachhaltige Wirtschaftsent-
wicklung – Finanzsektorförderung
Programme Development of sustainable 
economy – promotion of the financial 
system
Mozambique 24030 TD 1
41 29551 Komponente 1 (Inv.): KKMU Kreditlinie 
und EE / EE Kreditlinie
Constituent 1 (Inv.): SSME credit 
guideline and EE / EE credit guideline
Mozambique 24030 TD 1
42 29552 Komponente 1 (BM): Begleitmaßnahme 
zu den MSME und EE / EE-Kreditlinien
Constituent 1: accompanying measures 
to MSME and EE / EE credit guidelines 
Mozambique 24030 TD 1
43 29553 Komponente 2: Branchless Banking Constituent 2: Branchless Banking Mozambique 24030 TD 1
44 29554 Komponente 3 (Inv.) 
Einlagensicherungsfonds
Constituent 3 (INV.): Deposit guarantee 
funds
Mozambique 24030 TD 1
45 29555 Komponente 3 (BM): Begleitmaßnahme 
zur Einlagensicherung und Weltspartag
Constituent 3: Accompanying measures 
to deposit guarantee and international 
savings day
Mozambique 24030 TD 1
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46 29653 Mikrofinanzierung III (Begleitmaßnahme) Microfinance III (accompanying 
measures)
Ghana 24030 TD 1
47 30491 Programm Entwicklung der 
Agrarfinanzierung
Programme Development of agrarian 
financing
Uganda 24030 TD 1
48 31002 Mikrofinanzierung III (Ländliche 
Mikrofinanzierung)
Microfinance III (Microfinance in rural 
areas)
Ghana 24030 TD 1
49 31321 FZ-Förderkredit an ACLEDA Laos FZ Development loan ACLEDA Laos Laos 24030 TD-1
50 31417 Nachhaltige Wirtschaftsförderung im 
ländlichen Raum
Promotion of sustainable economy in 
rural areas
Nepal 31162 TD 2
51 31609 Komponente 4 (BM): Begleitmaßnahme 
Finanzielle Grundbildung
Constituent 4 (accompanying measures): 
Basic financial education
Mozambique 24030 TD 1
52 31610 Komponente 5 (BM): Begleitmaßnahme 
Beratungsleistungen für MSME
Constituent 5 (accompanying measures): 
Advisory service for MSME
Mozambique 24030 TD 1
53 32186 Einrichtung der Institution Kreditbüro Implementation of the institution Credit 
Agency
Mozambique 24030 TD 1
54 32187 Finanzierung Wertschöpfungsketten/
Agri-Finance
Financing value chains / agri-finance Mozambique 24030 TD 1
55 32203 Programm Wirtschafts − und Be-
schäftigungsförderung − Förderung 
Mikrofinanzsektor
Programme Economy and employment 
promotion – promotion microfinance 
system
Rwanda 24030 TD 1
56 32210 Nachhaltige Agrarwirtschaftsförderung Promotion of sustainable agrarian 
economy
Burkina Faso 31120 TD 1
57 32453 Programm Entwicklung der Agrarfinan-
zierung (BM)
Programme Development of agrarian 
financing (accompanying measures)
Uganda 24030 TD 1
58 32574 Kleinbewässerung im Großraum West 
(VPT)
Small-scale irrigation West (VPT) Burkina Faso 31120 TD 1
Source: KfW project list, 2014
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Table 13. Projects’ CRS codes and trade development marker (KfW)
CRS Code Description Number of projects TD-1 TD-2
24010 Banking and financial services – financial policy and administrative management 1 1
24030 Banking and financial services – formal sector financial intermediaries 35 35
24040 Banking and financial services – informal/semi-formal financial intermediaries 5 5
24081 Banking and financial services – education/training in banking and financial services 5 5
31120 Agriculture – agricultural development 7 7
31140 Agriculture – agricultural water resources 2 2
31162 Agriculture – industrial crops/export crops 1 1
31193 Agriculture – agricultural financial services 2 2
Total 58 57 1
Source: KfW project documents, 2014
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